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1. 
Introduction 
The only bodies directly amenable to European Convention' challenges under the 
Human Rights Act 1998 are public authorities.^ The three species are courts and 
tribunals,'' 'core' public authorities and 'hybrid' public authorities, the latter 
being private persons who perform 'functions of a public nature' and a particular, 
public, act."* The courts have grappled to disappointing effect with the meaning of 
the public authority provisions since the HRA's entry into force. In particular, 
they have attracted concentrated and sustained criticism for their restrictive 
treatment of 'functions of a public nature', which treatment has left the law 'out 
of step with reality' by excluding an overwhelming majority of private providers 
from the scope of s 6(3)(b) when providing public services on behalf of local and 
central government.^ In March 2007, the Joint Committee on Human Rights 
adopted its predecessor's observations on the 'highly problematic' resultant 
human rights implications, particularly for the elderly and infirm recipients of 
such services,^ declaring it 'a matter of some urgency to consider what action is 
' European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (1950) 
( E C H R ) . 
- Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA) , s 6(1). 
' Ibid., s 6(3)(a). 
' Ibid., ss 6(3)(b) and 6(5). 
' The Joint Committee on Human Rights' Ninth Report of Session 2006-07, 'The Meaning of 
Public Authority under the Human Rights Act' H L (2006-07) 77, H C (2006-07)410 [4]. 
* Ibid., [3], affirming the Seventh Report of Session, 'The Meaning of Public Authority under the 
Human Rights Act' H L (2003-04) 39, H C (2003-04) 382. 
necessary to bring about a solution.'^ In June of that year however, a bare 
majority of the House of Lords reaffirmed the restrictive approach in YL v 
Birmingham City Council by ruling that a private provider of care and 
accommodation acting on behalf of a local authority was not exercising 
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'functions of a public nature' under s 6(3)(b). The Human Rights Act 1998 
(Meaning of Public Function) B i l l / currently before the House of Commons and 
due for Second Reading on 17 October 2008, was introduced by the Joint 
Committee's Chairman to 'reinstate unambiguously the wide interpretation of the 
term "public function" [sic] that was understood to be the meaning... when the 
Act was passed'.'" It is hoped that Parliament will do so in a convincing, 
coherent and workable fashion. 
In the meantime however, the Health and Social Care Act 2008 (HSCA) received 
the Royal Assent on 21 July 2008. Section 145(1), not yet in force, aims to 
address the immediate care home problem: 
'A person ("P") who provides accommodation, together with nursing or personal care, in 
a care home for an individual under arrangements made with P under... [inter alia, ss 21 
and 26 of the National Assistance Act 1948"] is to be taken for the purposes of 
subsection (3)(b) of section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998... to be exercising a 
fijnction of a public nature in doing so...' 
'Ibid., [ I I ] . 
' [2007] UK.HL 27, [2008] 1 A C 95. The Joint Committee on Human Rights supported the 
minority approach in its Eighteenth Report of Session 2006-07, T h e Human Rights of Older 
People in Healthcare' H L (2006-07) 156-1, H C (2006-07) 378-1 [159]. 
' Human Rights Act 1998 (Meaning of Public Function) H C Bill (2007-2008) [45]. 
'° Hansard H C vol 469 col 739 (18 December 2007) (Mr Andrew Dismore MP). 
" H S C A , s 145(2)(a). 
The HSCA is not a panacea. Section 145(1) applies only to care homes and not to 
other private providers of central and local government services; the Joint 
Committee's Chairman, whilst welcoming the 'interim solution' in the HSCA, 
stressed during the passage of the HSCA through Parliament that he would 
continue to pursue a more general reinterpretation of 'functions of a public 
nature' through the Human Rights Act 1998 (Meaning of Public Function) Bill . '^ 
Additionally, the HSCA does not distinguish a care home's 'private' acts from its 
public ones, as required by s 6(5) HRA. This is an unfortunate omission given 
that under s 6(5), private persons performing public functions are only required 
to comply with the Convention in respect of public acts.'"' 
With these observations in mind, the thorough doctrinal analysis which follows 
in this thesis of the meaning of the 'public authority' and related provisions 
within the HRA seems timely. Despite the recent enactment of the HSCA, the 
thesis makes extensive and deliberate reference to the care home context for 
three reasons. First, s 145 HSCA is not yet the applicable law of the land. Until it 
enters into force, the House of Lords' ruling in YL remains the authoritative 
statement on the meaning of 'functions of a public nature' under s 6(3)(b) HRA 
in that context. Second, the judicial dicta in care home cases often apply more 
widely to other instances of contracting out, and wider still to the general scope 
of s 6(3)(b). It is therefore difficuh to try to conduct a searching analysis of the 
meaning of 'public authority' in isolation from the care home context. Third, s 
145 HSCA, even when in force, will not without more have clearly overruled the 
result in YL that private care home providers are not hybrid public authorities. 
Hansard H C vol 472 col 47 (18 February 2008) (Mr Andrew Dismore MP). 
H R A , s 6(5): 'In relation to a particular act, a person is not a public authority by virtue only of 
subsection (3)(b) if the nature of the act is private.' 
The HSCA's failure to address the application of s 6(5) is likely to preserve the 
controversy over the scope of the public authority provisions in the care home 
context by igniting an alternative and equally intense debate on the distinction 
between 'public' and 'private' acts. Chapters 3 and 5 illustrate the difficulties 
which might confront care home users seeking to deploy their Convention rights 
against service providers without a direct action under s 6(3)(b); their findings 
are pertinent, lest judges instinctively opposed to the application of Convention 
rights in the private sphere attempt to exploit the uncertainty surrounding s 6(5) 
in order to cast the hybrid public authority net narrowly. 
I proffer an original and expanded 'two-strand' approach to the hybrid public 
authority provisions in Chapter 6. First, however, I challenge three traditional 
assumptions concerning the hybrid public authority concept. The first is that the 
oft-neglected 'core' public authority concept plays little or no part in the 
interpretation of 'functions of a public nature' under s 6(3)(b). Chapter 4 
demonstrates in the course of its lengthy analysis that the essential distinction 
between core public authorities and private persons rests upon that between 
selflessness on the one hand, and selfishness on the other. Not only does this 
finding represent a significant first principle from which to infer the meaning of 
'funcfions of a public nature' under s 6(3)(b), but its reflection in Strasbourg 
jurisprudence concerning 'state' and 'citizen' also aids in the deconstruction of 
the second traditional assumption, namely that Strasbourg jurisprudence serves 
as a relevant interpretative aid to s 6(3)(b). As Chapter 5 shows, in its current 
form, Strasbourg jurisprudence evinces no doctrine of hybridity and is relevant 
only to the interpretation of the core public authority concept. This in turn 
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counters the third assumpfion, namely that hybrid public authorities are incapable 
of relying on their own Convention rights when performing 'functions of a public 
nature'. 
Before proceeding with the analysis however, I consider two preliminary issues. 
The first is the effect of the duties to take into account Strasbourg jurisprudence 
under s 2 HRA, and to interpret legislation as far as possible in a Convention-
friendly manner under s 3. Chapter 2 questions academic commentators who 
perceive a general warrant through s 2 to expand on the level of protection 
available in Strasbourg, but notes due to Strasbourg's irrelevance to s 6(3)(b) that 
this conclusion would bear only upon the core public authority concept. 
Regarding s 3 HRA, Chapter 2 doubts that s 3 could lend direct support to the 
argument that 'functions of a public nature' should be read more expansively. 
However, Chapter 6 observes that s 3 could apply so as to preserve the 
Convention rights of hybrid public authorities, weakening the arguments in 
favour of interpreting s 6(3)(b) narrowly. 
The second preliminary issue is the extent to which Convention rights can 
already be applied domestically so as to alter the legal relationships between 
private individuals. 'Horizontal effect', as it is known, can occur through the 
courts' duties as public authorities to act compatibly with the ECHR when 
developing the common law, or through the injunction in s 3 - which draws no 
distinction between disputes involving a public authority and those involving 
only private persons - to interpret legislation compatibly with the Convention. 
Chapter 3 argues that the first form of horizontal effect, properly understood. 
11 
requires the courts only to apply the values underlying the Convention rights 
rather than the rights themselves when developing the common law. Chapter 3 
then applies these findings, in conjunction with the courts' current treatment of s 
3 HRA, to YUs care home context in order to illustrate the difficulties which 
recipients of contracted out services might face when trying to vindicate their 
rights against service providers without a direct action under s 6(3)(b). 
Chapter 7 draws together the main strands to the analysis and concludes that the 
hybrid public authority concept is a sheep in wolfs clothing when analysed 
against the framework of the HRA and ECHR. All ss 6(3)(b) and 6(5) would 
appear to do is to allow a private complainant the opportunity to air his grievance 
in court against a private defendant exercising 'functions of a public nature' and 
performing a particular, public act. When in court however, the litigants remain 
private individuals and the defendant hybrid public authority retains the ability to 
utilise the indirect horizontal effect of the Convention by deploying its rights 
against the court as any other private person could. Section 6(3)(b) is not a 
provision whose application to contracted out service providers the judiciary 
should fear. 
12 
2. 
The Effect of Sections 2 and 3 HRA 
Before conducting a detailed analysis of the term 'public authority' within the 
HRA, it is necessary to consider the preliminary issues of how ss 2 and 3 might 
affect its width. Both ss 2 and 3 are capable at first sight of affecting the ordinary 
meaning of the public authority provisions by injecting relevant Strasbourg 
jurisprudence for consideration from abroad (s 2) and by requiring a Convention-
compatible reading of domestic legislafion as far as possible (s 3). It is argued 
that whilst s 2 may dictate to some extent the meaning of the core public 
authority concept (since it is not clear from s 2 that a general warrant exists to 
extend the level of protection provided for by Strasbourg), neither provision can 
be deployed to manipulate the meaning of the term 'fijnctions of a public nature' 
within s 6(3 )(b) and thereby widen - or narrow - the category of hybrid public 
authorities beyond the boundaries set by an interpretation using ordinary 
principles of statutory construction. Each of ss 2 and 3 are analysed in turn. 
A. TAKING STRASBOURG JURISPRUDENCE INTO ACCOUNT 
Section 2(1) HRA provides that 'A court or tribunal determining a question 
which has arisen in connection with a Convention right must take into account 
any... [Strasbourg jurisprudence] whenever made or given, so far as... is 
relevant'.''* Senior judges appear to have treated s 2(1) largely as a duty to follow 
Strasbourg jurisprudence,'^ even though this does not on its face appear to be 
what s 2(1) requires. This approach has generated criticism notably from 
Masterman,'^ Wicks'^ and L e w i s , w h o propose alternative solutions such as 
treating Strasbourg jurisprudence as persuasive rather than binding authority'^ or 
taking into account broad Strasbourg principles rather than jurisprudence as 
such.^° These commentators' criticisms contain two distinct threads. The first 
thread I refer to as 'generic' criticisms, which relate to the undesirability in given 
circumstances of domestic courts binding themselves to particular Strasbourg 
rulings. An example would be that states are only bound in Strasbourg to abide 
by rulings to which they are parties and that certain rulings may therefore be 
unsuitable for other states to follow if, for instance, they rely on margins of 
appreciation not designed for those states. '^ A further example of generic 
criticism is that a Strasbourg ruling's age can sometimes make it a questionable 
authority to apply.^^ Hence, domestic courts may decline to follow such rulings 
and, indirectly, expand on Strasbourg protection in these circumstances. 
Emphasis added. 
See e.g. R (Alconbury Developments Ltd) v Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport 
and the Regions [2001] U K H L 23, [2003] 2 A C 295 [26] (Lord Slynn), cited with approval in R 
(Anderson) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2002] U K H L 46, [2003] I A C 837 
[ 18] (Lord Bingham); R (Animal Defenders International) v Secretary of State for Culture. Media 
and Sport [2008] U K H L 15, [2008] 2 W L R 781 [37] (Lord Bingham). 
R. Masterman, 'Section 2(1) of the Human Rights Act 1998: binding domestic courts to 
Strasbourg?' [2004] P L 725. 
E . Wicks, 'Taking Account O f Strasbourg? The British Judiciary's Approach To Interpreting 
Convention Rights' (2005) 11(3) E P L 405. 
" J . Lewis, 'The European ceiling on human rights' [2007] PL 720. 
" Masterman (fti 16) 736. 
20 Ibid., 735. See also Lewis (fh 18) 747. 
'^ Masterman (fh 16) 728-730. For a fuller account, see Wicks (fn 17) 406-407 and 414 and R. 
Clayton, 'The Human Rights Act six years on: where are we now?' [2007] E H R L R 11, 18-19. 
Wicks (/*;^ .^) 408-409. 
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The second and more implicit 'expansionist' thread to the commentators' 
criticisms argues that domestic courts should not bind themselves to Strasbourg 
jurisprudence under s 2 because it fetters their apparently general discretion to 
depart from Convention jurisprudence by offering greater protection to 
Convention rights than Strasbourg would allow for.^^ 
A detailed critique of the first thread is beyond the scope of this chapter, partly 
due to lack of space and partly because it is only the second thread which relates 
directly to the scope of Convention protection and hence to the width of the 
definition of 'public authorities' against whom Convention rights can be 
domestically enforced. Additionally, the thrust of the 'generic' criticism is that 
there will be individual circumstances where it is inappropriate to follow 
Strasbourg rulings. This is a sensible proposition, and one with which domestic 
courts seem to agree by reserving situations of 'good reason' which allow them 
to depart from Strasbourg rulings despite an approach that otherwise closely 
follows that jurisprudence.'^'' Although the precise content and boundaries of 
'good reason' are unclear, they could include a decision by Strasbourg 
'fundamentally at odds with the separation of powers under the British 
constitution'^^ or, as Lewis observes, legally erroneous or unclear and outdated 
Strasbourg jurisprudence.^^ Such circumstances, I suggest, are adequately 
explicable by reference to Parliament's intent: when reading together the court's 
See Wicks (ibid.); Masterman (fh 16) 725-726; S. Grosz, J . Beatson and P. Duffy, Human 
Rights: The 1998 Act and the European Convention (Sweet & Maxwell, London 2000) 20. 
Anderson (fri 15) [ 18] (Lord Bingham); R (Amin) v Secretary of State for the Home Department 
[2003] U K H L 51, [2004] 1 A C 653 [44] (Lord Slynn). 
Alconburyifn 15) [76] (Lord Hoffmann). 
Lewis (fn 18) 730-731, citing R v Lyons (No. 3) [2002] U K H L 44, [2003] 1 A C 976 and 
Hansard H L vol 583 col 514 (18 November 1997) (Lord Irvine of Lairg). See further R. 
Masterman, 'Aspiration or foundation? The status of the Strasbourg jurisprudence and the 
"Convention rights" in domestic law' in H. Fenwick, G. Phillipson and R. Masterman (eds), 
Judicial Reasoning under the UK Human Rights Act (CUP, Cambridge 2007) 72. 
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duties to act compatibly with the Convention and to take Convention 
jurisprudence into account, it is arguable i f not obvious that Parliament would 
not intend such jurisprudence to be followed - even at the risk of denying a 
domestic Convention remedy - i f it emasculated existing constitutional principle 
such as the separation of powers or was legally erroneous or temporally 'stale'.^^ 
Hence, I wish to focus on the second thread. Although space does preclude a full 
analysis of the issue,^ ^ the second thread, in my opinion, is not obviously correct 
in contending that domestic courts possess a general warrant under s 2 to expand 
on the level of Convention protection that Strasbourg would give. In A'^  v 
Secretary of State for the Home Departments^ Lord Hope (with whom Lords 
Nicholls, Walker and Brown agreed) stated that: 
'[Allowing the applicant's appeal] would amount to an extension of the... [Strasbourg 
jurisprudence]. As I said at the start of this opinion, it is not open to the national court to 
extend the scope of the Convention in this way.''" 
Expansionists crificise this approach, highlighting s 2(1 )'s non-binding wording 
('take into account') and the government's views during the passage of the Bill 
through Parliament that domestic courts would be 'free to give a lead to Europe 
Oswan V United Kingdom (App no 23452/94) (2000) 29 E H R R 245 might be regarded by 
domestic courts as a legally erroneous judgment: Lord Hoffmann, 'Human Rights and the House 
of Lords' (1999) 62 M L R 159, 162. McCann v United Kingdom (App no 19009/04) [2008] 
B L G R 474 may be another: Doherty v Birmingham City Council [2008] U K H L 57, [2008] 3 
W L R 636 [20] (Lord Hope) and [82] (Lord Scott). 
As Wicks (fh 17) observes, the true meaning of s 2 relates to the more complex concepts of 
public international law, such as the status and appropriateness of each of the doctrines of 
monism and dualism in English law: 412-413. 
[2005] U K H L 31, [2005] 2 A C 296. 
Ibid., [52]. See also [71] (Baroness Hale). 
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as well as be led.'''' In response, it is unclear that, in the government's eyes, 
'giving a lead' to Strasbourg necessarily meant a general ability to expand on the 
scope of protecfion for which Strasbourg would allow. The example which Lord 
Irvine gave of domestic courts appropriately 'giving a lead' to Strasbourg was of 
an instance 'where there has been no precise ruling on the matter and a 
commission opinion which does so has not taken into account subsequent 
Strasbourg court case law.'"*" Additionally, the scheme of the HRA as a whole 
seems to seek only to guarantee compatibility with the Convention rather than 
additional protection beyond what Strasbourg would give.''^ Although Lewis 
would attempt to counter this by arguing that the differing schemes of the ECHR 
and HRA could indicate a different and more expansive reading of 'Convention 
rights' under the HRA,"'* Lewis' 'discovery' of the HRA's intention to develop a 
divergent and expanded set of rights is questionable. An expanded set of 
domestic rights risks undermining Parliament's basic intention to make 
Convention rights domestically enforceable, since a more extensive reading of 
'Convention rights' would render it less likely that courts could read legislation 
Convention-compatibly under s 3 HRA and more likely that they would issue a 
declaration of incompatibility under s 4.^ ^ Moreover, a divergent domestic 
'^ Masterman (fti 16) 729, citing Hansard H L vol 583 col 514(18 November 1997) (Lord Irvine 
of Lairg). See also Grosz, Beatson and Duffy (fti 23) 20 and Wicks (fn 17) 409. 
-^ Hansard (ibid) (Lord Irvine of Lairg). See further Hansard H L vol 584 col 1269 (19 January 
1998) (Lord Lester of Heme Hill). 
" This is apparent fi-om the text of ss 3(1), 4(2), 10(1), 6(1) and 19(1). Masterman argues that 
'Equal attention must be paid to the aims of . , [the Convention]' in order to infer principles such 
as the need for national authorities 'to further realise human rights and fundamental freedoms': R. 
Masterman, 'Taking the Sfrasbourg jurisprudence into account: developing a "municipal law of 
human rights" under the Human Rights Act' (2005) 54 I C L Q 907, 920 and 912 (emphasis 
added). This is attractive and would circumvent the obstacle of the HRA's focus on compatibility 
but, I suggest, risks diverting the courts' attention - at the expense of Parliament's obvious 
intention - away fi-om judgments, decisions and opinions of the Strasbourg organs to which s 2 
instructs the courts to have regard. 
Lewis (fh 18)724-725. 
" C f Phillipson (fh 50 and fh 53), whose theory of self-reflection (see Part B below) would 
produce a maximal reading of the words 'so far as it is possible' under s 3, thus rendering Lewis' 
17 
meaning of 'Convention rights' would deprive Strasbourg of a useful dialogue 
with national courts which sees those courts giving a reasoned and thorough 
exposition of the Convention's requirements from which Strasbourg can then 
draw.^ ^ The efforts of the domestic courts are of far less use if, as Lewis 
contends, their analytical exercises relate more to constitutionally idiosyncratic 
'municipal rights' than the Convention itself 
Impact on the 'Public Authority' Provisions 
Given the above findings, this chapter treats expansionist criticisms with caution; 
it is not clear that courts possess a general warrant to expand on the level of 
protection offered in Strasbourg. 
How does this conclusion relate to the 'public authority' provisions under s 6 
HRA? Since the ECHR is an international treaty, only states can be liable in 
Strasbourg. As Quane explains, the state's international responsibility can be 
engaged in two ways.^ ^ First, the organs of the state can behave in ways which 
breach the rights of the individual. I shall call this 'active' liability. Second, the 
state may be under a positive obligation to intervene to prevent the interference 
by a private individual with another private individual's Convention rights. 1 
shall call this 'passive liability'. Passive liability, i.e. the law on positive 
expanded meaning of 'Convention rights' less of a practical obstacle to the use of s 3. Space 
precludes a fuller analysis of the issue. However, self-reflection theory, I respectfully suggest, is 
not obviously correct. By producing a maximal reading of the words 'so far as it is possible', it 
appears to shrink to vanishing point Parliament's role in securing rights protection. This is 
contrary to Parliament's evident desire in ss 3(2) and 4 H R A to reserve a portion of this 
responsibility to itself 
C . Warbrick, 'The European Convention on Human Rights and the Human Rights Act: the 
view from the outside' in Fenwick, Phillipson and Masterman (fn 26) 25, 55. 
H. Quane, 'The Strasbourg jurisprudence and the meaning of "public authority" under the 
Human Rights Act' [2006] P L 106, 108. See also YL v Birmingham City Council [2007] U K H L 
27, [2008] I A C 95 [92] (Lord Mance). 
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obligations, is of no relevance to the identification of bodies as 'public 
authorities' under s 6. As Quane explains, any individual - such as a prisoner 
killing a cellmate - can potentially behave in a way which puts a state in breach 
of its positive obligations and, consequently, it would be unrealistic to render that 
individual a public authority.^^ It is clear from the active liability concept that 
Strasbourg has its own perception of which bodies constitute the core of the state. 
Additionally, Strasbourg must often decide for the purposes of Art 34 and the 
admissibility of claims to the European Court which bodies are 'non-
governmental' organisations capable of bringing claims and which, by contrast, 
are 'governmental' organisations incapable of so doing."'^  Both situations are 
potentially analogous to the domestic concept of 'public authority' under s 6 
since they both attempt to draw the basic distinction between 'state' and 'private' 
persons. 
In my view, which will be expanded on in Chapters 4 and 5 in the context of 
hybrid public authorities, Strasbourg jurisprudence in its current form bears no 
relation to the hybrid public authority concept and is relevant only to the 
domestic identification of core public authorities under s 6(1) HRA. Therefore, 
the lack of a general warrant to expand on Strasbourg protection does not affect 
Quane (ibid.) 108. C f YL (ibid.) [60] (Baroness Hale). Quane, I suggest, is correct. Since 
Strasbourg jurisprudence on positive obligations appears to render the state liable regardless of 
whether the private individual in question is performing a 'public' or 'private' act, the possibility 
arises, if Baroness Hale is correct, that s 6(5) H R A is Convention-incompatible by relieving 
defendants of liability resulting from private acts. This is because it would restrict the 
circumstances in which a domestic remedy could be given against Convention interferences 
which would generate a remedy in Strasbourg. See Chapter 3 on the accommodation within 
domestic law of passive liability jurisprudence. 
" Art 34: 'The Court may receive applications from any person, non-governmental organisation 
or group of individuals claiming to be the victim of a violation... of the... Convention,' 
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the width of the hybrid public authority category.'"' But as regards the core public 
authority category, the lack of a general warrant does imply that domestic courts 
should not, in general, interpret the core public authority category more 
expansively than Strasbourg would interpret its own category of'state' bodies. 
As will be seen in Chapter 4, the same basic 'public interest' theme underlies the 
identification of core public authorities under s 6(1) HRA and core 'state' bodies 
in Strasbourg. This makes it unlikely, therefore, that the domestic and Strasbourg 
courts would diverge on their interpretation of the core of the state in practice. 
Against this, however, is the potential, as Chapter 4 demonstrates, for the 
interpretation of the core public authority concept under s 6(1) to depend at times 
upon principles not necessarily deriving from Strasbourg jurisprudence, such as 
the need under Fewings for public bodies to demonstrate specific legal authority 
for their actions,"*' or the desirability following Datafin^^ of including 'adopted' 
private persons within the category of core public authorities. Strasbourg 
jurisprudence is not yet sufficiently developed to reveal whether or not such 
principles are at odds with its conception of the 'state'. Should Strasbourg 
jurisprudence in this area develop to reveal a disparity, domestic courts will be 
required to adhere to binding domestic precedent over later inconsistent 
Strasbourg jurisprudence.''^ Should no binding domestic precedent exist, the 
courts' current approach to s 2 HRA would seem to require them to follow the 
Strasbourg jurisprudence save for 'good reason' as expressed in cases like 
Hence, this casts doubt on the majority's approach in YL (fn 37) [88] (Lord Mance) and [161] 
(Lord Neuberger). See further Chapter 5. 
^ V Somerset County Council, exp Fewings [1995] 1 All E R 513 (QB) 524 (Laws J). 
Rv Panel of Take-overs and Mergers, ex p Datafin Pic [1987] 2 W L R 699, [1987] QB 815 
(CA) . 
Kay V Lambeth London Borough Council [2006] U K H L 10, [2006] 2 W L R 570. 
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Anderson.'^'* Whether or not domestic courts can accommodate these domestic 
core pubHc authority principles within the good reason exception remains to be 
tested by reference to how that concept develops over time and, presumably, the 
extent of any disparity between the domestic principles and relevant Strasbourg 
jurisprudence. 
In sum, it is not obvious that domestic courts possess a general warrant to 
expand on the level of Strasbourg protection. This chapter therefore favours the 
courts' current approach, which is in effect to follow Strasbourg jurisprudence 
under s 2 HRA save for 'good reason'. Domestic courts will need to bear this 
approach in mind when identifying core public authorities in future. 
B. T H E I N T E R P R E T A T I V E OBLIGATION 
Section 3 HRA provides, so far as is relevant: 
'(1) So far as it is possible to do so, primary legislation and subordinate legislation must 
be read and given effect in a way which is compatible with Convention rights. 
(2) This section... 
(b) does not affect the validity, continuing operation or enforcement of any 
incompatible primary legislation...' 
The duty to interpret legislation compatibly with the Convention is a 
comprehensive one which can involve substantial judicial re-interpretation of a 
provision regardless of whether or not that provision contains ambiguous 
' Anderson (fh 15). 
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language.''^  The legislative provision in question must, however, be prima facie 
incompatible with the Convention before the interpretative obligation under s 3 
begins to bite."^ 
Despite recent judicial dicta to the effect that s 3 'was not intended to be used in 
construing the [Human Rights] Act itself,'"^ the position is not yet settled; Lord 
Bingham's assertion that it was the H R A ' s 'plain' intention not to allow s 3 to 
apply to other provisions of the H R A " ^ is of questionable accuracy given that the 
Act draws no distinction itself between HRA and other legislative provisions. 
Nevertheless, at first sight, it would be difficult to see how the 'public authority' 
provisions within s 6 - which seek to protect Convention rights by making it 
unlawful for such bodies to act incompatibly with the Convention - could be 
prima facie incompatible with it from the victim's perspective.'*^ However, 
Phillipson's theory of self-reflection argues that s 3 can apply to itself'^ Since s 
3, seeking to ensure Convention-compliance as far as possible with Convention 
rights would also seem on its face to be nothing other than Convention-
compatible, Phillipson's theory invites closer inspection. 1 shall argue in this part 
of the chapter that this reasoning, positing a situation different from that 
concerning the 'public authority' provisions within s 6 HRA, is inapplicable to 
RvA (No. 2) [2001] U K H L 25, [2002] 1 A C 45, 68 (Lord Steyn). 
See e.g. A {ibid.) 72 and 86 (Lord Hope); Ghaidan v Godin-Mendoza [2004] U K H L 30, [2004] 
2 A C 557 [24] (Lord Nicholls) and [60] (Lord Millett). 
R (Al-Skeini) v Secretary of State for Defence [2007] U K H L 26, [2008] 1 A C 153 [15] (Lord 
Bingham). C f [246] (Lord Brown). 
'Ubid.,[\5l 
As will be seen in Chapter 6 however, it may, if interpreted so as to strip rights from hybrid 
public authorities, be incompatible from their perspective. 
G. Phillipson, '(Mis)-reading section 3 of the Human Rights Act' (2003) 119 L Q R 183. 
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them. Section 3 cannot be used to read the 'public authority' provisions more 
widely than ordinary principles of interpretation would allow for. 
Self-Reflection Theory 
The essence of self-reflection as argued for by Phillipson is that s 3 must apply to 
itself in order to widen the words 'so far as is possible' under that section, thus 
maximising the circumstances under which courts can provide a substantive 
remedy by reading legislation compatibly with the Convention and minimising 
those under which courts are forced to resort to the declaration of incompatibility 
under s 4. 
Observing the need for prima facie incompatibility in a statute before s 3 can 
apply,^' Phillipson argues that s 3 can apply to itself for two reasons. First, he 
says, the need for prima facie incompatibility is: 
'[S]imply a practical one, designed to discourage the courts from wasting time trying to 
apply section 3(1) to statutes which were Convention-compliant in the first place. 
However, where the correct interpretation of section 3(1) itself \% the issue, the courts 
are, by definition, already engaged with that provision and so cannot somehow also 
ignore it' ." 
Phillipson's second argument is that a judge opting to issue a declaration of 
incompatibility under s 4 rather than providing a useful remedy by using s 3 
would have 'failed to interpret section 3(1) itself in a Convention-friendly 
Ibid., 187-188. 
" Ibid., 187 (emphasis original). 
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manner, because he would have interpreted it in a way that allowed continuing 
violations by public authorities of the relevant Convention rights'. 
Inapplicability to Section 6 
It will be seen immediately that the first argument fails to apply in respect of the 
public authority provisions, where the 'correct interpretation' in issue is that of s 
6, rather than s 3(1). The courts would not therefore already be engaged with s 3, 
leaving accusations of judicial time-wasting to stand. However, Phillipson's 
second argimient - that judges would be failing to read s 3 compatibly with the 
Convention by allowing continuing Convention violations when resorting too 
quickly to s 4 - might, at first sight, also be thought to apply to the courts when 
considering the public authority provisions in s 6. Is a court also failing to 
comply with s 3's statutory injunction to read legislation (i.e. s 6) compatibly 
when resorting too quickly to a finding that a particular person is not a 'public 
authority' against whom Convention rights can be directly enforced in domestic 
law? 
Closer analysis reveals not. First, whether or not the courts would be allowing a 
continuing Convention violation by a public authority prejudges, where s 6 is 
concerned, the very issue in question. Second, judicial interpretation of s 6 using 
ordinary principles of statutory interpretation would leave no continuing 
violation of the Convention anyway, since such principles already provide for the 
protection which Strasbourg requires. As will be seen in Chapters 4 and 5, the 
" Ibid. Hickman has criticised this reasoning on the ground that that the Convention does 'not 
mandate any particular degree or method of incorporation': T. Hickman, 'Constitutional 
dialogue, constitutional theories and the Human Rights Act 1998' [2005] P L 306 at fh 114, a 
recent rebuttal to which can be found in G. Phillipson, 'Deference, Discretion, and Democracy in 
the Human Rights Act Era' (2007) 60 C L P 40, 62-63. 
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core public authority concept in s 6(1) seeks to replicate those bodies which 
Strasbourg would regard as 'state' bodies, and the hybrid public authority 
concept in s 6(3)(b) expands on this by creating a further category of hybrid 
public authorities - private persons exercising functions of a public nature - who 
are also directly amenable to Convention challenges. Moreover, as will be seen 
in Chapter 3, situations where Strasbourg indicates that the state is under a 
positive obligation to regulate private activity in order to comply with the 
Convention are absorbed as far as the HRA allows into the courts' development 
of the common law under the horizontal effect doctrine, and play no part in the 
interpretation of s 6's 'public authority' provisions. In short, unlike the situation 
of interaction between ss 3 and 4 with which Phillipson's self-reflective theory is 
concerned, this is not an instance where Strasbourg jurisprudence requires a 
remedy which is then denied by the courts' interpretation - using ordinary 
principles of statutory construction - of the public authority provisions under s 6. 
C. CONCLUSIONS 
As regards s 2 and the judicial duty to take Strasbourg jurisprudence into 
account, within the available space, it is my conclusion that expansionist 
criticisms of the courts' current approach do not convincingly reveal a general 
statutory warrant through s 2 to expand on the level of protection which 
Strasbourg would provide. 
For the width of the term 'public authority' under s 6, the consequences are 
twofold. Regarding hybrid public authorities, my views as developed in Chapter 
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5 that Strasbourg jurisprudence does not in its current form apply to 'functions of 
a public nature' under s 6(3)(b) means that the courts, on a true reading of s 
6(3)(b), should interpret the term without reference to Strasbourg jurisprudence. 
Section 6(3)(b) was seemingly intended as a 'domestic' provision designed to 
expand on the scope of Convention protection as provided by Strasbourg. 
As will be seen in Chapters 4 and 5, core public authorities, as demonstrated by 
their institutional characteristics, are closely analogous to Strasbourg's 
conception of 'the state' in active liability and under Art 34 ECHR. Such 
jurisprudence will be relevant and should be followed by domestic courts save 
for 'good reason'. Therefore, they should not, in the absence of additional 
statutory authority, interpret the category of core public authorities more widely 
than Strasbourg would interpret its category of'state' bodies. 
As regards s 3, the interpretative obligation would not appear to generate a wider 
interpretation of s 6's 'public authority' provisions than ordinary principles of 
statutory construction would allow for. Despite Phillipson's suggestion through 
self-reflection theory that statutory provisions seeking to give effect to 
Convention rights may also be subject to s 3's interpretative obligation, s 6, I 
have sought to argue, is not subject to such an obligation. 
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3. 
Horizontal Effect 
Although Convention rights are only directly enforceable 'vertically' through s 6 
HRA against public authorities, 'horizontal effect' of these rights can 
nevertheless occur by their application in such a way as to alter the legal 
relationships between private individuals. There are two routes to horizontal 
effect in domestic law. The first is through the designation in s 6 of courts and 
tribunals as public authorities required to act compatibly with the Convention 
under the HRA,^" which has given rise to the widespread view that courts are 
bound to develop the common law in a Convention-friendly fashion whether or 
not the dispute at hand involves a public authority. The second route is through 
the interpretative obligation in s 3(1) which requires, without drawing a 
distinction between those disputes involving a public authority and those 
involving only private individuals, that legislation be read Convention-
compatibly as far as possible. 
Aside from the first route arising directly from the meaning of 'public authority' 
under the HRA and therefore falling conveniently for discussion in a thesis on 
that term, there are two further reasons why it is necessary to address horizontal 
effect. First, as for the 'hybrid public authority' concept in s 6(3)(b) HRA which 
HRA, ss 6(1) and 6(3)(a). 
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seeks to subject persons exercising 'functions of a public nature' to human rights 
challenges, horizontal effect is a viable way of employing the HRA to ensure 
rights redress against private persons. Ascertaining the doctrine's limits therefore 
helps to identify the role and purpose of the hybrid public authority concept. 
Second, as will be seen, common law horizontal effect allows for the 
accommodation in domestic law - as far as possible without intruding into 
Parliament's sphere - of the Strasbourg jurisprudence on positive obligations. 
Finding a suitable home in domestic law for such jurisprudence bolsters the case 
in Chapters 4, 5 and 6 for an interpretation of the 'public authority' provisions 
without reference to such jurisprudence and, more generally, lends credence to 
my arguments on how domestic courts should interpret those provisions in 
future. 
The first part of this chapter examines the technical doctrinal limits to common 
law horizontal effect. 1 intend to conduct a detailed analysis of the limits to only 
common law horizontal effect since the general requirements of statutory 
horizontal effect under s 3 are relatively settled, with academic debate focussing 
specifically upon the single issue of the outer limits of the term 'so far as it is 
poss ib le ' .By contrast, there has not yet for instance been any authoritative 
ruling on the horizontal effect requirements of s 6, indicating perhaps that space 
remains within the academic debate for the contribution which this chapter seeks 
to provide. Having sought to ascertain the doctrinal limits to common law 
horizontal effect, the second part then attempts to demonstrate the limits to 
common law and statutory horizontal effect in the widely-litigated context of 
" For a brief overview, see the debate between D. Nicol, 'Are the Convention rights a no-go zone 
for Parliament?' [2002] P L 438 and A. Kavanagh, 'Statutory interpretation and human rights 
after Anderson: a more contextual approach' [2004] PL 537. 
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care homes. This exercise represents an effort to highlight the need for a broader 
reading of 'functions of a public nature' under s 6(3)(b) in order to ensure 
effective redress against service providers performing services pursuant to 
contracts with core public authorities. 
A. T H E COURTS AS PUBLIC AUTHORITIES: DEVELOPING 
T H E COMMON LAW 
Section 6(1) HRA states that ' I t is unlawful for a public authority to act in a way 
which is incompatible with a Convention right', before providing in s 6(3)(a) that 
'public authority' includes 'a court or tribunal'. Four broad views of the effect of 
these provisions exist. The first is that they give rise to direct horizontal effect 
whereby domestic courts, in order to act compatibly with the Convention, must 
develop the common law by creating new causes of action for rights-based 
challenges between private individuals.^^ The second and dichotomous view is 
that the provisions generate no horizontal effect at all, since the Convention 
rights themselves are rights which can exist only against the state and not private 
individuals." The third and fourth views - both variants of 'indirect horizontal 
effect', where domestic courts do not create new causes of action but must 
nevertheless develop the common law so as to act compatibly with the 
Convention - lie between these extremes. The first variant, known as 'strong 
indirect horizontal effect', accepts that the courts are not required by s 6 to create 
new rights-based causes of action, but argues instead that in order to fu l f i l their 
W. Wade, 'Human rights and the Judiciary' [1998] E H R L R 520 and 'Horizons of horizontality' 
(2000) 116 L Q R 217; S. Pattinson and D. Beyleveld, 'Horizontal applicability and horizontal 
effect' (2002) 118 L Q R 623; J. Morgan, 'Questioning the "true effect" of the Human Rights Act' 
(2002) 22 L S 259. 
" R. Buxton, 'The Human Rights Act and private law' (2000) 116 L Q R 48. 
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duty to act compatibly, the courts must ensure that all law which they apply 
accords with the Convention.^* The second variant, known as 'weak indirect 
horizontal effect', argues that domestic courts are not required by s 6 to apply the 
Convention rights as under the strong model but instead that they must develop 
the common law consonantly with Convention values.^^ 
Due to the judiciary's continuing failure to address the horizontal effect issue, it 
would be a fruitless task to try to distil a coherent impression of the judicial 
position from the existing case law. In Campbell v MGN Ltd,^'^ for instance, 
confusion even appeared to exist within individual judgments themselves.^' The 
decided cases do however reveal that some horizontal effect exists, but that this 
stops short of requiring the creation of new rights-based causes of action.^^ The 
polar extremes of 'direct horizontal effect' and 'no horizontal effect' therefore 
appear to have been judicially rejected.^'' These broad observations set the scene 
for the analysis which follows. It argues in favour of 'weak' rather than 'strong' 
horizontal effect as the preferable interpretation of Parliament's intent which, in 
the event, the judiciary should adopt. Reference is made to direct horizontal 
effect where helpful to illustrate the chapter's arguments, though I do not 
contend given the apparent rejection of direct horizontal effect that the courts 
would give it serious thought in practice. 
M. Hunt, 'The "horizontal effect" of the Human Rights Act' [1998] P L 423. 
G. Phillipson, 'The Human Rights Act, "Horizontal Effect" and the Common Law: a Bang or a 
Whimper?' (1999) 62 M L R 824. 
*° [2004] U K H L 22, [2004] 2 A C 457. 
'^ G . Phillipson, 'Clarity postponed: horizontal effect after Campbell' in H. Fenwick, G. 
Phillipson and R. Masterman (eds). Judicial Reasoning under the UK Human Rights Act (CUP, 
Cambridge 2007) 143, 158-165. The confusing judgments are those of Lords Hope, Nicholls and 
Hoffmann. 
'^Ibid., 152. 
" See Douglas v Hello! [2001] 2 W L R 992, [2001] Q B 967 ( C A ) on the rejection of 'no 
horizontal effect', and Campbell (fti 60) [132] (Baroness Hale) and X v K [2004] E W C A Civ 662, 
[2004] I C R 1634 [54] (Mummery LJ) on the rejection of direct horizontal effect. 
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I make no attempt in this chapter to add to the 'burgeoning'literature by 
engaging exhaustively with the technical doctrinal and theoretical arguments in 
favour of each position on horizontal effect. Instead, I will start by supplying a 
much-needed analysis of the Strasbourg jurisprudence on positive obligations in 
order to argue that the legal community should be wary of accepting either the 
'strong indirect' or 'direct' horizontal effect approaches. Weak indirect 
horizontal effect, it is contended, is a preferable interpretation of s 6's 
requirements. 
Positive Obligations 
Aside from states being under negative duties to abstain from interfering with 
Convention rights, Strasbourg jurisprudence emphasises that they may also be 
under duties to take positive steps in order to ensure effective respect for a 
right,^^ and that such positive obligations 'may involve the adoption of measures 
designed to secure [rights]... even in the sphere of the relafions of individuals 
between themselves.'^^ Domestic courts are required to take such jurisprudence 
into account. The Convention jurisprudence on positive obligations and passive 
liability falls logically for consideration under the HRA's 'horizontal effect' 
provisions since both Strasbourg and HRA schemes indicate a duty upon the 
organs of the state to regulate private activity in order to comply with the 
Convention. 
Morgan (fh 56) 260. 
" Marckx v Belgium (App no 6833/74) (1979-80) 2 E H R R 330 [31]. 
^"•Xand y V The Netherlands (App no 8978/80) (1986) 8 E H R R 235 [23]. 
The words used in s 6(1), it is recalled, are 'incompatible with a Convention 
right.'^^ As Phillipson observes, prior to the interpretation of s 6(1) is the issue of 
'whether there are any Convention obligations in play at all ' . In other words, 'is 
there an obligation on the UK to provide a measure of protection for Convention 
rights in situations such as the one that has arisen in the litigation[?]'^^ It is to this 
vexed question which the chapter now turns. 
Uncertainty 
The question of the requirements of positive obligations comprises two issues.^ " 
The first is whether the state is required to regulate private activity in a given 
situation. I f so, the second issue is the extent of that requirement, i.e. the nature 
of the regulation required. Strasbourg has recently stated that it 'does not 
consider it desirable, let alone necessary, to elaborate a general theory 
concerning the extent to which Convention guarantees should be extended to 
relations between private individuals inter 5e . '^ ' Thus, domestic courts must 
attempt themselves to distil Strasbourg jurisprudence in order to resolve these 
issues. 
Strasbourg is unhelpful regarding the first issue {when a duty arises), stating no 
more than that positive obligations 'may'''" or 'sometimes' arise.Moreover, 
Strasbourg is even unclear on why such obligations arise at all. Whereas some 
Emphasis added. 
Phillipson (fn61) 149. 
Ibid. 
™ For a comprehensive overview in relation to specific Convention rights, see A. Mowbray, The 
Development of Positive Obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights by the 
European Court of Human Rights (Hart Publishing, Oxford 2004). 
^' VgT Verein gegen Tierfabriken v Switzerland {App no 24699/94) (2002) 34 E H R R 4 [46]. 
''- X and Y (fn 66) [23]; Whiteside v United Kingdom (App no 20357/92) (1994) 18 E H R R C D 
126, C D 127. 
Plattform •Ante fur das Leben'v Austria {App no 10126/82) (1991) 13 E H R R 204 [32], 
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cases emphasise the wording inherent in the individual Convention articles 
themselves,^ "* others root the doctrine in the obligation under Art 1 to 'secure' the 
Convention's rights and freedoms to those within the jurisdiction^^ or, as has 
elsewhere been observed, a combination of these and other factors such as the 
need to ensure an adequate remedy for Convention breaches under Art 13 and 
'the principle set out in Convention case law that protection of rights is intended 
to be "practical and effective" not merely theoretical'.^^ 
As to the second issue (extent of the duty), Strasbourg emphasises that states 
possess a wide margin of appreciation regarding the choice of the means used to 
secure compliance with positive obligations.^^ Although it has at times sought to 
delineate this margin by stating that the relevant measures adopted by the state 
must be 'reasonable and appropriate',^^ the extent of this requirement is stated in 
varying t e r m s . A t any rate, the requirements of a positive obligation 'wil l vary 
considerably from case to case'.''^  
The result is that 'Beyond the decided cases, it is not always easy to predict when 
a positive duty will be imposed by the Strasbourg institutions' or what will be 
required when it is. When novel factual situations arise domestically and courts 
Plattform {ibid.); X and Y {fn 66) [23]. 
See e.g. Siliadin v France (App no 73316/01) (2006) 43 E H R R 16 [77]; VgT (fn 71) [45]; 
Whiteside {fn 72) C D 127. 
J. Wadham, H. Mountfield, A. Edmundson and C . Gallagher, Blackstone's Guide to the Human 
Rights Act 1998 (4* edn OUP, Oxford 2007) [2.44]. 
" See e.g. Plattform {fn 73) [U\,Xand Y{fa 66) [24]. 
Plattform {ibid.). 
For instance, the Grand Chamber of the European Court in lla^cu v Moldova and Russia (App 
no 48787/99) (2005) 40 E H R R 46 phrased the question as 'to what extent a minimum effort was 
nevertheless possible and whether it should have been made': [334] (emphasis added). 
*° Myzsk V Poland{App no 28244/95) (1998) 26 E H R R C D 76, C D 78. 
S. Grosz, J . Beatson and P. Duffy, Human Rights: The 1998 Act and the European Convention 
(Sweet & Maxwell, London 2000) 92. Clapham has sought to order the jurisprudence using his 
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must try to infer Strasbourg's position on an issue, three situations can be 
distinguished. The first is where Strasbourg jurisprudence reveals that Strasbourg 
would hold an opinion on the relevant issue, and reveals with reasonable clarity 
what that opinion would be. The second is where Strasbourg jurisprudence 
reveals that Strasbourg would hold an opinion, but does not reveal with 
reasonable clarity what that opinion would be. I shall refer to this second 
situation colloquially as 'haziness'. The third situation is where Strasbourg 
jurisprudence reveals that Strasbourg would hold no opinion at all on the relevant 
issue, i.e. where that issue would fall outwith the European Court's jurisdiction. 
A domestic court faced with a horizontal effect situation in novel factual 
circumstances may be able to ' jo in the dots' f rom the decided Strasbourg cases 
and infer the potential position in Strasbourg were the dispute to reach the 
European Court. Such may be the case in the context o f the right to privacy 
between private individuals under Art 8. This is a context upon which much of 
the academic literature, domestic case law and a fair amount of Strasbourg 
litigation have focussed and in which academics and judges alike seem to feel 
confident in interpreting Strasbourg's position. Indeed, fol lowing Von Hannover 
V Germany,^'^ ' i t is clear beyond doubt that Article 8... requires a remedy in 
national law [in the event o f a breach]'.^"' Privacy can therefore be equated with 
the first situation above, namely where Strasbourg jurisprudence reveals both 
that Strasbourg would hold an opinion and, with reasonable clarity, what the 
'dignity' and 'democracy' analysis: A. Clapham, Human Rights in the Private Sphere (Oxford 
Monographs in International Law, OUP, Oxford 1993) 240 and Chapter 5. However, the 
continuing confusion on Strasbourg's part as to the basis for positive obligations renders 
Clapham's analysis more normatively attractive than practically helpful. 
(App no 59320/00) (2005) 40 E H R R 1, 
H. Fenwick and G . Phillipson, Media Freedom under the Human Rights Act (OUP, Oxford 
2006) 671, 
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opinion would be.*'' Outwith this context however, it is possible that the general 
uncertainty surrounding the law on positive obligations leaves courts unable to 
' jo in the dots' and rule confidently on situations other than those with identical 
or substantially similar facts to existing Strasbourg decisions. I f so, for a 
domestic court facing a horizontal effect situation with novel facts, Strasbourg 
jurisprudence would therefore equate to the second situation above since it 
reveals that Strasbourg would profess an opinion (it does reveal a doctrine of 
positive obligations), but does not reveal with reasonable clarity what the opinion 
would be. In this situation, the domestic court would have a choice. First, it 
could presume that the state would not be responsible for the relevant 
infringement on the international plane. Second, it could try to reach a decision 
by reasoning from first principles which may be found in Convention 
jurisprudence, such as 'democracy' or 'autonomy'.*^ Third, the court could 
presume that the state would be responsible on the international plane. The court, 
logically, cannot sidestep the issue and must choose one o f these: the 
jurisprudence in this situation does reveal that Strasbourg would profess an 
opinion were the matter to come before it. Although none o f the above options 
are ideal since all involve a degree of speculation or presumption in an uncertain 
area o f law, domestic courts should not, I suggest, prefer either o f the first two 
options. The first option amounts to the presumption that the European Court 
would not intend a remedy to be given beyond the highly fact-specific situations 
See A. Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Non-Stale Actors (Collected Courses of the 
Academy of European Law, OUP, Oxford 2006) 400, and the recent ruling in Murray v Express 
Newspapers Pic [2008] E W C A Civ 446, [2008] E C D R 12 [60] (Sir Anthony Clarke MR). 
There are, of course, situations where the text of the right makes it harder if not impossible for 
positive obligations to attach: Art 3 of the First Protocol, guaranteeing the right to free elections, 
would be an example. 
Democracy, at least, is a guiding principle of Convention interpretation: R. Clayton and H. 
Tomlinson, The Law of Human Rights (OUP, Oxford 2000) [6.21]-[6.22]. 
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on which it has been given the chance to rule; this is impossible to sustain in 
practice when the inherently haphazard nature o f litigation w i l l continue to 
present novel scenarios in which Strasbourg would doubtless wish to intervene. 
The second option o f reasoning from first principles may produce a result with 
which Strasbourg would agree. Similarly however, it may not: this is an area of 
law, it is recalled, where Strasbourg jurisprudence is sufficiently hazy to prevent 
domesfic courts f rom inferring with reasonable clarity what Strasbourg's position 
would be. Any first principles which a domestic court purported to identify could 
be tenuously helpful at best since i f those principles did enable domestic courts 
to infer with reasonable clarity what Strasbourg's position would be, this area of 
law would not be one o f 'haziness' at all. The third option o f presuming that the 
state would be responsible, I suggest, is preferable. 
Admittedly, this does outstrip Strasbourg's view that positive obligations to 
regulate private activity may exist and that the measures used to f u l f i l the 
obligation lie principally within the state's margin of appreciation. Parliament, 
however, is nevertheless likely to have intended such a result, because the 
alternative options would involve domestic courts adopting a position which 
automafically risked allowing Convention breaches potentially actionable in 
Strasbourg to go domestically unregulated. 
Juxtaposing Positive Obligations and Horizontal Effect 
In order to appreciate the significance of the above analysis, it is necessary 
briefly to explore the concepts of direct and strong indirect horizontal effect. 
Wade advocates direct horizontal effect, whereby domestic courts create new 
36 
rights-based causes o f action between private individuals. According to him, s 
6's designation o f courts as public authorities bound to act compatibly with the 
Convention implies that ' i f a Convention right is relevant, a court deciding a case 
must decide in accordance with it, no less in a case between private parties 
than... against a public authority.' 
Drawing primarily on s 6(1 )'s evident desire to subject only public authorities to 
the duty to act compatibly with the Convention, Hunt infers instead that 'there 
no 
are persons who are not bound to act compatibly with the Convention at a l l ' . In 
Hunt's view, 'private relationships are left undisturbed insofar as they are not 
regulated by law, but once law becomes involved in regulating those 
relationships, they have lost their truly private nature... [The state is bound to 
act] in a way which upholds and protects the rights.' Hence, he concludes, the 
Convention applies through s 6 to all law^*' whilst ' fa l l ing short o f immediately 
conferring new causes o f action.'^' Baroness Hale appeared to endorse this 
position in Campbell^^ 
Nevertheless, the distinction between situations concerning existing causes o f 
action and those where none exist is open to objection for generating arbitrary 
practical results, especially since the content o f that cause o f action is 
subsequently ignored by the court when it applies the relevant Convention right 
" Wade, 'Horizons of horizontality' (fn 56) 217-218. 
Hunt(fn 58) 438. 
434-435. 
Ibid., 442. 
" Ibid., 424. 
92 Campbell {fn 60) [132]. For commentary, see Phillipson (fn 61) 158. 
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pursuant to its duty under ss 6(1) and 6(3)(a).^'' As Morgan explains, 'The cause 
of action becomes merely an empty shell, into which any Convention right can 
be poured.'^"^ 
As Phillipson explains, a court adopting a Wade or Hunt approach could not 
allow non-Convention factors such as existing common law principles to justify 
overriding a Convention right, since it would not be acting compatibly with the 
Convention i f it did.^^ Advocating weak indirect horizontal effect, Phillipson 
observes that Wade's approach (and, seemingly, also that of Hunt in 
circumstances where an underlying cause of action exists) would involve 
subjecting private law to a 'full-scale takeover by the Convention... in a 
particularly drastic way that would threaten whole swathes o f the common law 
with replacement by private HRA actions.'^^ 
It is only when applying the earlier analysis on positive obligations that the fu l l 
extent o f this takeover becomes clear. Given the uncertainty surrounding the law 
on positive obligations, it is at least arguable that a domestic court obliged to 'act 
compatibly' with the Convention must presume when faced with a novel private 
dispute that a positive obligation to regulate private acfivity exists for any right 
and, due to the diff icul ty o f ascertaining the limits of the margin o f appreciation, 
that such a duty requires the regulation for which the claimant contends in all 
circumstances. I f 'acting' compatibly as under the Wade and Hunt approaches 
means applying the Convention rights, the takeover would operate to maximum 
Morgan (fri 56) 271. 
Ibid. 
Phillipson (fn61) 153. 
' Ibid., 152; Phillipson (fh 59) 824. 
effect in domestic law. Whereas commentators advocating direct horizontal 
effect rightly link their arguments to the HRA's need to ensure that remedies 
available in Strasbourg are provided in domestic law,^^ their omission fu l ly to 
consider the potential domestic effects o f the uncertainty in the Strasbourg 
jurisprudence seems to result in the collective presumption that such a disruptive 
result would not materialise. Even Morgan, advocating direct horizontal effect, 
flippantly remarks that the application o f Convention rights between third parties 
in every case 'would entail deep incursions by the law into the heart o f the 
private sphere, to a degree which no one would f ind acceptable.'^^ Deep 
incursions, I have sought to argue, may necessarily flow from anything stronger 
than weak indirect horizontal effect. 
Defending Weak Indirect Horizontal Effect 
It follows f rom the foregoing analysis that once the nature o f Strasbourg 
jurisprudence on positive obligations is considered, the fu l l extent o f the potential 
for disruption which the Wade and Hunt approaches may have on existing 
common law principles becomes apparent. Consequently, weak indirect 
horizontal effect, I suggest, is a preferable reading o f s 6 HRA's provisions. 
Weak indirect effect appeared to receive the support of Lord Nicholls in 
Campbell?'^ However, typical of the confusion in this area, his Lordship also 
seemed in the same judgment to endorse strong indirect horizontal effect, having 
earlier opined a third view that it was unnecessary to decide whether s 6(1) 
®^  Wade, 'Human rights and the judiciary' (fh 56) 525; Pattinson and Beyleveld (fn 56) 640-641; 
Morgan (fn 56) 259. 
'*//b/^/.,267. 
Campbell {fn 60) [17]. 
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obliged or prevented the court f rom giving domestic effect to Art 8 ECHR.'"" 
Having argued f rom the above analysis o f the jurisprudence surrounding positive 
obligations that weak indirect effect would be a preferable reading o f s 6( l ) ' s 
requirements, this chapter now sets about defending it. 
Advocating direct horizontal effect, Morgan invokes three principal criticisms 
against the weak model:"" first, the requirements o f an approach necessitating 
common law 'development' as distinct from the creation of new causes o f action 
are imprecise; second, the approach results 'at least sometimes'in a failure to 
protect rights which (third) should be discounted in view o f s 3 HRA's 
requirement that legislation be construed Convention-compatibly. 
Regarding the first criticism, it is diff icult to see why such a blurred line exists 
between 'development' and 'creation of new causes o f action'. The concept of 
'values' as distinct f rom 'rights' may generate some confusion over what, 
exactly, the court is striving to develop the common law consonantly with, but 
even this can be clarified. As Phillipson's analysis reveals, the concept may be 
more amorphous than that o f rights but essentially relates to the 'values 
represented by those rights.''"^ 'Privacy' would therefore seem to underlie Art 8, 
'the sancfity o f l i f e ' Art 2, 'expression' Art 10 and so on. A values-based 
approach requires the court not to apply a right but to consider and weigh its 
underlying values against countervailing factors which, because courts - unlike 
Phillipson (fi i61) 163. 
Morgan (fh 56)271-273. 
'"^ Ibid., 273 (emphasis original). 
Phillipson (fh 59) 830 (emphasis original). 
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under the strong indirect or direct approaches - need not treat the right as a rule, 
may derive f rom outwith the text o f the right itself'^'* 
As for Morgan's second criticism, the fact that the interpretation o f a HRA 
provision leaves rights unprotected does not mean that Parliament could not have 
intended that interpretation.'"' However, the greater the potential for rights to be 
left unprotected, the greater the likelihood that Parliament intended something 
else in an Act designed to give 'further effect' to Convention r i g h t s . A l t h o u g h 
- it is true - under the weak indirect horizontal effect approach the court would 
not be obliged to apply the right in question, they would function as 'mandatory 
principles' such that the courts would be 'obliged to have regard to the values 
represented by the rights in their development and application o f the common 
law.''"^ Since these values as mandatory principles rather than rules may be 
displaced by non-Convention factors, a balancing exercise ensues between the 
desirability of upholding the value on the one hand and non-Convention factors 
such as existing common law principles on the other. This chapter earlier argued 
that due to the uncertainty inherent in the Strasbourg jurisprudence on positive 
obligations, domestic courts should presume in factual circumstances not 
identical or closely analogous to cases already decided in Strasbourg that 
Strasbourg would hold the state responsible. In other words, the line should be 
taken to be drawn on the side o f responsibility. But this is a different issue to the 
brightness with which that line is drawn. Whereas in 'haziness' cases domestic 
courts should presume the state to be responsible internationally, cases w i l l have 
Ibid., 837. 
'"^  Section 3(1), which requires legislation to be construed compatibly with the Convention only 
as far as possible, is an example. 
'"^  This purpose is stated in the HRA's preamble. 
Phillipson (fn 59) 843, 
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been decided in Strasbourg (albeit in rare situations) involving factual situations 
which are identical or closely analogous to the domestic dispute at hand. I f the 
state is found to be responsible by Strasbourg in those cases, the 'responsibility 
line' is drawn more brightly and domestic courts know - or at least strongly 
suspect - rather than simply presume the state to be responsible for the 
interference with the Convention rights in the dispute at hand. Knowing or 
strongly suspecting that the state would be responsible internationally should, I 
suggest, be placed as a relevant factor in the balance between Convention values 
and countervailing factors and, given the HRA's desire to give further effect to 
Convention rights, result in a stronger presumption that Convention values 
should outweigh the relevant common law principles than in 'haziness' cases 
where domestic courts merely presume the state to be responsible .Therefore , 
in cases where Strasbourg jurisprudence does suggest the state's responsibility, a 
proper appreciation of the nuances o f the weak indirect horizontal effect 
approach reveals the potential for a gravitational pull towards the protection o f 
the right in question. 
Despite the balance being weighted more in favour of protecting the right in 
circumstances where Strasbourg decisions reveal clearly that the state would be 
responsible internationally,'"^ there may nevertheless be circumstances where 
domestic courts choose to uphold common law principles; namely, I suggest, in 
instances where they feel that incremental common law development would be 
unable to protect the right and larger-scale reform would be needed. Parliament 
This may represent an alternative solution to what Phillipson {ibid.) regards as the 'difficult' 
question of how much prima facie weight to attach to a Convention value: 844. 
There would, of course, still need to be interference by the private individual with the victim's 
rights in order for the behaviour to be ComenUon-incompatible. 
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has declared that failure to legislate is not an 'act' capable o f generating domestic 
Convention l iabi l i ty ."" I f Parliament is not to be impugned for fail ing to legislate 
and cannot legally be compelled to do so,'" it would seem to strain the language 
of the HRA to allow the courts to fashion the common law by 'legislating' when 
providing a remedy."' Although the difference between judicial interpretation 
and legislation may be incapable of precise definition," ' ' judicial 'law-making' is 
incremental, constrained by precedent and based on interpretative reasoning 
rather than being purely forward-looking like Parliamentary legislation."'* 
Hence, s 6(6) arguably represents an injunction upon the courts to refrain from 
fashioning a common law remedy in order to protect a Convention right i f to do 
so would go beyond incremental development or run counter to existing 
precedent."' In this sense, s 6(6) delimits the meaning o f s 6(I) ' s 'horizontal 
effect' provisions."^ Morgan's concern that the weak indirect horizontal effect 
HRA, s 6(6). 
"' Some political compulsion does exist, however, in the form of declarations of incompatibility 
made under s 4 HRA. 
"" It might be thought that Parliament had somehow 'donated' through the H R A the 
responsibility of protecting rights to the judiciary, but such a conclusion is incompatible with the 
message in s 6(6) that Parliament is under no obligation to legislate. Had the courts had such 
power to protect rights donated to them, it would be unnecessary to consider compelling 
Parliament to legislate since a remedy would already be available. 
A. Kavanagh, 'The elusive divide between interpretation and legislation under the Human 
Rights Act 1998' (2004) 24 O J L S 259. 
271-273. 
Morgan's view that the 'pre-Act approach to common law development is no longer valid... if 
the Act requires a different approach' (fn 56, 272 and 273) fails to take account of s 6(6), a 
provision which he omits to mention. Pattinson and Beyleveld (fh 56) argue that the judicial 
creation of causes of action is not necessarily judicial 'legislation' since courts are 
constitutionally permitted to find existing principles embedded in the common law and apply 
them to settle a case: 642. However, the courts are not finding principles embedded in the 
common law in the present context. The principles derive from the Convention, an international 
treaty which cannot be domestically incorporated other than by Parliament as the sovereign law-
maker: JH Rayner (Mincing Lane) Ltd v Department of Trade and Industry [1990] 2 A C 418, 
[1989] 3 W L R 969. Parliamentary sovereignty would, I suggest, be flouted by de facto 
incorporation of the treaty unless the terms of the HRA - the instrument seeking to give effect to 
the Convention - clearly allowed for the creation of new causes of action. This is the very issue 
in question. 
'Section 6(6) was included in order to preserve Parliamentary sovereignty and prerogative 
power: in this case, the power of the executive to introduce legislation': H. Fenwick, C/v;7 
Liberties and Human Rights (4* edn Routledge-Cavendish, Abingdon 2007) 215 (emphasis 
added). 
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approach risks failing to protect rights therefore seems to miss the point: 
domestic courts can apply the value so as to protect the right (indeed, they wi l l 
usually do so where Strasbourg jurisprudence does indicate that the state would 
be responsible internationally) or, alternatively, they w i l l refuse to do so where 
the HRA requires them to refrain from transcending the boundaries o f common 
law development into the legislative sphere."^ 
Morgan's third argument, relating to the interpretative obligafion under s 3, 
therefore appears to fall away. Domestic courts could not, when using s 3, depart 
'substantially f rom a fundamental feature o f an Act o f Parliament'."* Since 
Parliament has emphasised at various points within the HRA the desire to 
maintain its sovereignty,"^ I would suggest - even leaving the apparent effect of 
s 6(6) to one side - that an interpretation of s 6(1 )'s horizontal effect 
requirements which allowed the courts to intrude into Parliament's role by 
'legislating' rather than 'developing' the common law would depart from a 
fundamental feature o f the HRA. 
The Courts as Public Authorities: Conclusions 
Strasbourg jurisprudence on positive obligations is infused with uncertainty, both 
as to when a duty arises and what it requires. An arguable concomitant o f such 
uncertainty is the need for domestic courts, giving effect to the Convention rights 
through the HRA, to presume in novel factual circumstances involving private 
individuals that Strasbourg would find state responsibility were the case to reach 
See, mutatis mutandis, Grosz, Beatson and Duffy (fn 81) 91. My approach in this chapter 
differs by arguing based on the uncertainty of the law surrounding positive obligations that courts 
should refrain from 'legislating' in order to protect rights. 
Re S and Re W UK.HL 10, [2002] 2 A C 291 [40] (Lord Nicholls). 
'"See e.g. ss 3(2) and 4. 
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the European Court. Given the injunction in ss 6(1) and 6(3)(a) for the courts to 
act compatibly wi th the Convention, labouring under this presumption would 
require them when faced with a dispute to engage in some common law 
development at all times in order to 'act' compatibly under s 6(1) HRA. But if , as 
under the Hunt and Wade approaches, 'acting compatibly' means applying the 
right, the full-scale takeover against which Phillipson protests would generate 
maximum disruption in domestic law. The weak indirect horizontal effect model, 
providing for development o f the common law consonantly wi th Convention 
values, is therefore a preferable inference o f Parliament's intent when enacting ss 
6(1) and 6(3)(a). The relative sophistication o f this approach's balancing exercise 
between Convention values and existing common law principles allows for the 
substantive protection o f a right, but only where the common law can 
accommodate such a step. Judicial development which would amount in 
substance to 'legislation' is not required hy the approach. Nor, it would seem, is 
it even permitted due to s 6(6). 
B. T H E LIMITS IN P R A C T I C E 
The question whether private care homes providing care and accommodation 
pursuant to contract with a local authority are performing 'functions of a public 
nature' under s 6(3)(b) H R A has plagued the courts since the HRA's entry into 
force. The early decision o f the Court o f Appeal in R (Heather) v Leonard 
Cheshire Foundation^^'^ attracted staunch academic criticism by giving a 
120 [2002] E W C A Civ 366, [2002] 2 All E R 936. 
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negative answer;'^' the House o f Lords nevertheless reaffirmed the Leonard 
Cheshire principle in YL v Birmingham City Council.^^^ As Chapter 1 explained, 
s 145 o f the Health and Social Care Act 2008 (HSCA), when it enters into force, 
w i l l designate the provision o f care and accommodation pursuant to 
arrangements like those in YL a public function under s 6(3)(b) HRA. 
Nevertheless, YL remains good law until s 145 enters into force. Additionally, the 
following analysis illustrates the difficulties o f enforcing Convention rights using 
horizontal effect. This analysis helps to demonstrate why judges instinctively 
hostile to the application o f Convention rights in the private sphere should not 
simply invoke the HSCA's failure to address the application o f s 6(5) HRA in 
order to maintain the status quo and deny that Parliament intended that the 
ECHR apply to care homes. 
In Chapters 5 and 6, I introduce and defend a general interpretation o f s 6(3)(b) 
which expands on the current position taken by the courts. In this part of the 
current chapter I take the care home context as a topical one within which to 
demonstrate the pracfical limits to the horizontal effect o f the HRA, thereby 
highlighting the need for a wider reading o f the public authority provisions than 
that currently taken by the courts in order to provide service users with an 
appropriate remedy for relevant interferences wi th their Convention rights. I 
consider the horizontal effect o f each of ss 6 and 3 HRA in turn, discounting the 
possibility that either could assist a service user in such a context. 
'"' See, notably, P. Craig, 'Contracting out, the Human Rights Act and the scope of judicial 
review' (2002) 118 L Q R 551; C. Donnelly, 'Leonard Cheshire again and beyond: private 
contractors, contract and s.6(3)(b) of the Human Rights Act' [2005] P L 785; the Joint Committee 
on Human Rights' Seventh Report of Session 2003-04, 'The Meaning of Public Authority under 
the Human Rights Act' H L (2003-04) 39, HC (2003-04) 382. 
[2007] U K H L 27, [2008] 1 A C 95. 
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Developing the Common Law 
In response to the House o f Lords' ruling in YL, I briefly explored how service 
users might take advantage o f common law horizontal effect in order to vindicate 
their Art 8 right to respect for the home: 
'[T]hose in Y L ' s position might in ftjture take Hunt's advice''"' and remain in the home 
until physically evicted, whereupon they could allege battery and, relying on the HRA's 
"horizontal effect", try to persuade the courts to interpret the common law on battery in 
accordance with their Art 8 rights.''^'' 
Applying the findings f rom Part A of this chapter reveals the difficulties which a 
service user might encounter in this respect. Due to the uncertainty surrounding 
the law on positive obligations, a domestic court required to act compatibly with 
the Convention should presume the state to be responsible in Strasbourg. Under 
the weak indirect horizontal effect model which 1 argued above is the more 
appropriate reading o f the requirements o f ss 6(1) and 6(3)(a) HRA, a balancing 
exercise then ensues between the 'value' of a home life and non-Convention 
factors. There seems to be no Strasbourg case directly in point which suggests a 
positive obligation on the state to regulate the behaviour o f private individuals in 
this instance.'^^ Therefore, there is no necessary 'gravitational pul l ' towards the 
application o f this value so as to protect the service user's Art 8 right as there 
would have been had such Strasbourg jurisprudence existed. Additionally, there 
are common law principles which a court may decide to weigh in the balance 
Hunt (fh 58) 442. 123 
'"'' A. Williams, 'YL v Birmingham City Council: Contracting out and "functions of a public 
nature'" [2008] E H R L R 524, 531. I do not propose to examine Art 3 here following Buxton LJ's 
observations in YL (fn 135) that potential Art 3 interferences will usually be redressed by the 
existing criminal law. 
'-^ YL (fn 122) [92] (Lord Mance). 
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against upholding the Convention value in this case. One such principle is 
commercial autonomy.'^^ Developing the common law o f battery so as to 
provide a remedy against a service provider seeking to evict a service user (as in 
both Leonard Cheshire and YL) would inhibit the ability o f a private service 
provider - 'neither a charity nor a philanthropist' - to perform a 'socially useful 
business for profit ' , '^^ which sits uncomfortably with 'the ordinary private law 
freedom to carry on operations under agreed contractual terms'.'^* Furthermore, 
a domestic court may be unreceptive to the distortion o f the common law of 
battery - aimed at safeguarding personal bodily integrity'^^ - into a cause o f 
action which protected the right to a home.'''" 
Hence, a domestic court may decide that protecting the service user's Art 8 right 
to a home would encroach into the legislative sphere and decline to offer that 
protection. These observations do not, of course, attempt to predict with certainty 
how a domestic court would or should rule, but they do expose real difficulties 
which a service user might experience in seeking to invoke common law 
horizontal effect as a method of vindicating their Convention rights. 
The Interpretative Obligation 
The interpretative obligation under s 3 HRA could be of prima facie use in two 
situations: first, when a service user brings an action against the local authority 
'^ ^ Despite growing exceptions in the form of regulatory legislation, autonomy can still be said to 
underlie the modem law of contract: Treitel (fri 147) 1-8. 
'-'yz.(fii 122) [26] (Lord Scott). 
'-^ lbid.,[\\6] (Lord Mance). 
S. Deakin, A. Johnston and B. Markesinis, Markesinis and Deakin's Tort Law (5'^ edn OUP, 
Oxford 2003) 415; T. Weir, A Casebook on Tort{\(f edn Sweet & Maxwell, London 2004) 321. 
Certain dicta in Campbell (fri 60) to the effect that courts are required by s 6 to develop 
relevant common law causes of action or those with the same underlying values as the 
Convention right in question may lend implicit judicial support to this point: see [132] (Baroness 
Hale) and [43] (Lord Hoffmann), 
48 
contracting out the services and, second, when the service user brings an action 
against the private provider itself 
Action Against Local Authority 
The National Assistance Act 1948 ( N A A ) seeks 'to terminate the existing poor 
law and to provide... for the assistance of persons in need'.'^' In Leonard 
Cheshire and YL, local authorities discharged their duties under s 21 to arrange to 
provide care and accommodation for the appellants by contracting with private 
organisations (Leonard Cheshire Foundation and Southern Cross Healthcare 
respectively) for the provision o f the services.'^^ Had the local authorities 
continued to provide the services, the service users would have been able directly 
to seek redress for breaches o f the Convention occurring during service delivery 
due to the local authorities' status as core public authorities required to comply 
with the Convention in respect o f all of their acts. '" Since it was held in Leonard 
Cheshire and YL that private service providers are not public authorities required 
to comply with the Convention, service users lack such action in the event of a 
local authority's decision to arrange with a private organisation for the provision 
of the services. 
A service user might therefore try to claim that the local authority had breached 
their Convention rights by deciding to outsource the services and, in doing so, try 
to persuade the court to use the interpretative obligation under s 3 HRA to render 
s 26 N A A Convention-compatible. This, it seems, would fai l for two reasons. 
Preamble, N A A . 
Section 26(1): 'arrangements under section 21 of this Act may include arrangements made 
with a voluntary organisation or with any other person who is not a local authority'. 
See fiirther Chapter 4. 
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First, it is difficult to say that s 26 NAA is prima facie Convention-incompatible 
unless it is successfully argued that outsourcing, by diminishing the level of 
Convention protection which service users are able to seek, is itself a breach of 
the Convention. This contention was firmly rejected at first instance by Forbes J 
in R (Johnson) v Havering London Borough CounciP^ and by the Court of 
Appeal in 71.'^^ As Buxton LJ (with whom Dyson LJ and Sir Anthony Clarke 
MR agreed) explained, the resident would not suffer 'any significant loss of 
protection' from Art 3 as a result of outsourcing since behaviour amounting to a 
breach of Art 3 will usually engage the criminal law anyway.'^^ Regarding the 
service user's submission that outsourcing would result in the breach of Art 8, 
Buxton LJ pointed to the extensive regulatory regime enacted through the Care 
Standards Act 2000'^^ (which applies equally to private providers and, his 
Lordship said, exceeded the level of protection required by Art 8) and concluded 
that 'the residents lost nothing in article 8 terms by the transfer.''^* Furthermore, 
depriving the residents of a direct action against their carer would not amount to 
an Art 8 breach because ' i t would seem impossible to say that there is an article 8 
obligation to maintain a particular type or level of provision when discharging 
duties under secfion 21.' ' ' '^ Even i f such an obligation did exist, there is no 
reason to presume that diminution in the level of provision would ^necessarily 
entail a breach of article 8.''''° 
[2006] E W H C 1714 (Admin) [44] 
[2007] E W C A Civ 26, [2008] Q B 
136 Ibid., [11]. 
'^ ^ It is not thought following an examination of the provisions of this Act that a service user 
could successfully invoke the interpretative obligation here. 
yz,(fn 135) [12]. 
Ibid., [16]. 
Ibid, (emphasis original). 
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The second reason why s 3 HRA would be of no benefit in an action against the 
local authority is that, even i f s 26 were prima facie Convention-incompatible, 
interpreting it so as to allow for Convention redress against the local authority in 
the event of outsourcing would go beyond what is 'possible' under s 3. Since s 
26 N A A expressly permits outsourcing, it 'cannot be read or given effect 
compatibly with the Convention rights. The local authority is accordingly 
protected [by s 6(2)(b) H R A " " ] from its alleged breach of the Convention by the 
fact that in privatising the homes it is giving effect to section 26'.'''^ 
Action Against Private Service Provider 
It is difficult to see how a service user could successfully mount a claim against a 
service provider and try to persuade the court to invoke s 3 HRA. The service 
user experiencing or threatened with potentially Convention-infringing behaviour 
such as inhuman treatment or eviction may try to bring a claim for breach of 
contract or trespass to the person'"'^  against the service provider and allege, since 
s 26 permits outsourcing, that it should be interpreted so as to require the service 
provider to respect the Convention upon outsourcing. Since the service user's 
action would lie against the service provider as a private person rather than 
public authority however, the court's power to grant such relief 'as it considers 
just and appropriate'"'"' would not apply - even i f s 3 could be used to read s 26 
Section 6(2)(b): a public authority acting incompatibly with a Convention right does not act 
unlawfully if 'in the case of one or more provisions of... primary legislation which cannot be 
read or given effect in a way which is compatible with the Convention rights, the authority was 
acting so as to give effect to or enforce [them]...' 
" - r L ( f n 135) [23}(Buxton LJ) . 
The interpretative obligation, it is recalled, is engaged when legislation is interpreted and does 
not appear to require that a claim be brought through a statutory cause of action. 
HRA, s 8(1). 
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in this way''*^ - and its ability to offer adequate redress by making a specific 
order greatly diminished.''*^ 
An alternative would be for the service user to argue that s 26 should be read so 
as to allow for a specific remedy against the provider.''*^ It seems however that 
this claim would be likely to fail. The service user in this case would essentially 
contend that s 26 fails to provide an adequate remedy against interferences by the 
private provider with their Convention rights. As Lord Nicholls (with whom all 
of their Lordships agreed) explained in Re S: 
'In Convention terms, failure to provide an effective remedy for infringement of a right 
set out in the Convention is an infringement of article 13. But article 13 is not a 
Convention right as defined in section 1(1) of the Human Rights Act 1998. So 
legislation which fails to provide an effective remedy for infringement of [a Convention 
right]... is not, for that reason, incompatible with a Convention right within the meaning 
of the Human Rights Act.' 
In sum therefore, s 3's interpretative obligation would seem of little assistance to 
a service user in the care home context. 
'^ ^ This attempt to read s 26 compatibly with the Convention would still relate more, in the words 
of Hale L J , to 'what the Act does not say than what it does:' Re S and Re W [2001] E W C A Civ 
757, [ 2 0 0 1 ] H R L R 5 0 [50]. 
'""^  The relative inadequacy of 'private law' damages as compared to specific remedies under the 
H R A is explored in Chapter 5. 
'•"^  This would therefore reflect the HRA's preference for specific remedies over damages (see s 
8) and contrast with the law of contract, which prefers damages and only allows for specific 
performance ' if it is, in the circumstances, the most appropriate remedy': G. H. Treitel, The Law 
of Contract {\\* edn Sweet & Maxwell, London 2003) 1026. 
/?e5(f i i 118) [60]. 
52 
C . C O N C L U S I O N S 
This chapter has advocated 'weak indirect horizontal effect', under which courts 
are required to develop the common law compatibly with Convention values 
rather than apply the rights themselves, as the correct interpretation of the courts' 
obligation under s 6(1) HRA. Especially when considered against the backdrop 
of the uncertainty in Strasbourg jurisprudence surrounding positive obligations, 
strong indirect and direct horizontal effect models risk seriously disrupting 
sophisticated principles of common law to a degree which, I suggest, Parliament 
should not be regarded as having intended. I have also sought to argue that the 
nuances of the weak indirect horizontal effect model generate a balancing 
exercise allowing for a gravitational pull towards the application of the value so 
as to protect the right in those circumstances where Strasbourg jurisprudence 
does reveal that the state would be responsible in Strasbourg. Where applying a 
value so as to protect a right would involve the courts intruding into Parliament's 
sphere by undertaking development akin to 'legislation' however, s 6(6) informs 
the limits of s 6(l)'s duty by suggesting that the courts should decline to afford 
such protection. 
Applying common law and statutory horizontality to the topical context of 
outsourced care home services exposes the difficulties which service users would 
encounter in seeking to enforce their Convention rights against private service 
providers. Consequently, it seems, rights redress can only adequately be provided 
by adopting a wider reading of the public authority provisions than that currently 
taken by the courts. 
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4 . 
Core Public Authorities 
Section 6 HRA provides, so far as is relevant: 
'(1) It is unlawful for a public authority to act in a way which is incompatible with a 
Convention right... 
(3) In this section 'public authority' includes-
(a) a court or tribunal, and 
(b) any person certain of whose functions are functions of a public nature... 
(5) In relation to a particular act, a person is not a public authority by virtue only of 
subsection (3)(b) if the nature of the act is private...' 
'Public authority' is undefined in the Act, but s 6(3) is evidently non-exhaustive 
by its use of the word 'includes'. This has led commentators such as Oliver to 
reason that other public authorities must exist independently of s 6(3), and 
therefore by virtue of the use of the term 'public authority' in s 6(1).'"*^ This 
chapter is concerned with this 'other' category of public authority, which are also 
commonly referred to as 'core', 'true' or 'standard' public authorities. Due 
perhaps to the views of O l i v e r a n d some of their Lordships in Aston 
D. Oliver, 'The frontiers of the State: public authorities and public functions under the Human 
Rights Act' [2000] P L 476. 
150 Ibid. 
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Cantlow^^^ that the core public authority category should be narrowly construed 
(an argument which I later address), core public authorities have received less 
academic and judicial attention than their hybrid counterparts. It is important not 
to overlook this category however, and in this chapter I conduct a thorough 
analysis of it. First, I examine the nature of core public authorities and (second), 
relying on Oliver's work, I identify a basic institutional 'public interest' theme to 
such bodies. Third, I examine relevant existing jurisprudence and argue that the 
views of Strasbourg and the domestic courts concerning which bodies constitute 
'the state' are also built upon public interest foundations. Fourth, I attempt to 
refine the public interest theme with particular reference to charitable 
organisations and voluntary regulators. I do not propose to consider the issue of 
core public authorities relying on their own Convention rights in this chapter. 
Although Davis has advanced compelling normative arguments as to why they 
should be able to do so when in the public interest,'^^ Strasbourg has repeatedly 
affirmed the rule that Art 34 ECHR prohibits governmental organisations from 
ever relying on their own Convention rights.'^^ Art 34 is reflected domestically 
in s 7(7) HRA,'^'* rendering the issue of core public authorities relying on their 
own Convention rights academic (as Davis acknowledges)'^^ for the foreseeable 
future. 
Parochial Church Council of the Parish of Aston Cantlow and Wilmcote with Billesley, 
Warwickshire v Wallbank [2003] U K H L 37, [2004] 1 A C 546. 
H. Davis, 'Public Authorities as "Victims" Under the Human Rights Act' [2005] C L J 315. 
'^ ^ See e.g. Ayunlamiento de Mula v Spain (fri 170). This rule, as explained later, is subject to rare 
instances of public policy as in Radio France, where Strasbourg seems prepared to classify a core 
state body as a non-governmental organisation under Art 34 in order for that body to enforce its 
Convention right to free expression. 
Section 7(7): ' . . . a person is a victim of an unlawful act only if he would be a victim for the 
purposes of Article 34 of the Convention if proceedings were brought in the European Court of 
Human Rights in respect of that act.' 
Davis (fii 152)316. 
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A . T H E N A T U R E O F C O R E P U B L I C A U T H O R I T I E S 
Differing assumptions are frequently made on the nature of core public 
authorities and therefore how to define them. An analysis of the Parliamentary 
material reveals three approaches. The first is an institutional approach, which 
defines a core public authority by who it is. Lord Irvine provided an apt example 
when stating that 'the Armed Forces are obviously at the heart of government 
and ought to be... [regarded as core public authorities].''^^ 
A distinction where core public authorities are concerned can be drawn between 
the factual and legal nature of functions. As will shortly be seen, core public 
authorities are liable in respect of acts whether performed pursuant to public or 
private functions. To this end therefore, all functions and acts performed by core 
public authorities are, in the HRA's eyes, legally public.'" However, a core 
public authority's functions,/o'c/MoZ/y speaking, can be private i f performed for 
the primary benefit of the core public authority:'^* employing cleaning staff for 
local authority offices would be an example. Although the analysis of the 
function's factual nature has no bearing on the liability of the core public 
authority itself, it is relevant, I suggest (and this will be developed more fully in 
Chapter 6 in relation to hybrid public authorities), to the contracting out context, 
where core public authorities' functions are performed by institufionally private 
persons who are alleged by claimants to be performing 'functions of a public 
nature' under s 6(3)(b) HRA. 
Hansard H L vol 584 col 1359 (19 January 1998) (emphasis added). 
As Lord Hope stated, 'Section 6(1)... assumes that everything that a "core" public authority 
does is a public function': Aston Cantlow (fh 151) [41] (emphasis added). 
See Part D. 
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The institutional approach, which focuses on who the body is, can be contrasted 
with the second, functional approach, which defines a core public authority by 
what it does. Mr Straw's contention that a core public authority is a body 'all of 
whose fiinctions are [factually] public' encapsulates this.'^^ 
The third, combined, approach to core public authorities is an amalgam of the 
first two and assumes all of a core public authority's functions to be factually 
public precisely because of who it is. A fiirther observation by Lord Irvine 
demonstrates the combined approach: 
'Clause 6 is designed to apply not only to obvious public authorities such as government 
departments and the police, but also to bodies which are public in certain respects but 
not others. Organisations of this kind will be liable under Clause 6 of the Bill for any of 
their acts, unless the act is of a private nature.''^" 
The bodies 'public in certain respects but not others' to which Lord Irvine refers 
are clearly hybrid bodies under s 6(3)(b) HRA; this then implies that the 
'obvious' or core public authorities are public in all respects including, 
presumably, their functions. The functional and combined approaches are similar 
in that they both assume all of a core public authority's functions to be public, 
but they differ in how to identify a core public authority. Whereas the functional 
approach would seem to require all of a body's functions to be listed and labelled 
factually 'public' before it could qualify as a core public authority, the combined 
approach would require the identification of a public authority by who it is - like 
Hansard H C vol 314 col 409 (17 June 1998). 
"° Hansard H L vol 582 col 1232 (3 November 1997) (emphasis added). 
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the institutional approach - and then assume all of that body's functions to be 
factually public by virtue of its institutional status. 
Arbitrating between institutional and functional approaches, Oliver favours the 
former, firstly because the very words 'public authority' in s 6(1) place the 
emphasis on the nature of the institution.'^' I would agree that the HRA's focus 
is on the institutional rather than the functional because of the sheer 
impracticality - which would no doubt have been known to Parliament - of a 
court having to list all of the functions of, for instance, the Foreign Office or the 
Armed Forces in order to satisfy itself that they were all public and hence that 
those bodies were core public authorities.'^^ 
The combined approach would at least meet this objection since it aims to 
identify a core public authority by institutional factors rather than the 'listing' 
method which would seem integral to the functional approach, but the combined 
approach should also be discounted in favour of the institutional approach. As 
Oliver observes, ' i t is clear that some of the functions of government 
departments are private.''^^ Although a proponent of the combined approach 
would seek to counter this observation by arguing that these functions were 
actually of a factually public nature by virtue of their being performed by a core 
public authority, a function such as employing cleaning staff would undoubtedly 
be private when performed by a private person. The combined approach 
Oliver (fn 149) 480. CfAslon Canilow (fii 151) [85] (Lord Hobhouse). 
See also P. Cane, 'Church, state and human rights: are parish councils public authorities?' 
(2004) 120 L Q R 41,43-44. 
Oliver (fh 149) 478. See also YL v Birmingham City Council [2007] U K H L 27, [2008] 1 A C 
95 [72] (Baroness Hale) and [110] (Lord Mance); P. Craig, Administrative Law {6^^ edn Thomson 
Sweet & Maxwell, London 2008) 571. 
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therefore says nothing useful about the nature of the functions themselves. 
Rather, it merely restates the institutional nature of the body performing a 
particular function. This, too, is potentially misleading: i f all of a core public 
authority's functions are factually public because of who it is, it could be taken to 
mean that all of a private person's functions are private because of who he or she 
is. Such a sharp divide between public and private would sit uncomfortably with 
s 6(3)(b), which clearly presupposes some elision between public and private by 
rendering persons 'certain of whose functions are functions of a public nature' 
public authorities. 
Oliver's second argument in favour of an institutional approach is that: 
'[I]t would be circular [due to the HRA binding both core public authorities and private 
persons exercising public functions] to define an authority as a [core] public authority 
solely or even largely by virtue of the fact that it performed some public functions.''*'* 
This argument, with respect, is harder on its face to follow than her first, but 
appears to suggest a difficulty in determining public functions without a previous 
idea in mind of what the state's core - and therefore what public activity -
actually is. Oliver's argument is forceful when seen in this way. Every state 
possesses a nucleus of bodies performing essential functions, which bodies differ 
fundamentally in character and activity from ordinary 'private' persons. The 
composition of this nucleus may differ from state to state and may even change 
within a single state over time, but will remain present in some form or 
Oliver {ibid.) 480-481. 
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another.'^ ^ A purely functional approach, seeking to ascribe 'core' status to a 
particular body simply by analysing the nature of its functions, would essentially 
distinguish core public authorities from hybrid persons due to the number of 
public functions each performed: i f they were all public, the public authority 
would be core; i f only some were public, it would be hybrid. This would amount 
to the constitutionally artificial proposition that private persons exercising public 
functions are institutionally no different to and possess the same inherent 
objectives as those bodies comprising the nucleus of the state. 
It is the fundamental institutional difference between core public authorities and 
private persons which not only illustrates the need for an institutional approach to 
s 6(1) HRA, but is also significant in any attempts to define 'core public 
authority' and 'functions of a public nature.' 
Section 6(5) Inapplicable 
For the sake of completeness it should be emphasised that s 6(5), which states 
that 'In relation to a particular act, a person is not a public authority by virtue 
only of subsection (3)(b) i f the nature of the act is private', is inapplicable to core 
public authorities.'^^ Aside from this following from s 6(5)'s reference only to 
hybrid public authorities under s 6(3)(b),'^^ Strasbourg jurisprudence also 
demonstrates upon examination that the core of the state must comply with the 
See e.g. Aston Cantlow (fh 151) [159] (Lord Rodger). 
It would now appear judicially settled that this is the case: see e.g. Aston Cantlow {ibid.) [11] 
(Lord Nicholls), [35] and [41] (Lord Hope) and [85] (Lord Hobhouse); YL (fn 163) [37] 
(Baroness Hale), [81], [110] and [119] (Lord Mance), [129] and [169] (Lord Neuberger). Cf R 
(Haggerty) v St Helens Council [2003] E W H C 803 (Admin) [24] (Silber J), 
Oliver (fn 149)479. 
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Convention whether engaging in public or private activity.'^^ It is clear, for 
instance, that Strasbourg regards local authorities - bodies which s 6 HRA would 
recognise as core public authorities'^^ - as governmental organisations always 
precluded from enforcing their own Convention rights.'^'' Additionally, a neat 
homogeneity exists between 'governmental organisations' under Art 34 and 
'core' state bodies engaging state responsibility under the active liability 
principle.''' The message, therefore, would seem to be that bodies regarded by 
Strasbourg as the core of the state are always regarded as the core of the state, 
whether acting in public or private capacities. 
B . T H E B A S I C ' P U B L I C I N T E R E S T ' T H E M E 
Prior to the enactment of the HRA, the government and members of the Houses 
of Commons and Lords gave various examples of bodies which in their opinion 
would qualify as core public authorities under s 6. These included 'the police, the 
courts..., government departments and prisons','^' the armed forces,'" central 
Oliver (ibid.) cites Young, James and Webster v United Kingdom (App nos 7601/76 and 
7806/77) (1982) 4 E H R R 38 as authority for the proposition that 'the obligations of states... 
extend into the exercise of private functions'. However, this appears to misapply Young since the 
European Court in that case proceeded on the basis that British Rail was an institutionally private 
person: [49]. Consequently, the relevant functions were not those of a body analogous to a core 
public authority in domestic law at all. 
See e.g. Poplar Housing and Regeneration Community Association Ltd v Donoghue [2001] 
E W C A Civ 595, [2002] Q B 48, 67 (Lord Woolf CJ); S. Grosz, J. Beatson and P. Duffy, Human 
Rights: The 1998 Act and the European Convention (Sweet & Maxwell, London 2000) 65. 
'™ Ayuntamiento de Mula v Spain (App no 55346/00) (unreported); Danderyds Kommun v 
Sweden (App no 52559/99) (unreported); RENFE v Spain (App no 35216/97) (1997) DR 90-B. 
See, mutatis mutandis, Breisacher v France (App no 76976/01) (unreported). 
Danderyds Kommun {ibid.), applied in that respect in the Scottish case of Grampian 
University Hospitals NHS Trust v Napier 2004 JC 117; Hautanemi v Sweden (App no 24019/94) 
(1996) 22 E H R R CD155; Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines v Turkey (App no 40998/98) 
(2008)47 E H R R 24[81]. 
Hansard H L vol 583 col 796 (24 November 1997) (Lord Irvine of Lairg). 
'^ ^ Hansard (fn 156) (Lord Irvine of Lairg). 
government (including executive agencies) and local government and 
immigration officers.'^'* 
It is difficult to see at first sight what underlies the character of these 'obvious' 
public authorities. In the House of Lords, Baroness Young assumed that all core 
public authorities were created by statute.'^' However, As Jack Straw MP 
observed in the House of Commons, this would not include Secretaries of State, 
which are not established by statute and most of whose powers derive from the 
prerogative or common law.'^^ As Oliver pertinently observes: 
'[T]he most reliable indicator of "publicness" which the government and other bodies 
mentioned above have in common is that generally in our constitutional theory they are 
regarded as being under duties to act only in the public interest as they perceive it to 
be... Private bodies exercising public functions, on the other hand, may be entitled to act 
for profit and generally in their own or their shareholders' interests when not exercising 
public functions...'''' 
Oliver identifies various factors which indicate a body's status as a core public 
authority.'^* Although none are of themselves conclusive, they include the 
exercise of 'authority' itself by the possession of special or coercive powers, 
public funding, a statutory basis (since there 'exists a strong presumption that 
Parliament only legislates i f it considers it to be in the public interest to do so')'^^ 
and democratic accountability. 
Home Office, 'Rights Brought Home: The Human Rights Bill' (Cm 3782, 1997) [2.2]. 
Hansard H L vol 583 col 800 (24 November 1997). 
Hansard H C vol 314 col 413 (17 June 1998). 
Oliver (fn 149) 483-484 (emphasis original). 
481-483. 
Ibid., 482. 
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The possession of 'special' (i.e. particular) powers would seem to be an 
important factor. As Fewings makes clear, for the purposes of administrative law, 
'public' bodies must show specific legal authority for their actions whereas 
private persons possess the residual liberty to act as they wish within the confines 
180 
of the law. Although existing principles of administrative law are not 
coterminous with the scope of the 'public authority' provisions within s 6 
HRA,'^' it would be highly surprising i f a body regarded institutionally as a core 
public authority were not also amenable to judicial review as a public body. 
One would therefore expect core public authorities, properly classified, to be 
caught by the Fewings principle in administrative law. This in turn suggests that 
bodies not imbued with particular legal authority beyond the residual liberty 
possessed by private individuals to perform their day-to-day activities should not 
be regarded as core public authorities since they would otherwise be paralysed by 
the need in administrative law to show specific legal authority for their actions. 
An approach to core public authorities based on the public interest objectives of 
such bodies would seem correct for three reasons. First, not only does it take the 
more favourable institutional rather than functional or combined approach to core 
public authority, but it is also constitutionally realistic by recognising the nucleus 
R V Somerset County Council, ex p Fewings [ 1995] 1 All E R 513 (QB) 524 (Laws J), affirmed 
in the Court of Appeal [1995] 1 W L R 1037, [1995] 2 All E R 20 ( C A ) 1042 (Sir Thomas 
Bingham MR) . C f Malone v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis (No 2) [1979] Ch 344, 
[1979] 2 W L R 700 (Ch) 367, where Sir Robert Megarry V - C declared that if telephone tapping 
by the Post Office 'can be carried out without any breach of the law, it does not require any 
statutory or common law power to justify it'. As Harris notes, Malone 'does not appear to have 
been confidently recognised in the U K courts': B. Harris, 'The "third" source of authority for 
Government action revisited' (2007) 123 L Q R 225, 229. See also I. Leigh, Law. Politics and 
Local Democracy (OUP, Oxford 2000) 42. 
See Chapter 5. 
As Craig observes on the possibility of some link between judicial review and s 6 HRA, 'legal 
claims do not arise in isolation. There will be many cases where a claim based on the HRA will 
be juxtaposed to one concerning Wednesbury unreasonableness, consistency, etc.': P. Craig, 
Administrative Law (5"" edn Thomson Sweet & Maxwell, London 2003) 595-596. 
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of the state and the differing character and purposes of the bodies comprising that 
nucleus. Second, the same public interest theme can be detected in leading 
Strasbourg and domestic cases. Third, as will be seen in Chapter 5 in the context 
of hybrid public authorities, Oliver's approach, when used to analyse the 
Strasbourg jurisprudence, aids in the convincing attribution of a proper role to 
that jurisprudence when determining the meaning of 'public authority' under the 
HRA. 
However, Oliver's 'public interest' theme should not be left in its present form 
and needs refinement; this occurs in Part D of this chapter. 
C . E X I S T I N G J U R I S P R U D E N C E : D E M O N S T R A T I N G T H E 
T H E M E 
In my view, which will be expanded on in Chapter 5 in the context of hybrid 
public authorities, Strasbourg jurisprudence is relevant only to the domestic 
identification of core public authorities under s 6(1) HRA. The contrary views 
expressed by Quane,'^'' the Court of Appeal in R (West) v Lloyd's of London^^'^ 
and the House of Lords in YL v Birmingham City Council^^^ are based on a 
186 
misreading of Aston Cantlow, a misunderstanding of the relevant Strasbourg 
jurisprudence, or both. 
H. Quane, 'The Strasbourg jurisprudence and the meaning of "public authority" under the 
Human Rights Act' [2006] P L 106. 
[2004] E W C A Civ 506, [2004] H R L R 27. 
yz.(fn 163). 
Aston Cantlow (fh 151). 
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It is presently sufficient, however, to keep in mind their Lordships' views in 
Aston Cantlow that Strasbourg jurisprudence is relevant only to identifying core 
public authorities. In that case, a Parochial Church Council (PCC) sought to 
enforce chancel repair liability against lay rectors who contended that to do so 
would interfere with their right to respect for property under Art 1 of the First 
Protocol of the Convention. The House of Lords unanimously dismissed the lay 
rectors' contentions and, in so doing, unanimously held that the PCC was not a 
core public authority, and by a majority (Lord Scott dissenting) that the PCC was 
not a hybrid public authority. Their Lordships evidently had only core public 
authorities in mind when arguing for the utility of Strasbourg jurisprudence to the 
'public authority' concept in s 6 HRA. Having introduced the relevant 
background to the case. Lord Nicholls began by stating: 
'The expression "public authority" is not defined in the Act, nor is it a recognised term 
of art in English law... [T]he broad purpose sought to be achieved by section 6(1) is not 
in doubt. The purpose is that those bodies for whose acts the state is answerable before 
the European Court of Human Rights shall in future be subject to a domestic law 
obligation not to act incompatibly with Convention rights.''*' 
It is crucial to remember that by using the words 'It is unlawful for a public 
authority to act in a way which is incompatible with a Convention right','^^ s 
6(1) HRA uses the term 'public authority' not just to introduce the concept of 
core public authorities, but also as an umbrella term to refer to all species of 
public authority including hybrid public authorities. It is clear that Lord Nicholls 
was using 'public authority' not in the umbrella sense but instead to refer only to 
Ibid., [6]. 
Emphasis added. 
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core public authorities by the nature and examples o f bodies he believed were 
caught by the term. In the next paragraph, he stated: 
'Conformably with this purpose, the phrase "a public authority" in section 6(1) is 
essentially a reference to a body whose nature is governmental in a broad sense of that 
expression. It is in respect of organisations of this nature that the government is 
answerable under the European Convention on Human Rights. Hence, under the Human 
Rights Act a body of this nature is required to act compatibly with Convention rights in 
everything it does. The most obvious examples are government departments, local 
authorities, police and the armed forces.' 
Similarly, Lord Hope saw the relevance o f the Strasbourg law on non-
governmental organisations under Art 34'^° only to core public authority under s 
6(1): 
'The test as to whether a person or body is or is not a "core" public authority for the 
purposes of section 6(1) is not capable of being defined precisely. But it can at least be 
said that a distinction should be drawn between those persons who, in Convention terms, 
are governmental organisations on the one hand and those who are non-governmental 
organisations on the other.'"' 
Lord Rodger said: 
Aston Canilow (fh 151) [7] (emphasis added). See, for concurrent interpretations of Aston 
Cantlow, H. Fenwick, Civil Liberties and Human Rights (4'*' edn Routledge-Cavendish, 
Abingdon 2007) 219; C . Turpin and A. Tomkins, British Government and the Constitution: Text 
and Materials (Law in Context, 6"' edn CUP, Cambridge 2007) 750. 
Art 34: 'The Court may receive applications from any person, non-governmental organisation 
or group of individuals claiming to be the victim of a violation... [of] the Convention.' 
Aston Cantlow {ibid.) [47]. 
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'A purposive construction of that section [6(1)] accordingly indicates that the essential 
characteristic of a public authority is that it carries out a function of government which 
would engage the responsibility of the United Kingdom before the Strasbourg organs.'"" 
This could be taken to refer to 'public authority' in its umbrella sense, but Lord 
Rodger was keen to keep his consideration of the PCC's status as a 'core' public 
authority distinct f rom that o f its status as a 'hybrid ' public authority. The latter 
issue received separate consideration later on in his judgment.'^^ It is therefore 
clear that his Lordship's comment relating to the relevance o f Strasbourg 
jurisprudence was made only in the context of core public authorities. 
Furthermore, Lord Scott, in 'complete agreement' wi th the reasoning o f both 
Lord Hope and Lord Rodger on the core public authority p o i n t , e v i d e n t l y 
believed them to speak with one voice on the issue. 
The only member o f the House not to state an explicit opinion was Lord 
Hobhouse, but even he tacitly agreed with Lord Hope's approach when declaring 
during his analysis o f whether the PCC was a core public authority that 'The 
Strasbourg jurisprudence has already been deployed... [by Lord Hope] and 1 
need not repeat i t . ' ' ^ ' 
It is now possible, with a clearer view in mind as to how the relevant Strasbourg 
jurisprudence relates to the domestic 'public authority' concept within s 6 HRA, 
to examine that jurisprudence more closely. I argue in this part o f the chapter that 
in the jurisprudence on 'governmental organisations' under Art 34 and on active 
lbid.,\\k^\ 192 
"'/6/c/.,[169]-[173]. 
Ibid., [87]. 
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State liability, Strasbourg's view on which bodies constitute the core o f the state 
is underlain by a 'public interest' theme; that is to say, Strasbourg regards as the 
core o f the state those bodies whose primary purpose is to serve the public -
rather than their own - interest. This is also reflected in two relevant domestic 
cases. 
ECHR: Article 34 and Governmental Organisations 
The effect o f Ar t 34 ECHR,'^^ as previously mentioned, is that governmental 
organisations cannot f i le applications in Strasbourg alleging the infringement o f 
their Convention rights. Consequently, a rich tapestry o f jurisprudence has 
emerged from Strasbourg on which bodies do or do not constitute such 
organisations. 
Holy Monasteries v Greece 
In Holy Monasteries,^'^'' the applicant monasteries alleged breaches o f Art 1 o f 
the First Protocol and Arts 6, 9, 11, 13 and 14 ECHR after Greek legislation 
required the transfer o f certain o f the monasteries' property to the Greek state. 
The government's preliminary objection that the applicants were governmental 
organisations incapable o f making an Art 34 application was rejected by the 
European Court, which noted 'at the outset that the applicant monasteries do not 
exercise governmental powers.''^^ To support its findings, the court drew 
attention to four factors.'^^ First, the monasteries possessed essentially spiritual 
and ecclesiastical rather than public administration objectives. Second, their 
See text to fn 190. 
Holy Monasteries v Greece (App nos 13092/87 and 13984/88) (1995) 20 E H R R 
Ibid., [49]. 
Ibid. 
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classification as public law entities in domestic law demonstrated only the 
domestic legislature's desire to protect them to the same extent as - rather than 
equate them with - other public law entities. Third, the monastery councils' only 
power consisted o f making rules concerning spiritual l ife and the internal 
administration o f monasteries. Fourth, the monasteries were under the 
supervision o f the local archbishop rather than the state, and as such were 
'completely independent' o f the state.'°° 
The court's second stated factor emphasises that the domestic categorisation of a 
body w i l l not be conclusive o f its status in Strasbourg. When taken as a whole, 
factors one, three and four, I suggest, amount to the conclusion that the 
monasteries were not bodies whose primary purpose was to serve the public 
interest. The court's reference to 'public administration' objectives in the first o f 
its stated factors is illuminating. Despite omitting an explanation as to what 
would constitute such objectives, the court seems to have had in mind those 
bodies whose objectives are to manage and/or provide for society and therefore 
to serve the public interest. Public administration objectives may be incapable of 
precise definition but the clear message, in the court's view, is that the lack of a 
public administration objective meant that the monasteries lacked an obvious 
public interest purpose. The possession of ecclesiastical and spiritual objectives 
per se was seemingly insufficient in the court's view to amount to such a public 
interest purpose, although it is unclear why. One possible explanation, however, 
could lie in the diff icul ty o f confidently asserting a correlation between the 
religious and the public interest without first addressing the theological issue o f 
Ibid. 
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whether the religious views held by the particular body in question are 
defensible. Whether or not this did underlie the court's reasoning is unknown, 
but suffice it to say that the increasing societal trend towards secularism is likely 
to render this argument - that religious interests do not necessarily correlate with 
the public interest - more socially realisfic with the passing o f time.^*" 
The possession of 'special authority, in the sense of [for example] coercive 
powers over the civi l and political rights o f individuals' may be a relevant factor 
as to whether a body has as its primary purpose the service o f the public interest 
because, as Oliver observes, many core public authorities possess such 
authority.""^ The thrust of the court's third stated factor (that the monastery 
councils could only regulate the monasteries' internal workings), it would seem, 
is that the regulatory authority possessed by the monastery councils only allowed 
the monasteries to bind themselves, and consequently did not extend to any 
authority over other individuals at all. 
The court's fourth stated factor (independence) is also relevant to the public 
interest. Private persons are free within the constraints o f the law to further their 
own rather than the public interest.'^^^ The stronger their institutional ties to and 
assimilation with the state's nucleus however, the greater is the possibility that 
they behave like the nucleus and that their primary purpose is to serve the public 
interest rather than their own. Bodies with restricted institutional independence 
from the state's nucleus may, therefore, be governmental organisations and core 
For interesting related comments on growing secularism, see D. Nicholls, The Pluralist State 
(Macmillan, London 1975). 
Oliver (fn 149)481. 
f ew/«g5 (fii 180). 
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public authorities. Whether this is so w i l l of course depend on the specific facts 
of each case, but the logical relevance o f institutional independence to the 
applicants' objectives explains the court's mention o f it. 
Further Cases 
In Ayuntamiento de Mula^^* a local borough council lodged an application 
alleging the breach of Art 6(1) ECHR after a domestic dispute over the 
ownership o f a town castle. Dismissing the application under Art 34, the 
European Court o f Human Rights said: 
'[L]ocal-govemment organisations are public-law bodies which perform official duties 
assigned to them by the Constitution and by substantive law. They are therefore quite 
clearly governmental organisations.'^"^ 
Although Holy Monasteries demonstrates that the domestic law classification of 
a body is not conclusive o f its status in Strasbourg, the court's reference in 
Ayuntamiento de Mula to 'public-law bodies' and 'of f ic ia l dufies' assigned by 
the constitution, echoing the Commission's language in the earlier case of 
Consejo General,^^^ appears to reveal Strasbourg's view that the bodies 
comprising the core or 'nucleus' of the state differ ftindamentally in institutional 
character and behaviour f rom private persons. As I argued in Part B o f this 
chapter, Oliver's view that the distinguishing feature o f such core bodies is their 
Ayuntamiento de Mula v Spain (fii 170), applied in this respect in Assanidze v Georgia (App 
no 71503/01) (2004) 39 E H R R 32 [148]. 
""^ Ayuntamiento de Mula {ibid.) This is so even if those councils are independent legal persons: 
Danderyds Kommun v Sweden (fn 170). 
Consejo General de Colegios Oficiales de Economistas de Espana v Spain (App nos 26114/95 
and 26455/95) (1995) D R 82-B. Here, the Commission held that the General Council of Spanish 
Economists, a professional regulatory body created by statute, was a governmental organisation 
incapable of filing an application under Art 34. 
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duty to serve the public as opposed to their own interest is accurate. Consejo 
General and Ayuntamiento de Mula may not be explicit authority for 
Strasbourg's 'public interest' approach therefore, but the public interest theme 
does usefully explain why, particularly, 'public-law bodies' performing 'off icial 
duties' constitute governmental organisations under Art 34. 
Radio France: a Public Policy Exception 
In Radio France^'^'' the claimants alleged the breaches o f Arts 6, 7 and 10 ECHR 
after encountering domestic sanction for broadcasting damning stories about the 
former deputy mayor o f Paris. In reaching its decision that Radio France, a state-
financed radio broadcaster, was a non-governmental organisation capable of 
filing an Art 34 application, the court said that in order to identify a 
governmental organisation: 
'[A]ccount must be taken of its [the body's] legal status and, where appropriate, the 
rights that status gives it, the nature of the activity it carries out and the context in which 
it is carried out, and the degree of independence from the political authorities.'^"* 
The court then noted that domestic law placed Radio France under the direct 
control o f an independent regulator, that Radio France operated in a sector open 
to competition rather than holding a monopoly and that it exercised no 
'authority' in the form o f 'powers beyond those conferred by ordinary law'.^ *^^ It 
continued: 
Radio France v France (App no 53984/00) (2005) 40 E H R R 29. The relevant decision is the 
admissibility decision of 23 September 2003. 
Ibid., [26]. 
^''Ibid. 
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'Thus, although Radio France has been entrusted with public-service missions and 
depends to a considerable extent on the State for its financing, the legislature has 
devised a framework which is plainly designed to guarantee its editorial independence 
and institutional autonomy... The court accordingly concludes that Radio France is a 
"non-governmental organisation" within the meaning of Article 34. . . '^'° 
Despite being subject to ordinary company law, Radio France was (a) created by 
law, (b) required by law to undertake public service missions in the general (i.e. 
public) interest where other providers were not similarly so required, (c) under 
government supervision, (d) financed by taxes and (e) subject to particular public 
service obligations such as the need to ensure public service continuity in staff 
recruitment.^" Radio France would therefore appear to be a body established to 
serve the public interest and consequently a 'governmental organisation' under 
Art 34, but the court drew heavily upon Radio France's institutional 
independence to support its conclusion that it was a non-governmental 
organisation. 
There are two possible interpretations, I suggest, o f the court's decision in Radio 
France. The first is that Radio France's independence rendered it a body whose 
primary purpose was to serve its own interests as opposed to those o f the public. 
The second, 'public policy' , interpretation is that Radio France was an 
institutionally governmental organisation, but that the fundamental importance o f 
media freedom required it to vindicate its own rights against the state by filing an 
Art 34 application and, as such, required it to be treated as a non-governmental 
organisation in this case. 
Ibid, (emphasis added). 
-" Ibid., [24]. 
73 
The first interpretation is unconvincing. First, Radio France was undeniably 
required to serve the public interest in its activities. As the court observed, 
domestic law imposed upon it 'more than a hundred obligations, concerning its 
educational, cultural and social missions in pa r t i cu l a r . ' ^Second , that 
independent, institutionally private persons are generally free to further their own 
rather than the public interest within the confines o f the law does not logically 
produce the conclusion that independent bodies w i l l always have as their purpose 
the furtherance o f their own interests."^Despite its relevance,^''' a body's 
institutional independence is therefore a factor o f uncertain general moment 
whose precise significance w i l l depend on the facts o f each case. The court's 
treatment o f it as highly persuasive i f not decisive in Radio France is 
questionable given Radio France's clear public interest objectives. 
Given this, the public policy argument that media organisations should be able to 
enforce their right to freedom of expression (and any rights incidental to the 
enforcement o f that right) against the state and should consequently be treated as 
non-governmental organisations is more convincing. The particular and 
fundamental importance o f a free press has been recognised domestically^'^ and 
by Strasbourg,^and clearly featured in the court's reasoning in Radio France 
when it was keen for its conclusions to correlate wi th Recommendation No. R 
(96) 10 o f the Committee o f Ministers o f the Council o f Europe to member States 
See e.g. RENFE v Spain {fn 170), where the railway provider was a governmental authority 
despite possessing a distinct legal personality and consequent administrative autonomy, and 
Danderyds Kommun (fh 170), where the local municipality was a governmental organisation 
despite being 'an independent legal person, acting in its own capacity'. 
On this, see Mykhaylenky v Ukraine (App no 35091/02) (unreported) [44]. 
Derbyshire County Council v The Times Newspapers Ltd [1993] A C 534, [1993] 2 W L R 449 
(HL) . 
Observer and Guardian v United Kingdom (App no 13585/88) (1992) 14 E H R R 153; Jersildv 
DenmarkiApp no 15890/89) (1995) 19 E H R R 1. 
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on the guarantee o f the independence o f public service broadcasting, 'whose 
recitals reiterate that the independence of the media is essential for the 
functioning o f a democratic society'.^'^ Furthermore, characterising the Radio 
France decision as a public policy exception would represent a more nuanced 
analysis o f Radio France's status. The conclusion that Radio France's 
independence rendered it a body whose purpose was to serve the private as 
opposed to public interest could prevent Strasbourg f rom declaring it a 'core' 
state body capable o f engaging France's state responsibility under the active 
liability principle^'* or, in the same vain, a 'public authority' capable of 
interfering with, for instance, the right to privacy under Art 8 ECHR."'^ 
Characterising Radio France as a public policy exception, however, would 
confine the conclusion - that a body which would ordinarily be a core state body 
can nevertheless be a non-governmental organisation - to those situations where 
'state' media organisations seek to vindicate their own rights to freedom of 
expression. 
ECHR: Active Liability 
Four cases arising for consideration here are Van der Mussele,^^^ Wos^'^^ 
Sychev'^^ and Appleby They do not, I suggest, explicitly reveal a 'public 
Radio France (fti 207) [26]. 
It is recalled that a strong if not conclusive link exists in Strasbourg jurisprudence between 
core state bodies under the active liability principle and 'governmental organisations' under Art 
34; Danderyds Kommun v Sweden (fh 170); Hautanemi v Sweden (fh 171); Islamic Republic of 
Iran Shipping Lines v Turkey (fh 171). 
The 'public interest' theme clearly underlies the approach to 'public authority' in Art 10, for 
instance: Casado Coca v Spain (App no 15450/89) (1994) 18 E H R R 1. 
For a similar case in which a 'public law' broadcaster's independence was emphasised in 
order to justify its classification as a non-governmental organisation for the purposes of filing an 
Art 10 complaint, see Osterreichischer Rundfunk v Austria (App no 35841/02) (unreported). 
Van der Mussele v Belgium (App no 8919/80) (1984) 6 E H R R 163. 
--- Wos V Poland (App no 22860/02) (2007) 45 E H R R 28. The relevant decision is the Court's 
admissibility decision of 1 March 2005. 
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interest' theme to Strasbourg's view of which bodies engage the state's 
responsibility under the active liability principle. Rather, the highly fact-specific 
outcomes in these cases can be comfortably and usefully rationalised by 
reference to the public interest theme. 
In Van der Mussele, a pupil advocate alleged breaches o f Arts 4(2), 1 of the First 
Protocol and 14 ECHR when compelled by the institutionally independent 
Belgian Order o f Advocates to provide free legal services to indigent persons. 
Although finding no ultimate breach of the Convention, the European Court 
rejected the government's prior submission that Belgium could not be 
responsible for the actions o f the Order of Advocates. According to the court, 
Belgium had chosen to ensure its compliance wi th the Art 6 ECHR obligation to 
provide such legal services by compelling the Order to compel advocates to 
undertake the work, which solution could not 'relieve the Belgian state o f the 
responsibilities it would have incurred... had it chosen to operate the system 
itself.'"^^ It is clear that the Belgian state was under an obligation deriving from 
the Convention itself, but the court fails to clarify the particular relevance o f 
Convention as opposed to, for instance, domestic law obligations on the state. 
Furthermore, the court fails to clarify why the fulf i lment of an obligation as 
opposed to, for instance, the performance o f any other function by an 
institufionally independent body on the state's behalf w i l l engage the state's 
responsibility. In short, the limits to the 'delegation' principle are diff icul t to 
discern: nothing in the court's reasoning in Van der Mussele explains why the 
state's responsibility w i l l not be engaged by the performance o f any function 
Sychev v Ukraine (App no 4773/02) (unreported). 
Appleby v United Kingdom (App no 44306/98) (2003) 37 E H R R 38. 
Van der Mussele (fh 221) [29]. 
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(such as cleaning government offices) by any independent person on behalf of 
the state. 
Van der Mussele can be sensibly rationalised and its ambit identified when 
analysed using the public interest theme. Despite the institutional independence 
of the Order o f Advocates, its primary purpose was to serve the public interest by 
regulating the relevant arm of the Belgian legal profession; indeed, it was 
established by domestic law for this very reason.^^^ The court, evidently, did not 
see the Order o f Advocates as an institutionally private person with the primary 
purpose o f furthering its own interests. The Order was, the court noted, endowed 
with 'legal personality in public law' and 'associated with the exercise of judicial 
power'. ' That the Order o f Advocates was a body whose primary purpose was 
to further the public interest is, I suggest, the underlying reason why it was 
regarded as a core state body capable o f engaging the state's responsibility under 
the active liability principle. 
In Wos, the applicant had been subjected to forced labour in Nazi-occupied 
Poland during the Second World War and applied for compensation to the 
Polish-German Reconciliation Foundation (PGRF), a body regulated by domestic 
private law and established after international treaty wi th Germany to distribute 
compensation scheme funds. The applicant claimed that the PGRF had 
incorrectly calculated his level of compensation and, after unsuccessful domestic 
action, alleged the breach of Art 6 ECHR. The European Court held that the 
PGRF's actions were capable of engaging Poland's state responsibility and, as in 
'-''Ibid., [15]. 
Ibid., [29]. 
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Van der Mussele, based its conclusion upon the delegation o f state powers to the 
PGRF.^^* Again however, the court gave no indication as to what constituted 
'state powers'. Like Belgium's delegation in Van der Mussele to the Order of 
Advocates o f the performance of its international obligation to render free legal 
assistance under Ar t 6, the Polish state in Wos was also under an international 
treaty obligation - this time to administer the compensation funds. The effective 
ratio decidendi o f these cases could therefore be that the performance by an 
institutionally independent person of a state's international obligations engages 
the state's responsibility. However, the court could have easily articulated such a 
principle i f it wished. Additionally, it is unclear f rom the judgment why the 
performance o f an international obligation - or any obligation for that matter -
sets the parameters o f active liability. 
Again, I suggest, Wos can be made sense of when analysed using the public 
interest theme. The court noted in its judgment that the PGRF was a foundation 
which, under domestic law, was 'established in order to carry out socially and 
economically beneficial goals which comply with the basic interests o f the 
Republic o f Poland.'^"^ It can therefore be said that the PGRF, established to 
administer the compensation schemes, had as its purpose the service of the public 
rather than its own interest. This is supported by the court's further observations 
on the PGRF's institutional character, namely that it was founded by a 
government minister who controlled the composition o f the PGRF's supervisory 
board and management board and that the Minister o f the State Treasury could 
Wos V Poland (fn 222) [72]-[73]. 
'-'Ibid., [22]. 
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exercise 'a certain degree of control and supervision over the Foundation'. 
Therefore, 'the government had at its disposal substantial means o f influencing 
the Foundation's operations'.^^' That the Foundation's primary purpose was to 
serve the public interest is, I suggest, why the PGRF was found to engage 
Poland's responsibility under the active liability principle. 
In Sychev, the European Court decided that the omissions o f a judgment-
executing Liquidation Commission engaged the state's responsibility. Sychev is 
more dif f icul t to analyse because, as wi l l be seen in my analysis o f Quane's 
views in Chapter 5, the European Court relied to questionable effect on Costello-
Roberts v United Kingdom^^^ as authority for the proposition that a private 
person could engage the state's responsibility when performing state powers. It is 
diff icul t to tell f rom the court's account o f the Liquidation Commission's 
characteristics whether it was a body whose primary purpose was to serve the 
public interest or its own. The Commission comprised representatives of the 
main creditors o f the Lenina coal mine, a bankrupt state-owned entity,^"'^ which 
might suggest that those creditors and hence the Commission had as their 
primary purpose the service o f the creditors' own interests by seeking to recover 
the creditors' debts. However, the main creditors included 'several State owned 
companies'^^"* which, i f they were bodies whose primary purposes were to serve 
the public interest, could indicate the contrary. It is therefore diff icult to tell, 
Ibid., [68]. 
Ibid. 
(App no 13134/87) (1995) 19 E H R R 112. Costello-Roberts is best seen as a 'passive liability' 
(positive obligation) case: see Chapter 5 and e.g. C . Ovey and R. White, Jacobs & White: The 
European Convention on Human Rights (4"" edn OUP, Oxford 2006) 86. 
-^^ Sychev (fh 223) [6]. 
Ibid. 
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despite what I regard as the court's erroneous reliance on Coslello-Roberts, 
whether the court in Sychev reached the correct decision on the facts. 
A case which falls clearly on the 'private' side o f the line however is Appleby, in 
which the private owner o f a shopping centre reftising the applicants the right to 
petition the public was held not to be able to engage the state's responsibility 
under the active liability principle when those applicants alleged the breaches o f 
Arts 10 and 11 ECHR. It is evident that the owner o f the centre (Postel Properties 
Ltd) was a body which had as its primary purpose the service o f its own interests. 
Postel purchased the town centre in which the shopping centre was located from 
the Washington Development Corporation, a body established under statute to 
build the new town centre."^^ Although the ability to enter into commercial 
transactions could not o f itself render the body a private person since many core 
state bodies can also do so, it can indicate that body's ability to make profit and 
therefore serve its own interests. Since Postel Ltd was essentially 'run as a 
commercial business',"^^ it was an institutionally private person which had as its 
primary purpose the service o f its own interests. As such, the court was right, I 
suggest, not to regard it as a body capable of engaging the state's responsibility. 
Domestic Law 
It is argued that a clear public interest theme to the courts' reasoning can be 
idenfified in each o f the following two cases. 
Appleby {fnllA) [11]. 
This would rightly appear to be a strong indicator of the private as opposed to 'state' nature of 
a body: Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines v Turkey (fri 171) [81]; Ukraine-Tyumen v 
Ukraine (App no 22603/02) (unreported). 
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Aston Cantlow 
Here, it is recalled, the principal question was whether the Parochial Church 
Council (PCC) was a public authority - core or hybrid - under s 6 HRA. The 
Court of Appeal held that the PCC was a core public authority. '" Sir Andrew 
Morritt V-C, giving the judgment of the court, emphasised the following: 
'[First, the P C C ] . . . is an authority in the sense that it possesses powers which private 
individuals do not possess to determine how others should act. Thus, in particular, its 
notice to repair has statutory force. [Second] It is public in the sense that it is created and 
empowered by law; [third] that it forms part of the church by law established; and 
[fourth] that its functions include the enforcement through the courts of a common law 
liability to maintain its chancels resting upon persons who need not be members of the 
church.'"' 
As previously mentioned, the possession of special authority can be an indicator 
that a body is a core public authority whose primary purpose is to serve the 
public interest.^^^ The second factor - legal basis (here through delegated 
legislation)^''*' - also suggests an objective o f serving the public interest because, 
as previously mentioned. Parliament is presumed only to legislate i f it would be 
in the public interest to do so.""" The third factor, although the House of Lords 
appeared to disagree on the basis o f Holy Monasteries, would seem to imply that 
a PCC, representing an integral part in the workings o f the Church of England, 
had as its primary purpose the service o f the public interest because the Church 
of England itself was a core public authority with the same purpose. The fourth 
[2001] E W C A Civ 713, [2002] Ch 51. 
"''Ibid., [35]. 
Oliver (fn 149)481. 
Aston Cantlow (fn 237) [32] (Sir Andrew Morritt V - C ) . 
Oliver (fn 149)482. 
factor (enforcing common law liability) seems to relate to the first factor by 
suggesting that the PCC's powers were coercive in the sense that they were 
deployable against subjects against their will, and not simply those who 
voluntarily assumed membership of the Church. Taken as a whole, these factors 
strongly suggest that the PCC was a core public authority because its primary 
purpose was to serve the public interest rather than its own. 
The House of Lords, it is recalled, reached the unanimous conclusion that the 
PCC was not a core public authority after a closer and more reliable inspection of 
the PCC's characteristics.'^''^ Their Lordships' judgment is clearly underlain by 
the sentiment that the PCC's primary purpose was to serve its own rather than the 
public interest. Lord Hobhouse's view that the PCC 'acts in the sectional not the 
public interest' notwithstanding that there may have been ancillary public interest 
benefits to its activities, is a clear indicator of this.^ '*" Lord Nicholls also believed 
the Church of England to be an essentially religious rather than governmental 
organisation '^*'' and that, since the PCC's role was to promote and manage the 
Church's mission locally, it was engaged in mere self-governance and the 
'promotion of its own affairs.'"''^ However, as seen above, it is difficult to make 
conclusive statements regarding the correlation (or lack thereof) between the 
religious and public interest without addressing the defensibility of the Church of 
England's religious views.'^ ''^  Consequently, it is difficult to assess whether the 
particular views of Lords Hobhouse and Nicholls that the PCC's purpose of 
^•"^ Aslon Cantlow (fii 151). 
Ibid., [86]. 
Ibid., [13]. See also [156] (Lord Rodger). 
-*^Ibid, [14]. 
The courts may well be reluctant on public policy grounds to undertake such a task anyway: R 
V Chief Rabbi of the United Hebrew Congregations, ex p Wachmann [1992] 1 W L R 1036, [1993] 
2 All E R 249 (QB) 1043 (Simon Brown J). 
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religious advancement fails to correlate with the public interest are correct on the 
facts. 
Nevertheless, other factors enunciated by their Lordships indicate that the PCC's 
primary purpose was not to further the public interest. Consonantly with the 
factors mentioned by Oliver as evidence of a body's public interest objectives,^''^ 
Lord Hope observed that the PCC lacked public accountability or public funding, 
and the powers it possessed to enforce chancel liability could not be deployed 
against the general public or a class of it.^"* Additionally, contrary to the Court of 
Appeal's analysis of the Church of England's status, it lacked legal 
personality.'^ "^ Again consonant with Oliver's view on the significance of a 
statutory basis, no Act of Parliament purported to establish the Church, and the 
relationship enjoyed by it with the state was one of recognition rather than 
devolution of power from state to Church.^ *^* As Lord Rodger observed, PCC's 
'were not constituted by statute but by the Church... to carry out functions 
determined by... the Church.'•^ '^ Moreover, applying Holy Monasteries and 
Hautanemi^^^ the PCC would fail to engage the state's responsibility in 
Strasbourg.^" Lord Scott, it is recalled, agreed with both Lord Hope and Lord 
Rodger on the core public authority point.^ '^* This reference to Strasbourg 
jurisprudence, because of its apparent public interest theme to the identification 
Oliver (fh 149)481-483. 
Aston Cantlow (in 151) [59]. 
249 Ibid., [61]. 
Ibid. 
~^'jbid.,[\52l 
Hautanemi v Sweden (fh 171). The Commission held, because the Church of Sweden was a 
non-governmental organisation under Art 34, that its actions could not engage the state's 
responsibility under the Convention. 
Aston Cantlow (fti 151) [164]-[166]. See also [49] (Lord Hope) and [86] (Lord Hobhouse), 
"'/A/W., [129]. 
of bodies as 'core' state entities, is also a strong indicator of the public interest 
theme in domestic law. 
Cameron v Network Rail Infrastructure Ltd 
In Cameron,'^^ the defendant, Network Rail Infrastructure Ltd (formerly 
Railtrack pic), was a company created and vested with the railway infrastructure 
as part of the privatisation of the railway network. A number of people were 
killed in the Potters Bar rail crash of 2002, which occurred on a stretch of railway 
owned and controlled by the defendant. The claimants - the daughters and 
executor of one of the deceased - claimed inter alia that the defendant had 
breached the right to life under Art 2 ECHR. Sir Michael Turner held that 
Network Rail was not a public authority under s 6 HRA. 
Regarding the core public authority point. Sir Michael listed various significant 
f ac to r s .F i r s t , the business of running a railway was not 'intrinsically an 
activity of government' since the 'very purpose of privatisation' was to 'sever the 
railways from direct governmental control'. Second, there was a 'clear 
commercial objective' to Railtrack's performance since it was 'concerned to 
make profits for its shareholders'. Third, Railtrack was under no obligation 'to 
conduct its operations in a manner subservient to the public interest' and could 
behave, subject to its licence conditions, however it saw fit in order to achieve its 
objectives of profit. Fourth, it was not democratically accountable. Fifth, its 
board of directors was appointed by the company under no government influence 
[2006] E W H C 1133 (QB), [2007] 1 W L R 163. 
Ibid., [29]. 
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or control. Sixth, it possessed no special powers or immunities other than those 
possessed by private individuals. Seventh, it was not publicly funded. 
Sir Michael's second, third and fifth factors clearly indicate that he saw the 
defendant as a person whose primary purpose was to serve its own interests 
rather than those of the public. This is supported in particular by Railtrack's lack 
of democratic accountability, special powers and public funding, any of which -
i f present - could have indicated in part its status as a 'public interest' body and 
hence a core public authority.^" Additionally, Railtrack's lack of'special powers 
beyond those which... [pertain to] relations between individuals'^^* should be a 
telling indicator of its status as a private person due to the potential difficulty 
were it to be classified as a core public authority of demonstrating specific legal 
authority for its actions under Fewings. 
In sum therefore, a closer inspection of both Strasbourg and domestic law reveals 
the presence of the public interest theme to the courts' reasoning. Broadly 
speaking, bodies engaging the state's responsibility or qualifying as 
governmental organisations under Art 34 in Strasbourg are, like core public 
authorities under the HRA, distinguished from private persons by the central 
feature of having as their primary purpose the service of the public interest rather 
than their own. Upon closer analysis, Radio France, I suggest, evidences a public 
policy exception at the Strasbourg level which may allow media organisations 
which would ordinarily be regarded as core state bodies to be classed as 'non-
governmental organisations' in order to enforce their Convention rights to free 
Oliver (fn 149)481-483. 
Cameron (fii 255) [29] (Sir Michael Turner). 
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speech. When viewed as such in domestic law, this public policy doctrine 
represents a Strasbourg-recognised exception to the assumption in Aston Cantlow 
that core public authorities can never enforce their own Convention rights."^^ 
D. REFINING T H E PUBLIC I N T E R E S T T H E M E 
This basic theme, I suggest, needs refining in two respects. First, I argue that core 
public authorities are at times capable of furthering their own interests. Second, I 
argue that bodies which have voluntarily assumed their public interest objectives 
remain institutionally private persons unless they have undergone subsequent 
adoption by the state. 
Furthering the Self-interest 
My use throughout this chapter of the words the 'primary purpose' in serving the 
public interest has been deliberate in order to reflect my view that core public 
authorities, at times, are capable of furthering their own interests. Oliver's 
essential thesis, upon which this chapter has attempted to build, is that core 
public authorities are distinct from private persons because their purpose is to 
serve the public interest. In other words, self-service is the hallmark of typically 
private activity or private functions; selflessness the hallmark of public. 
See, on this assumption, Aston Cantlow (fri 151) [8] (Lord Nicholls). 
Indeed, Oliver believes (fri 149) the performance of a public function under s 6(3)(b) to go 
hand in hand with a duty of altruism: 484. However, as Chapter 6 demonstrates, whilst this may 
be true of the exercise of coercive powers, it is not necessarily true of the second strand to 
'ftinctions of a public nature', namely the performance of a public function on a core public 
authority's behalf 
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Oliver's view is that a core public authority's purpose is to serve only the public 
interest.^^' But, as seen in Part A, she also believes that such bodies are capable 
(factually) of exercising private functions because they behave 'in ways that are 
on all fours with the ways in which private bodies act.'^ ^" In response however, it 
is difficult to see how core public authorities can ever act 'on all fours with' 
private persons i f everything they do is for the fundamentally different purpose 
of ftirthering the public interest. In other words, given Oliver's views on the link 
between private interest and private ftanctions, it is difficult - i f Oliver's view 
that core public authorities always behave in the public interest is correct - to see 
how they could ever exercise factually private functions. 
The more realistic view is that core public authorities will sometimes further 
their own interests. A local authority's employment of cleaning staff, for 
example, is a function which could loosely be said to benefit the public since it 
indirectly and tenuously facilitates the performance of that authority's statutory 
and common law duties. But the function of employing deeming staff would 
undoubtedly be a factually private fianction when performed by a core public 
authority. This is not because it is a contractual transaction similarly capable of 
performance by a private person but, I suggest, because first and foremost the 
local authority is furthering its own interests. The prime, immediate beneficiary 
of the employment of these staff is the local authority and its employees. Given 
the tenuous and indirect benefit upon the public, the function cannot realistically 
Oliver {ibid.) 483-484. 
Ibid., 478. 
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be said to be in furtherance of the public interest when the body feeling the 
immediate effects of the performance of that function is the performer itself 
Oliver cites R v Somerset County Council, ex p Fewings^^^ to demonstrate that 
core public authorities behave in furtherance of the public interest in everything 
that they do. Laws J said: 
'A public body has no heritage of legal rights which it enjoys for its own sake; at every 
turn, all of its dealings constitute the fulfilment of duties which it owes to others; indeed, 
it exists for no other purpose... It is in this sense that it has no rights of its own, no axe 
to grind beyond its public responsibility: a responsibility which defines its purpose and 
justifies its existence.'"" 
These comments were made outwith the human rights context, instead concerned 
with the issue of a public body's need to show specific legal authority for its 
actions. Fewings cannot be taken too literally in the HRA sphere. I f a core public 
authority's purpose is to further the public interest every time it performs a 
function, Fewings produces the conclusion when taken with Oliver's views on 
the nature of functions that the body's functions are all of a factually public 
nature. This in turn retreats to the 'combined' approach to core public authorities 
and should not, for the reasons given in Part A, be encouraged. 
It may therefore be necessary to draw a distinction between staff with and without public-
facing roles. C f Oliver (ibid.), who appears to believe that employing any member of staff would 
be a private function. However, her assertion is based upon the law of judicial review which, as 
will be seen in Chapter 5, should not be regarded as coterminous with the meaning of s 6's 
'public authority' provisions. 
Fewings (fn 180). 
Ibid., 524. 
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Alternatively, my interpretation of Oliver's views could be inaccurate and she 
may have an alternative method in mind of identifying a body's private 
functions. Perhaps a 'private' function is defined simply as a function which 
ordinary persons are capable of performing. This, after all, is what she could 
have meant when referring to core public authorities behaving in ways 'on all 
fours with' private persons. Typical examples of private functions include 
commercial transactions such as, she says, employing staff or letting and 
disposing of land."^^ 
However, such an approach would be too crude, and risks generating the 
conclusion (reached by the majority in Ylf^'' that all functions performed 
pursuant to commercial transactions are private functions. This would in turn 
represent a suspiciously restricted view of the reach of s 6(3)(b) HRA which, by 
rendering as public authorities 'any person certain of whose functions are... of a 
public nature', was intended at least by the government to apply to those bodies 
performing functions in the commercial context of contracting out.~^* The notion 
that the factual nature of a core public authority's functions is defined with 
reference to the public-private interest would therefore appear the more attractive 
one. 
Laws J's dicta in Fewings are best seen as authority for the proposition that a 
core public authority cannot further its own, private, interests in the event of 
Oliver (fh 149)478. 
YL (fh 163). For fhller discussion, see Chapter 5. 
Hansard H C vol 314 col 409 (17 June 1998) (Mr Jack Straw MP). This restricted view -
which is criticised in Chapter 6 - is indeed Oliver's precise thesis: D. Oliver, 'Functions of a 
public nature under the Human Rights Act' [2004] P L 329. 
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conflict with the public interest.'^ ^^ After all, it is only really in such a case, to 
borrow his Lordship's phraseology, that the body is grinding its own axe beyond 
its public responsibility. But this would not prevent core public authorities 
validly serving their own interests where there is no clash with the public interest 
and, as a result, neatly reconciles Fewings with the need to draw a principled 
distinction between the 'public' and 'private' functions performed by bodies 
under the HRA. 
Voluntary Assumption of Public Interest Objectives 
The basic theme - that core public authorities are bodies whose primary purpose 
is to serve the public interest - would on its face include charities and sporting 
regulatory bodies, neither of which Oliver thought would be caught by the public 
interest theme. 
Charities 
It is a straightforward proposition that charities are not usually core public 
authorities. However publicly beneficial their motives may be, they are for the 
most part legal persons or groups of individuals who have voluntarily assumed 
their 'public interest' objectives. Their precise status will depend on the facts of 
each case, however. For instance, in Wos}''^ the state responsibility-engaging 
Polish-German Reconciliation Foundation resembled a charitable organisation 
but, arguably, had not voluntarily assumed its 'public interest' objectives because 
Along these lines, see Harris' 'third source' concept (fn 180) 232, under which public bodies 
can act without specific statutory or common law authority but cannot assert 'legal rights over the 
residuary freedoms of others' when doing so. 
'™ Oliver (fh 149) 484. The government shared the view that charities would not be classed as 
core public authorities: Hansard H C vol 314 col 407 (17 June 1998) (Mr Jack Straw MP). 
Wosv Poland {fn 222). 
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it was established by core state bodies as a device for the distribution of state 
compensation funds in the public interest. Put simply, it was conceived by and 
bom to serve the state. The PGRF's position therefore differed from that of 
typical charitable organisations, which are established by private persons 
voluntarily assuming their 'public interest' objectives.^^^ 
Charitable organisations will thus remain for the most part private persons who 
can at best imitate the state's core by furthering the public interest. Therefore, 
such persons will need as a minimum to exercise 'functions of a public nature' 
under s 6(3)(b) in order to be categorised as public authorities under the HRA. 
Sporting Regulators 
It is less obvious why sporting regulators should not be classified as core public 
authorities, although there would appear to be two potential reasons. First, by 
analogy with the fiartherance of the religious interest by the Church in Holy 
Monasteries and Aston Cantlow, it might be said that the furtherance of sporting 
objectives cannot empirically be said to correlate with the public interest and 
therefore that sporting regulators lack as their primary purpose the service of the 
public interest. However, it is clear for example that the National Greyhound 
Racing Club (NGRC) and the Jockey Club are regarded as acting for the public 
interest when regulating sporting industries.^ •^^  
As regards the Fewings 'paralysis' point (Part B) above, the European Court's merits 
judgment does seem to reveal that the P G R F possessed the special authority to perform its 
general day-to-day activities compatibly with its aims: (2007) 45 E H R R 28 [30]. 
^''^ Law V National Greyhound Racing Club Lid [m3] 1 W L R 1302 ( C A ) 1308 (Lawton LJ) and 
1311 (Slade L J ) ; R v Disciplinary Committee of the Jockey Club, ex p Aga Khan [1993] 1 W L R 
909 ( C A ) 923 (Sir Thomas Bingham MR). 
The second and more convincing reason, 1 suggest, as to why sporting regulators 
should not be regarded as core public authorities is because their 'public interest' 
objectives, like those of charities, tend to be voluntarily assumed. In Law and 
Aga Khan respectively, the NGRC and Jockey Club were established under the 
initiative of private individuals who had unilaterally assumed their regulatory 
roles and hence public interest objectives. The Jockey Club was incorporated two 
hundred years later by Royal Charter,^ '^' but this merely amounted to a 'mark of 
royal favour to racing'^^^ rather than a challenge to the notion that its creators 
had voluntarily assumed their purpose of furthering the public interest. 
It is necessary however to address a further point. Although relating to the 
amenability of bodies to judicial review, Datafin illustrates the need to consider 
the position of voluntary 'public interest' bodies like the Panel of Take-overs and 
Mergers (PTM) who are subsequently incorporated into the governmental 
framework. 
The essential distinction here, I have sought to argue, is between those bodies 
forming the core of the state and those bodies who voluntarily assume their 
public interest objectives and, in doing so, merely emulate the state. However, it 
would be artificial to consider a body's objectives and their 
voluntary/involuntary status only at the time of its inception. Regulatory bodies 
such as the Jockey Club, for example, can be hundreds of years old and their 
institutional links to the core of the state may change over time. For this reason, 
Aga Khan (ibid.) 9\2. 
Ibid., 932 (Hoffmann LJ) . 
R V Panel of Take-overs and Mergers, ex p Datafin Pic [1987] 2 W L R 699, [1987] QB 815 
(CA) . 
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regulators with the primary purpose of serving the public interest, even i f initially 
voluntarily assuming this purpose, should be recognised as core public 
authorities i f subsequently 'adopted' by the state. 
Adoption, I suggest, comprises two elements. The first is a clear indication by the 
executive or Parliament (through legislafion) that the body is one which the 
executive or Parliament regards as a core state body or, put colloquially, 'one of 
the family'. This is akin to the decision made by the Department of Trade and 
Industry that a central regulatory body should exist to cover the activities of the 
PTM, but that it was content to continue to allow the PTM to undertake them.^ ^^ 
However, especially given the consequences of s 6(1) applying to all of a core 
public authority's activities, it would seem urmecessarily draconian i f it stopped 
there. The second element, therefore, is a demonstration of assent by the body to 
the executive or Parliamentary indication. Assent may take many forms, but it is 
doubtful that continuing to operate as before should suffice. Otherwise, a 
unilateral executive or Parliamentary indication (the first element of adoption) 
that a voluntary regulator fills a void which would otherwise be filled by the state 
could amount to the damaging instruction to stop operating or risk being classed 
as a core public a u t h o r i t y . O n the other hand, it is unlikely given the 
consequences of being subject to the HRA in respect of all of one's acts that 
Ibid., 838 (Sir John Donaldson MR). This indication is restated, it would seem, by 
Parliament's designation of the PTM through the Companies Act 2006 as 'the supervisory 
authority to carry out certain regulatory functions in relation to takeovers under the E C Directive 
on Takeover Bids (2004/25/EC)': see The Takeover Panel, 'The Panel on Takeovers and 
Mergers' <http://www.thetakeoverpanel.org.ukynew/> accessed 1 August 2008. 
Parliamentary sovereignty does however mean that a clear designation by Parliament that a 
body is a core public authority for the purposes of s 6 H R A would be law, whether or not the 
body's assent existed. 
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assent would take such an explicit form as a public statement by the body 
alluding to its own core public authority status. 
It is unclear from the judgment in Datafin whether assent to the executive's 
views that the PTM was 'one of the family' initially existed. Lloyd LJ alluded to 
the 'implied devolution of power' by state to PTM^'^ and Nicholls LJ to the 
presence on the PTM's membership board of persons appointed by the Governor 
of the Bank of England.'^ *" But without knowing the circumstances in which the 
'devolution' and membership came into being, it is difficult to know without a 
far more searching analysis of the PTM's history and institutional and relational 
links with the state whether this would have been enough. 
However, another indicator of the PTM's assent may exist. Although it gives no 
indication as to which, the Companies Act 2006 (CA) clearly sees the PTM as 
either a core or hybrid public authority,^^' and ftirther emphasises the PTM's 
service of the public interest by conferring on it the coercive power to give 
directions to restrain a person from acting in breach of regulatory rules devised 
by the PTM"^^ and by enabling the Secretary of State to fund the PTM.^^^ 
Moreover, the CA imbues the PTM with special statutory authority for the 
performance of its day-to-day activities. Section 942(2) provides that 'The Panel 
may do anything that it considers necessary or expedient for the purposes of, or 
Datafm (fti 276) 849. 
Ibid., 850. See also 825 (Sir John Donaldson MR). 
Section 961(1) C A exempts the P T M from liability in damages as a result of the performance 
of its functions, but this is expressly stated not to apply 'so as to prevent an award of damages... 
on the ground that... [an act or omission] was unlawful as a result of section 6(1) of the Human 
Rights Act 1998': s961(3)(b). 
Ibid., ss 943(2) and 946. The PTM can also impose sanctions on persons failing to comply 
with s 946 directions: s 952(1 )(b). 
Ibid., s 958. Note that the C A ' s provisions could also represent a Parliamentary 'indicatory' 
statement that the PTM is 'one of the family'. 
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in connection with, its functions.''^*'' Not only does this make it easier to classify 
the PTM as a core public authority given the Fewings 'paralysis' observation 
above, but the PTM's acquiescence in the conferral of such general powers and 
the strengthening of its institutional links with the state could amount to its 
implied assent to treatment as 'one of the family'. I f so, I would argue that the 
PTM - at least following the enactment of the CA - is a core public authority. I f 
not, it would remain an institutionally private person which could only be subject 
to direct human rights challenges when exercising 'functions of a public nature' 
under s 6(3)(b) HRA. 
E . CONCLUSIONS 
Core public authorities are institutionally defined by who they are rather than by 
the factual nature of the functions which they perform. Consonantly with 
Strasbourg jurisprudence and the apparent wording of s 6(1) HRA, they are 
required to comply with the Convention when performing either public or private 
acts. Subject to rare instances of public policy as seen in Radio France (which 
seems at present only to apply to the exercise by state media organisations of the 
right to free speech), they are unable to rely on their own Convention rights. 
Core public authorities (including adopted 'public interest' bodies) are bodies 
whose primary purpose is to serve the public interest as opposed to their own. 
This under-articulated but distinctly detectable 'public interest' theme can be 
It is unclear from Datafin whether such authority existed at the time of the judgment itself If 
not, this would expose a tension between Datafin and the dictum of Laws J in Fewings (fh 180) 
that the need to show positive legal authority for its actions applied to 'every public body': 534 
(emphasis added). 
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identified in the jurisprudence of both the Strasbourg and domestic courts. In Van 
der Mussele, Wos and Appleby, where it appears more subtly, the public interest 
theme can be used as an analytical tool with which to rationalise the courts' 
reasoning. By highlighting the parity between the approaches of the Strasbourg 
and domestic courts, the public interest theme also explains the obvious focus of 
their Lordships in Aston Cantlow on only core public authorities when arguing 
for the applicability of Strasbourg jurisprudence to the 'public authority' 
provisions in s 6 HRA.'^*' 
Core public authorities can at times ftarther their ovm interests. In order to do so 
validly, their own interests must not be shown to conflict with the public interest. 
I f no conflict exists, their actions will be valid and the relevant function they 
perform factually private in nature. This, in turn, assists in understanding the 
meaning of 'public interest' here. Although 'almost as many theories of the 
public interest as there are writers on the subject' exist," a detailed analysis of 
these theories in an attempt to define the term positively would be 
urmecessary. The basic distinction in the present context between core public 
authorities and private persons is of selfishness and selflessness. Private persons 
are free to serve their own interests within the confines of the law. By contrast, 
core public authorities wil l be required to put the interests of those for whom 
Considering this parity, Clapham's instant unease at Aston Cantlow's assimilation of core 
public authority with governmental organisations under Strasbourg law, 1 suggest, is unfounded: 
A. Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Non-Stale Actors (Collected Courses of the Academy 
of European Law, OUP, Oxford 2006) 481. 
A. McHarg, 'Reconciling Human Rights and the Public Interest: Conceptual Problems and 
Doctrinal Uncertainty in the Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights' (1999) 62 
M L R 671, 674. 
For a relatively recent exercise, see McHarg (ibid.) 674-678. 
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they are responsible before their own in the event of conflict between those 
interests. This is the sense in which 'public interest' is used. 
Oliver alludes to the merits of construing the core public authority category 
narrowly in order to avoid 'rolling forward the frontiers of the state' by widening 
the category of bodies unable to vindicate their own Convention rights against 
other core public authorities."^ My application of the public interest theme to 
Strasbourg jurisprudence may, therefore, be open to objecfion as being at odds 
with this principle since it would translate certain institutionally independent 
bodies such as the Order of Advocates in Van der Mussele and the Polish-
German Reconciliation Foundation in Wos into core rather than hybrid public 
authorities under the HRA and, as such, favours a more expansive reading of the 
core public authority category than that of Quane, or of the Court of Appeal in 
West or House of Lords in YL. In response (first), despite the potential 
undesirability of stripping bodies of rights protection by expanding the core 
public authority category, the extent to which it is permissible to allow a 
preoccupation with the judicial protection of core public authorities from rights 
abuses to influence the interpretation of s 6(1) is questionable.^^" Second, to the 
extent that this preoccupation can legifimately influence our interpretation of s 
6(1), the incompatibility between the 'narrowness' argument and the public 
interest theme is unclear: Oliver, as the original advocate of the basic public 
interest theme, evidently believes that theme to be compatible with the need to 
construe the core public authority category narrowly. Third, Radio France 
This would, however, be subject to rare instances such as that seen in relation to the religious 
interest in Aston Cantlow (fh 151) and Holy Monasteries (fh 197) where the relevant activities 
cannot be empirically equated with the public interest. 
Oliver (fii 149)492. 
''"Clapham (ft: 285) 485. 
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demonstrates how at Strasbourg level, media organisations which might 
otherwise be regarded as the core o f the state can in exceptional situations and as 
a matter o f public policy enforce their right to free speech by attracting 
classification as 'non-governmental organisations' under Art 34. 
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5 . 
Hybrid Public Authorities: 
The Current Law 
Section 6(3)(b) includes within the definition o f a 'public authority' 'any person 
certain o f whose functions are functions of a public nature'. Section 6(5) 
provides, implying a burden of proof on the would-be public authority, that ' In 
relation to a particular act, a person is not a public authority by virtue only o f 
subsection (3)(b) i f the nature o f the act is private.' Persons who are public 
authorities by virtue o f these provisions are commonly referred to as 'hybrid' or 
'functional' public authorities. 
This chapter analyses the courts' treatment so far o f these provisions. The first 
part illustrates the flaws present in their approach prior to the recent leading 
House o f Lords ruling in YL v Birmingham City Council.The second part 
examines YUs impact, priming the canvas for the introduction in the next chapter 
of a more appropriate interpretation of the hybrid public authority provisions. 
[2007] U K H L 27, [2008] 1 A C 95. 
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A. T H E E A R L Y LAW 
Four main problems with the courts' initial approach can be identified. First, the 
interpretation o f 'functions o f a public nature' was based largely on the 
institutional status o f the body in question rather than the functions it performed. 
Second, the courts equated s 6(3)(b) with the domestic law on the amenability o f 
bodies to judicial review. Third, the courts seemed unconcerned with the 
distinction between 'functions' in s 6(3)(b) and 'acts' in s 6(5) and, as two cases 
demonstrate, even with the important difference between 'core' and 'hybrid' 
public authorities themselves. Fourth, for additional interpretative assistance, the 
courts began to look to Strasbourg jurisprudence; this involved juxtaposing the 
HRA's hybrid public authority concept against a scheme without a comparable 
doctrine. 
Institutional Approach 
In Poplar Housing and Regeneration Community Association Ltd v Donoghue}^^ 
the Court o f Appeal found that Poplar Housing, a private company and registered 
social landlord created by a local authority (Tower Hamlets LBC) to inherit and 
manage its housing stock, was performing 'functions of a public nature' when 
providing the defendant, a periodic tenant whose accommodation had been 
transferred f rom Tower Hamlets to Poplar, wi th accommodation. Giving the 
judgment o f the court. Lord Woolf CJ expressed a list o f factors relevant to the 
decision. These included that a public function can be indicated by the extent to 
which the acts o f a private body are 'enmeshed in the activities o f a public body'. 
[2001] E W C A Civ 595, [2002] Q B 48. 
100 
the 'closeness o f the relationship which exists between Tower Hamlets and 
Poplar' and the similar position in which the defendant stood vis-a-vis each of 
Poplar and Tower Hamlets since at the time of transfer o f the housing stock ' i t 
was intended that she would be treated no better and no worse than i f she 
remained a tenant of Tower Hamlets.''^^^ 
These factors drew heavily upon the presence or absence o f institutional ties 
between the relevant private person and core public authority. The Court of 
Appeal adopted a similar approach in R (Heather) v Leonard Cheshire 
Foundation?^^ Despite the later House of Lords ruling in Aston Cantlow hinting 
at an approach focussing more on the nature o f the function performed by the 
body in question,"^^ some commentators remained unconvinced, due to Aston 
Cantlow's failure to overrule or even mention Donoghue or Leonard Cheshire, 
that lower courts would be prepared to depart from the approach adopted in those 
cases.'^^ Indeed, the Court o f Appeal seemed content to fo l low an institutional 
approach in R (Beer) v Hampshire Farmer's Markets Ltcf^'' and YL v 
Birmingham City Council?'^^ 
Ibid., 70. 
[2002] E W C A Civ 366, [2002] H R L R 30 [20]-[21 ] (Lord Woolf CJ) . 
''^ Parochial Church Council of the Parish of Aston Cantlow and Wilmcote with Billesley, 
Warwickshire v Wallbank [2003] U K H L 37, [2004] 1 A C 546 [41] (Lord Hope). 
See the Joint Committee on Human Rights' Seventh Report of Session 2003-04, 'The 
Meaning of Public Authority under the Human Rights Act' H L (2003-04) 39, H C (2003-04) 382 
[39] and R. Costigan, 'Determining "Functions of a Public Nature" under the Human Rights Act 
1998: A New Approach' (2006) 12 E P L 577, 580-581. 
[2003] E W C A Civ 1056, [2004] I W L R 233 [36], [38] and [40] (Dyson LJ) . 
[2007] E W C A Civ 26, [2008] QB 1 [46]. Here, Buxton LJ sought unconvincingly to defend 
Lord Wooifs focus on institutional factors in Donoghue and Leonard Cheshire. 
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An institutional approach is misguided due to s 6(3)(b)'s textual focus on 
functions.^^^ The courts' apparent treatment in the above cases o f institutional 
status and links with core public authorities as highly persuasive, i f not decisive, 
is unlikely to have reflected Parliament's true intention.^"^^ 
Amenability to Judicial Review 
In Donoghue, Lord Wool f CJ stated that the public authority provisions in s 6 are 
'clearly inspired by the approach developed by the courts in identifying the 
bodies and activities subject to judicial review.'^*^' Stanley Bumton J regarded it 
at first instance in Leonard Cheshire as 'clearly right' that the test for 
amenability to judicial review under CPR Part 54.1, using 'identical wording' 
and entering into force on the same day and ' i n the same context of public law', 
has the 'same meaning' as 'functions o f a public nature' under s 6(3)(b) HRA.''°^ 
At the risk o f splitting hairs, the wording in each set o f provisions is not 
'identical'. Whereas s 6(3)(b) refers to 'functions o f a public nature'. Part 54.1 
refers to a judicial review claim ' in relation to the exercise o f a public 
function.'^^^ Parliament's omission to use identical wording for such apparently 
similar provisions could equally have signified its intention that the two 
formulations should cover different ground.^'*'' Similar equation of 'functions of a 
public nature' under s 6(3)(b) with the law on the amenability o f bodies to 
P. Craig, 'Contracting out, the Human Rigiits Act and the scope of judicial review' (2002) 118 
L Q R 551,559. 
See further M. McDermont, 'The Elusive Nature of the "Public Function": Poplar Housing 
and Regeneration Community Association Ltd v Donoghue' (2003) 66 M L R 113, 122; D. Oliver, 
'Functions of a public nature under the Human Rights Act' [2004] PL 329, 331; Costigan (fri 
296) 582. 
Donoghue (fr 292) 69. 
[2001] E W H C 429 (Admin) [65]. 
Emphasis added. 
See J. Wadham, H. Mountfield, A. Edmundson and C. Gallagher, Blackstone's Guide to the 
Human Rights Act 1998 (4* edn OUP, Oxford 2007) [4.61]. 
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judicial review can be found in the Court o f Appeal's judgment in Leonard 
Cheshire''^^ and at first instance m R (A) v Partnerships in Care Ltd.^"^ Although 
both Court o f Appeal and House o f Lords rulings in Aston Cantlow demonstrated 
a greater judicial appreciation that the law on amenability to judicial review 
would not be determinative of the nature o f a function under s 6(3)(b),^^^ the 
courts' judgments in R (Beer) v Hampshire Farmer's Markets Ltd,^^^ R (West) v 
Lloyd's of London^^'^ and R (Mullins) v The Appeal Board of the Jockey Club^^^ 
all equated the s 6(3)(b) and amenability tests more closely. 
The meaning o f 'functions o f a public nature' under s 6(3)(b) and the test for the 
amenability of bodies to review should not be regarded as identical. As Oliver 
explains: 
'[The phrase "public function" in C P R Part 54] is shorthand for a sophisticated set of 
principles that were in the course of development well before the C P R came into effect. 
The C P R cannot change the substantive law... ["Public function" under C P R Part 54] 
has no one fixed meaning and allows for different tests to be applied to public and 
private bodies.'^" 
Lord Woolf CJ (fh 294) seemed formally to recognise that the scope of the two tests could 
differ: [36]. However, this was tempered by his Lordship's adherence to 'statutory powers' and 
'public flavour' - factors which closely resemble those used in /? v Panel on Take-overs and 
Mergers, ex p Datafm Pic [1987] Q B 815, [1987] 2 W L R 699 ( C A ) - as indicators of the public 
nature of a ftinction under s 6(3)(b): [35]. 
[2002] E W H C 529 (Admin), [2002] I W L R 2610 [9] (Keith J). 
[2001] E W C A Civ 713, [2002] Ch 51 [34] (Sir Andrew Morritt V - C ) ; (fh 295) [38] and [52] 
(Lord Hope) and [87] (Lord Hobhouse). 
™^ [2002] E W H C 2559 (Admin) [33] (Field J); (fh 297) [29] (Dyson LJ) , cited with approval in 
rz.(fh 298) [51] (Buxton LJ) . 
[2004] E W C A 506 (Civ) [34]-[35] (Brooke LJ) . 
[2005] E W H C 2197 (Admin) [42] (Stanley Bumton J). 
Oliver (fh 300) 346-347. See further P. Cane, 'Church, state and human rights: are parish 
councils public authorities?' (2004) 120 L Q R 41, 45-46 and S. Palmer, 'Public, private and the 
Human Rights Act 1998: an ideological divide' [2007] C L J 559, 568. 
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Conceptual Confusion 
As seen in Chapter 4, the Court o f Appeal in Aston Cantlow found that the 
Parochial Church Council (PCC) was a core public authority.^'^ In the alternative 
however, Sir Andrew Morrit t V-C, giving the judgment o f the court, held that ' I f 
this were to be incorrect, the PCC would nevertheless, and for the same reasons, 
be [exercising ftmctions o f a public nature under s 6(3)(b)].'^' ' ' Similarly, at first 
instance in Beer, Field J held simply that the body in question 'was acting as a 
public authority within section 6 o f the 1998 Act ' without exploring the 
distinction between core and hybrid public authorities."^''* The Court o f Appeal's 
failure to distinguish core f rom hybrid public authority in Aston Cantlow was 
rightly criticised in the House o f Lords."" ^  Aside f rom the importance o f the 
distinction due to the practical significance o f core public authorities being 
subject to the H R A in respect o f all o f their acts, the core/hybrid distinction - as 
Chapter 4 demonstrates - is also underlain by a fundamental institutional 
distinction between bodies whose primary purpose is to serve the public interest 
and those, by contrast, whose primary purpose is to serve their own. 
Early cases also failed to distinguish 'functions' under s 6(3)(b) f rom 'acts' under 
s 6(5) HRA. For instance, in Donoghue, Lord Wool f CJ listed factors which the 
court found relevant to its decision that Poplar was a hybrid public authority 
without explaining whether those factors were relevant to the nature o f Poplar's 
Aston Cantlow (fh 307). 
''^Ibid., [35] (emphasis added). 
Beer (fh 308) [35]. See also Pine v The Law Society (No. 1) [2001] E W C A Civ 1574, [2002] 
U K H R R 81 [8] (Sir Andrew Morritt V - C ) and Marcic v Thames Water Utilities Ltd [2003] 
U K H L 66, [2004] 2 A C 42 [71] (Lord Hoffmann). 
Aston Cantlow (fti 295) [43] (Lord Hope). 
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'functions' under s 6(3)(b), its 'acts' under s 6(5), or both.^'^ Lord Hobhouse was 
keen to untangle 'functions' from 'acts' in Aston Cantlow^^^ but Lords Nicholls 
and Hope did not.^'* Lord Nicholls' view in particular seemed to be that a 
'function o f a public nature' under s 6(3)(b) is dichotomous to an act o f a private 
nature under s 6(5).^'^ However, this skews the language of s 6(5), which merely 
deems a body performing a private act not to be a hybrid public authority: it does 
not state that a body performing a private act under s 6(5) ceases to perform 
functions o f a public nature under s 6(3)(b). Additionally, it is unclear why any 
dichotomy should necessarily arise when the words ' function' and 'act' used in 
the same section o f the H R A are different. Moreover, i f 'private act' in s 6(5) did 
mean 'private function' as the antonym of 'function o f a public nature' under 
6(3)(b), s 6(5) would be redundant anyway:'''^ unless Lord Nicholls had an 
unarticulated and intermediate category o f 'semi-public functions' in mind, any 
function which was not public in nature must, by implication from s 6(3)(b) 
alone, be private in nature. It would not have been necessary for Parliament to 
express such an obvious conclusion in a separate provision through s 6(5). 
Potential distinctions between 'functions' and 'acts' are explored more ful ly in 
Chapter 6. 
Donoghue (fh 292) 69. 
^" Aston Cantlow (fti 295) [88]. 
Cane (fn 311) 43. For similar 'act'/'ftinction' confusion, see Beer (fh 297) [15] (Dyson LJ) 
and YL (fn 298) [39] (Buxton LJ) . 
'What matters is whether the particular act done by the plaintiff council of which complaint is 
made is a private act as contrasted with the discharge of a public function': Aston Cantlow (fn 
295) [16]. 
As will be seen in Chapter 6, Landau argues that s 6(3)(b), referring simply to certain of a 
body's functions, can be satisfied if any function - not just the function performed in relation to 
the victim - is public: J . Landau, 'Functional public authorities after YU [2007] PL 630. It might 
be thought that 'private act' under s 6(5), if it did mean 'private function' as the antonym of 
'function of a public nature' under s 6(3)(b), had as its purpose the dismissal of Landau's 
approach by referring to the particular private act and consequently emphasising the need for the 
function in question to be public for s 6(3)(b) to be met. However, as Chapter 6 demonstrates, 
Landau's approach is untenable for other reasons such that s 6(5) would not be required in order 
to dismiss it. Hence, 1 reiterate, s 6(5) would be redundant if the words 'private act' under s 6(5) 
did mean 'private function'. 
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Strasbourg Jurisprudence 
In Aston Canllow, the House of Lords advocated the use o f Strasbourg 
jurisprudence as an aid to interpreting the 'public authority' provisions. As seen 
in Chapter 4, two areas o f Strasbourg jurisprudence are said to be relevant to s 6 
HRA: the jurisprudence on which bodies constitute 'state' organs capable of 
engaging the state's international responsibility in Strasbourg,"'^' and the 
jurisprudence on which bodies constitute 'governmental' organisations incapable 
of enforcing their Convention rights under Art 34 ECHR."'^^ Although Strasbourg 
jurisprudence was said cautiously by Dyson LJ in Beer to be 'less helpful ' to the 
interpretation o f 'fiinctions o f a public nature' under s 6(3)(b) than to the scope 
of core public authority under s 6(1),^^^ the Court of Appeal nevertheless sought 
to apply it when interpreting 'functions of a public nature' in West.^'^'^ This 
problem was perpetuated rather than remedied by the House o f Lords in YL\ the 
arguments against applying Strasbourg jurisprudence to s 6(3)(b) w i l l therefore 
be addressed in the penultimate part o f this chapter rather than here. 
B. YL AND BEYOND: CHARTING A WISER COURSE? 
In YL, the House o f Lords held by a bare majority (Lord Bingham and Baroness 
Hale dissenting) that the private provider of care and accommodation to an 
elderly Alzheimer's patient pursuant to contract with her local authority was not 
Aston Cantlow (fii 295) [6] (Lord Nicholls). 
Ibid., [47] (Lord Hope). Art 34: 'The Court may receive applications from any person, non-
governmental organisation or group of individuals claiming to be the victim of a violation... [of] 
the Convention.' 
Beer (fh 297) [28]. 
West (fii 309) [36]-[39] (Brooke LJ) . Stanley Bumton J also appeared to endorse the 
applicability of Strasbourg jurisprudence to s 6(3)(b) in Mullins (fri 310) [40], as did Forbes J at 
first instance in Johnson v Havering London Borough Council [2006] E W H C 1714 (Admin) [39], 
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exercising 'functions o f a public nature' and not, therefore, bound to respect Art 
8 ECHR when serving notice to evict. YL's result, it w i l l be seen in Chapter 6, is 
open to criticism on the ground that it failed to accord sufficient width to the 
term 'functions o f a public nature'. This part o f the chapter, however, 
concentrates on their Lordships' reasoning by assessing whether the problems 
with the courts' earlier approaches have been addressed. YL, it would seem, 
represents no more than an improvement in form to the approach taken in the 
early law. 
Institutional Approach 
Although not expressly overruling Donoghue's predominantly institutional 
approach to s 6(3)(b), members of both majority and minority disapproved of it 
in YL?^^ However, the institutional approach remains in substance i f not in form. 
Central to the reasoning of the majority's decision that the private provider was 
not a hybrid public authority under s 6(3 )(b) HRA was the character of the body 
as a self-serving commercial entity motivated by a desire to profit from 
performing the services. As Lord Mance explained, 'The private and commercial 
motivation behind Southern Cross's operations... [points] against treating 
Southern Cross as a person with a function of a public nature.'^'^ 
As seen in Chapter 4, the institutionally private persons who become hybrid 
public authorities by virtue o f s 6(3)(b) differ fundamentally in character from 
core public authorities precisely because of the ability to further their own 
interests - even at the expense o f others - within the confines o f the law. Hence, 
^-^ VL (fn 291) [105] (Lord Mance) and [61] (Baroness Hale) (dissenting). 
^-^ Ibid., [116]. Lord Neuberger agreed with Lord Mance: [126]. See ftirther [26] (Lord Scott). 
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self-interested commercial motivation institutionally characterises rather than 
excludes the persons who fall within s 6(3)(b) when performing public 
functions."'^'' 
Amenability to Judicial Review 
Members o f both majority and minority cautioned against relying too heavily on 
the law on amenability to review when interpreting 'functions o f a public nature' 
under s 6(3)(b). However, a real risk that lower courts w i l l elide these two 
legal schemes still seems to exist. In R (Weaver) v London & Quadrant Housing 
Trust,^^'^ the Divisional Court affirmed the decision in Donoghue that registered 
social landlords exercise 'functions of a public nature'. Richards LJ (with whom 
Swift J agreed) highlighted the differing rationales o f the law on amenability to 
review and 'functions o f a public nature' under s 6(3)(h),^^^ but then appeared to 
suggest that the tests covered identical ground by concluding that the issues of 
hybrid public authority and amenability to review stood or fell together."' 
The courts' apparent homeward trend towards the law on amenability to review 
can perhaps be explained by the diff icul ty inherent in identifying the correct 
relationship between amenability to review and 'functions of a public nature' 
under s 6(3)(b) without first identifying a principled and defensible approach to 
the hybrid public authority concept itself Introducing a more appropriate 'two-
See also Landau (fh 320) 636; M. Elliott, '"Public" and "private": defining the scope of the 
Human Rights Act' [2007] C L J 485, 486; S. Palmer, 'Public, private and the Human Rights Act 
1998: an ideological divide' [2007] C L J 559, 564-565 and 569. 
YL (fn 291) [12] (Lord Bingham) (dissenting) and [86]-[87] (Lord Mance). 
[2008] E W H C 1377 (Admin). 
"° Ibid., [60]. 
lbid.,[64]-[65]. 
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Strand' approach to s 6(3)(b), Chapter 6 briefly explores how the law on 
amenability to review might be o f use. 
Conceptual Confusion 
None of their Lordships in YL appeared unaware o f the distinction between core 
and hybrid public authorities. Regarding the distinction between 'functions' 
under s 6(3)(b) and 'acts' under s 6(5), Lords Scott and Neuberger were 
particularly keen to highlight the differences between the two."'''" As Lord 
Neuberger explained, 'acts' under s 6(5) are more specific than 'functions'; a 
'number o f different acts can be involved in the performance o f a single 
function. '"^ Despite the evidently increasing judicial tendency to untangle 
'functions' f rom 'acts', it is disappointing that only Lord Scott analysed in any 
depth the nature o f the 'act' o f serving notice upon Mrs YL."'^'' This, said his 
Lordship, was private in nature since it took place ' i n purported reliance on a 
contractual provision in a private law agreement.'"^ Even so. Lord Scott stopped 
short o f attempting to define a 'private' act, an unfortunate omission given that 
the meaning o f s 6(5) is highly germane to determining the scope of the hybrid 
YL (fti 291) [23] (Lord Scott) and [130] (Lord Neuberger). Baroness Hale also highlighted this 
distinction, but used it to confusing effect: '[T]he company... was performing a function of a 
public nature... Furthermore, an act in relation to the person for whom the public function is 
being put forward cannot be a "private" act for the purpose of section 6(5)': [73] (emphasis 
added). It is difficult to see without explanation why an act 'in relation to' the person for whom 
the public function is put forward cannot be private in nature: this, surely, is precisely what s 6(5) 
envisages. 
Ibid.,[m\. 
The tendency to distinguish the two concepts is also reflected in Weaver (fn 329): [26]. 
However, Richards LJ's treatment of the 'function'/'act' distinction was cryptic. Having 
expressly acknowledged that the registered social landlord in that case was 'relying on private 
law rights' when terminating the tenancy (which, following Lord Scott's judgment in YL, would 
point conclusively to the private nature of the act) his Lordship reasoned from the presumption 
that, since 'granting' a tenancy would be a public act, so must 'terminating' a tenancy since 'the 
allocation and management of the housing stock are to be regarded as part and parcel of a single 
function or as closely related functions.': [61]-[62]. At no point did his Lordship attempt to 
explain what constitutes a 'public' as distinct from a 'private' act. 
KZ,(fti 291) [34]. 
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public authority provisions.^•'^ Chapter 6 attempts to define the meaning o f a 
'private act' under s 6(5). 
C. CHASING T H E STRASBOURG RAINBOW 
I have attempted to show from the foregoing analysis that even after YL, the law 
still displays a predominantly institutional approach to s 6(3)(b) with the 
propensity for over-reliance on the law on the amenability o f bodies to judicial 
review, and lacks a fu l l understanding o f the meaning of s 6(5) HRA. The final 
criticism o f the current state o f the law involves lengthy but necessary analysis 
and thus deserves a separate mention. I argue in this part o f the chapter that 
Strasbourg jurisprudence, at least in its current form, bears no relation to the 
hybrid public authority concept under s 6(3)(b) and is only relevant to the 
identification o f core public authorities under s 6(1). Judicial and academic views 
to the contrary, I shall argue, are misguided. 
Domestic Application of Strasbourg Law 
This chapter has already mentioned the Court o f Appeal's reliance upon 
Strasbourg jurisprudence as an aid to the identification o f 'functions of a public 
nature' in West.^^'^ When reaching the decision in YL that Southern Cross (the 
care home provider) was not exercising fiinctions of a public nature under s 
6(3)(b), two of their Lordships in the majority drew inspiration f rom Strasbourg 
jurisprudence when reaching their decisions. Having drawn extensively from the 
Palmer (fn 311) 570. 
West (fn 309) [36]-[39] (Brooke LJ) . 
no 
judgments o f their Lordships in the earlier case o f Aston Cantlow,^^^ which 
explained the intention on the part o f s 6(1) HRA and 'public authority' to cover 
those bodies engaging the state's responsibility in Strasbourg, Lord Mance 
proclaimed that as 'section 6(3)(b) merely elucidates section 6(1). . . , the rationale 
applies as much to the identification o f a person exercising a function o f a public 
nature under section 6(3)(b) as it does to the identification of a core public 
authority.'"^^ Lord Neuberger, in seeming agreement with Lord Mance, believed 
it significant when reaching his decision that Strasbourg would classify Southern 
Cross as a 'non-governmental organisation' under Art 34 and a body which could 
not engage the U K ' s international responsibility under the ECHR.'''*" 
Aston Cantlow, I suggest, has been chronically misinterpreted in order to stand 
for the proposition that Strasbourg jurisprudence is relevant to identifying 
'functions o f a public nature' under s 6(3)(b) HRA. As seen in Chapter 4, their 
Lordships in Aston Cantlow seemed to have only core public authorities in mind 
when arguing for the utility o f Strasbourg jurisprudence to the 'public authority' 
concept. Moreover, the additional arguments in favour o f applying Strasbourg 
jurisprudence to s 6(3)(b) can in my opinion be met. 
Should Strasbourg Jurisprudence Nevertheless Apply? 
Quane argues for the relevance to s 6(3)(b) o f both the Strasbourg jurisprudence 
on the active liability principle and on 'governmental organisations' under Art 34 
Aston Canllow (fh 295). 
rz,(fn291)[88]. 
Ibid.,[]6]]. 
I l l 
ECHR.'''" Her thesis, in its simplest form, is that in each of these areas o f law, 
Strasbourg recognises that 'the state' can include private bodies exercising 
delegated or 'governmental' ftinctions. This, she reasons, can inform which 
private persons exercise 'functions o f a public nature' under s 6(3)(b). Quane's 
views, I argue below, are unpersuasive. 
Active Liability 
Regarding active liability, Quane relies on Costello-Roberts v United Kingdom^'^^ 
and Appleby v United Kingdom?'^^ The applicant in the first case received 
corporal punishment f rom the headmaster o f an independent school and claimed 
breaches of Arts 3, 8 and 13 ECHR. Despite finding no ultimate breach o f the 
Convention, the European Court of Human Rights did find that the private 
school's actions were technically capable o f engaging the UK's responsibility:^'*'* 
first, the state is obliged by Art 2 of the First Protocol to secure the rights of 
children to education. Functions such as discipline are not 'merely ancillary to 
the educational process.' Second, this right pertains to every child, and therefore 
as much to those in independent as in state schools. Third, 'the state cannot 
absolve itself f rom responsibility by delegating its obligations to private bodies 
or individuals.' Lord Mance in YL described Costello-Roberts as 'not an easy 
case to analyse'^'*' before noting that the European Court of Human Rights in 
Storck V Germany^^^ saw it as a judgment based on the principle of passive 
liability (positive obligations) rather than active liability as Quane suggests. 
H. Quane, 'The Strasbourg jurisprudence and the meaning of "public authority" under the 
Human Rights Act' [2006] P L 106. 
(App no 13134/87) (1995) 19 E H R R 112. 
(App no 44306/98) (2003) 37 E H R R 38. 
Costello-Roberts (fh 342) [27]-[28]. 
rZ.(fn291)[95] . 
"•^  (App no 61603/00) (2006) 43 E H R R 6. See also Costigan (fn 296) 583. 
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Since passive liability should be regarded as irrelevant to the 'public authority' 
provisions, this ought to indicate Costello-Roberts' irrelevance to s 6(3)(b) in my 
opinion. I would respectfully agree with his Lordship's 'passive liability' 
interpretation, which certainly reflects the tenor o f the Costello-Roberts ']\xAgmQnX 
because the European Court began the relevant analysis by emphasising that 
states can be under positive obligations to regulate private activity.^''^ The 
European Court mentioned its 'delegated functions' point last, and cited Van der 
Mussele v Belgium^^^ as authority for the proposition that the state's 
responsibility w i l l be engaged i f it delegates its obligations to private individuals. 
In Van der Mussele, the European Court held that the institutionally independent 
Order o f Advocates could engage the state's responsibility.^''^ In Strasbourg's 
view, Belgium had chosen to f u l f i l its obligation deriving f rom Arts 6(3)(c) and 
6(1) ECHR to provide free legal assistance by placing a domestic obligation on 
the Order o f Advocates to compel members o f the Bar to undertake the work. 
This solution, said the court, 'cannot relieve the Belgian state of the 
responsibilities it would have incurred... had it chosen to operate the system 
itself '^^° This is not, I suggest, persuasive authority for the principle that an 
institutionally private person such as the independent school in Costello-Roberts 
can engage the state's responsibility in Strasbourg when performing delegated 
state obligations. First, despite the obvious chain o f delegation f rom 'state' to 
Order o f Advocates and the latter's institutional independence, it is not clear that 
the court regarded the Order o f Advocates as a typically 'private' body to which 
Costello-Roberts (fn 342) [26]. 
(App no 8919/80) (1984) 6 E H R R 163. 
The facts are stated in Chapter 4. 
"° Van der Mussele {fn 348) [29]. 
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the independent school in Costello-Roberts would be suitably analogous. Indeed, 
in the same paragraph, the court noted that the Order of Advocates was endowed 
with 'legal personality in public law' and 'associated with the exercise of judicial 
power ' .Second, the court in Van der Mussele seemed at any rate not to decide 
the point on delegation alone, since it also alluded to the direct imposition by the 
legislature through domestic law of the obligation to provide free legal 
services.^" Hence, the court would seem to be emphasising Convention 
interference by the legislature rather than the institutionally independent 
delegate. 
In short, Van der Mussele is by no means clear authority for the proposition that 
the delegation of 'state' obligations to private individuals will engage the state's 
responsibility. Even i f the European Court of Human Rights in Costello-Roberts 
did wish to base its reasoning wholly or even principally on this point as Quane 
suggests and as I seek to refute, the court's reasoning is greatly weakened by 
relying on Van der Mussele to support that point. As seen in Chapter 4, the Order 
of Advocates' 'public interest' motives imply that Van der Mussele is best seen 
as deciding that the body was a core state body capable of engaging the state's 
responsibility under the active liability principle. 
Appleby v United Kingdon?^^ is the second case on which Quane relies to 
demonstrate that, for the purposes of active liability, Strasbourg envisages that 
private persons exercising governmental functions can engage the state's 
Ibid. 
'''Ibid. 
353 ' Appleby {fn 343). 
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responsibility.^^'' In Appleby^^^ refusal by the private shopping centre owner to 
allow the applicants to petition the public did not engage the UK's responsibility: 
'In this case, the applicants were stopped from... [petitioning by a] private company. 
The Court does not find that the Government bear [sic] any direct responsibility... It is 
not persuaded that any element of State responsibility can be derived from the fact that a 
public development corporation transferred the property to... [the company] or that this 
was done with ministerial permission.'''^* 
The European Court then considered the passive liability question of whether the 
state had failed in any positive obligation to protect the claimants' right to 
freedom of expression, concluding that it had not.^" Whereas Quane interprets 
the above dicta as implicitly accepting that a private body's actions can 
sometimes engage the state's responsibility under the active liability principle, a 
more natural reading of them is that a private body's actions cannot do so. After 
all, this was what the court decided on the facts: having observed that the alleged 
interference with the applicants' rights was by an institutionally private actor, the 
court was unmoved by further argument as to why that actor should nevertheless 
be regarded as 'the state'. Additionally, i f the court did believe that a private 
body's actions could theoretically engage the state's responsibility other than 
through passive liability, it gave no indication as to when this might occur. 
Quane (fti341) 112-114. 
The facts are stated in Chapter 4. 
Appleby {fn 2Al)[A\]. 
Ibid., [49]-[50]. 
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Finally, two authorities unmentioned by Quane deserve analysis. In Wos v 
Poland,^^^ the European Court held that the PGRF's actions were capable of 
engaging Poland's state responsibility. Having examined the institutional nature 
and activities of the PGRF,^'^ the court stated: 
'[T]he exercise of State powers which affects Convention rights and freedoms raises an 
issue of State responsibility regardless of the form in which these powers happen to be 
exercised, be it for instance by a body whose activities are regulated by private law.''*" 
Citing Van der Mussele, the court continued: 
'[T]he respondent State has decided to delegate its obligations arising out of 
international agreements [i.e. the treaty with Germany] to a body operating under private 
law. In the Court's view, such an arrangement cannot relieve the Polish State of the 
responsibilities it would have incurred had it chosen to discharge these obligations itself, 
as it could well have done... '^*' 
Therefore, a private law body exercising delegated state obligations may engage 
the state's responsibility. This appears to support Quane's view that a private 
person exercising state functions can engage the state's responsibility. However, 
IVos should not be so interpreted. The PGRF may have been regulated by private 
law, but it does not follow that it was a 'private' person. It should be recalled 
here from the previous chapter that 'private' persons contrast with core state 
bodies due to their inherently self-serving institutional nature. As in Van der 
Mussele, the body in Wos was created for a 'public interest' purpose (to fulf i l the 
(App no 22860/02) (2007) 45 E H R R 28. The relevant decision is the Court's admissibility 
decision of 1 March 2005. The facts are stated in Chapter 4. 
'^'/*/a'., [68]-[71]. 
Ibid., [72]. 
Wos {ibid.) [73]. 
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function of distributing compensation). Its primary duty was to further the pubHc 
interest rather than its own and in that sense it differed fundamentally in 
character from typically private persons. To perceive the PGRF as a private 
person because of its regulation by private law would be unnecessarily 
formalistic, especially since paradigmatically 'state' bodies such as government 
departments or the armed forces are also subject to private law regulation when, 
for instance, entering into commercial contracts. As seen in Chapter 4, Wos is 
better regarded as an example of a 'public interest' core state entity engaging the 
state's responsibility under the active liability principle. 
In Sychev v Ukraine/^^ the European Court decided that the omissions of a 
judgment-executing Liquidation Commission engaged the state's responsibility. 
The court started by citing Costello-Roberts as authority for the proposition that 
private individuals can engage the state's responsibility when performing state 
functions. With that, it baldly proclaimed: 
'The Court does not find it necessary to embark on a discussion of whether the 
liquidation commission was or was not itself a State authority for the purposes of Article 
34 § 1 of the Convention. It suffices to note that the body in question exercised certain 
state powers at least in the execution of court judgments.'^'" 
By drawing a distinction between 'State authority' and other bodies capable of 
engaging the state's responsibility, Sychev would seem the strongest authority yet 
in favour of Quane's thesis. However, the court's reasoning in Sychev is flawed, 
principally because the court read and sought to apply Costello-Roberts as 
^" (App no 4773/02) (unreported). 
363 Ibid., [54]. 
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authority for the proposition that a private person can engage the state's 
responsibility when performing state functions. This, I have argued, is an 
inaccurate interpretation which is not supported by other courts.^ '^* Additionally, 
the court's reasoning itself is confused and appears slow to distinguish between 
active and passive liability: after alluding to the Commission's exercise of 
'certain state powers',''^^ the court emphasised the positive obligations incumbent 
upon states under Art 6(1) 'to organise their legal systems in such a way that 
their authorities can meet its requirements.'^^^ This illustrates, first, that the 
'delegated functions' point was only a part of the court's overall conclusion on 
state responsibility. Second, even i f Sychev did support Quane's thesis, because 
the law on positive obligations is irrelevant to the interpretation of 'functions of a 
public nature' under s 6(3)(b), a judgment like Sychev which relied partly on 
passive liability could not be comfortably lifted into domestic law. To do so 
would risk infecting s 6(3)(b) with pronouncements on points of law not germane 
to the hybrid public authority concept. 
Article 34 and Governmental Organisations 
In Holy Monasteries v Greece,the European Court rejected the government's 
preliminary objection that the applicants were governmental organisations 
incapable of making an Art 34 application: the monasteries did not exercise 
governmental powers, were independent of the state and possessed ecclesiastical 
and spiritual rather than public administration objectives.^^^ 
''''' See Storck v Germany (fn 346) and YL (fti 291) [95] (Lord Mance). 
^"5vc/7ev(fti 362)[54]. 
Ibid., [56]. 
^" (App nos 13092/87 and 13984/88) (1995) 20 E H R R 1. The facts are stated in Chapter 4. 
Ibid., [49]. 
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According to Quane, Art 34 jurisprudence was used to interpret 'functions of a 
public nature' in Aston Cantlow?^^ Therefore, she reasons, Holy Monasteries 
'suggests several factors which should be taken into account' when determining 
the status of a private person under s 6(3)(b).^^^ As I have argued, Quane's 
analysis of Aston Cantlow is misguided because a closer analysis reveals that the 
House of Lords saw the relevance of Strasbourg jurisprudence only to the 
concept of 'core' public authorities. Indeed, this was certainly true of passages 
which Quane cited to support her point.^^' Consequently, Holy Monasteries is of 
no relevance to the identification of 'functions of a public nature', and nor does it 
support Quane's general thesis that Strasbourg recognises that a private person 
exercising governmental functions can be regarded as 'the state.' 
Quane believes Radio France v France^''' to be arguably the 'most significant 
case to date' in this area.^ ^^  In that case, applying Holy Monasteries and drawing 
largely on Radio France's institutional autonomy and editorial independence, the 
European Court held that Radio France was a non-governmental organisation 
capable of filing an Art 34 application.^ '^* The court stated in its analysis that the 
phrase 'governmental organisation' applies not only to central state organs, but 
also to decentralised authorities, such as local authorities, which exercise public 
functions."^ The court then stated that this was also true of 'public-law entities 
other than territorial authorities'.''^^ To support this point, the court drew from 
'Quane (fii341) 115. 
'''Ibid. 
371 
372 
See Aston Cantlow (fh 295) [49]-[50] (Lord Hope). 
(App no 53984/00) (2005) 40 E H R R 29. The ruling relevant for present purposes is the 
admissibility decision of 23 September 2003. The facts are stated in Chapter 4. 
Quane (fh 341) 117. 
Radio France (ft 372) [26]. 
Ibid. 
Ibid. 
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two Commission cases: Consejo General de Colegios Oficiales de Economistas 
de Espana v Spain^^^ and RENFE v Spain?^^ In Consejo General, the General 
Council of Spanish Economists, a professional regulatory body created by 
statute, alleged breaches of Arts 6, 1, 13 and 8 ECHR in relation to domestic 
challenges made to legislation concerning tax and national insurance issues. The 
Commission emphasised that professional regulatory bodies such as the General 
Council are 'public law entities exercising official functions conferred on them 
by the Constitution and by law'^^^ and that, because 'governmental 
organisations' can include, in systems of decentralised power, 'any national 
authority exercising public f u n c t i o n s ' , t h e General Council was a 
governmental organisation incapable of filing an application under Art 34. 
Similarly, in RENFE, the Commission held the Spanish National Railway 
provider to be a governmental organisation due to its status as a public law 
organisation created by law, its accountability to government, the legal control 
on its internal structure and activities and its position as the sole railway 
provider.^^' 
Quane believes the use of the term 'territorial authority' in Radio France to 
reveal a distinction at Strasbourg level between those bodies which the HRA 
would recognise as 'core' from those which it would recognise as 'hybrid' public 
authorities. This is ambitious, since the court in Radio France gave no useful 
indication as to what it meant when using the term. Additionally, according to 
(App nos 26114/95 and 26455/95) (1995) DR 82-B. 
RENFE V Spain (App no 35216/97) (1997) DR 90-B. 
379 , Consejo General (fn 377). This is my translation from the French text of the opinion. 
''"Ibid. 
RENFE {fn27S). 
Quane (fti 341) 117. 
120 
Quane, the cases of Radio France, Consejo General and RENFE 'suggest that a 
body may be regarded as a governmental organisation when it has special powers 
conferred on it by the state such as an operating monopoly, when legislation 
confers official duties on it, or when it is subject to a high degree of control by 
the state.'^ ^^ 
The use of the term 'public functions' by the Commission in Consejo General 
does at first sight imply a striking similarity between the Strasbourg and 
domestic schemes. But, it is recalled, Quane's essenfial thesis is that Strasbourg 
jurisprudence is relevant to 'functions of a public nature' under s 6(3)(b) because 
such jurisprudence analogously demonstrates how private persons can be 
regarded as 'the state' when performing public functions. It caimot be said, 
however, that any of the bodies in these Strasbourg cases were private persons. 
Radio France may have operated in a competitive market and the Spanish 
National Railway provider may have enjoyed administrative autonomy, but 
considering their characteristics as a whole implies that these bodies all had as 
their purpose the service of the public interest and, as such, were not 
insfitutionally private persons at all. Although Strasbourg may not have regarded 
them as the 'typical' or 'self-evident' core of the state, these cases, I suggest, did 
no more than hold that upon closer inspection, these bodies' characteristics and 
activities confirmed or denied their status as core state entities.^ ^"* This analysis is 
supported in particular by the careful use of the terms 'decentralised power' and 
'national authority' used by the court in Radio France: it is clear that Strasbourg 
Ibid., 118. 
Radio France, as contended in Chapter 4, was based on a public policy exception. 
121 
had more in mind than simply 'private' persons when considering which bodies 
can constitute governmental organisations under Art 34. 
Furthermore, as Quane notes,^ *^ the Commission in RENFE stated that the 
railway provider, being a governmental organisation, could not at any time make 
an Art 34 application. The implication of this, according to her, is that either the 
provider in RENFE was what the HRA would regard as a core public authority, 
or it was what the HRA would regard as a hybrid public authority but was 
prevented from ever invoking its own ECHR rights because it sometimes 
exercised 'functions of a public nature.' Quane believes the former conclusion to 
be incongruent with passages in Aston Cantlow urging a narrower interpretation 
of the core public authority category as compared to the hybrid category''*^ and 
consequently settles on the latter conclusion that the railway provider was a 
hybrid authority. She notes however that the Commission's view that the 
provider could never invoke its own ECHR rights sits uncomfortably with s 6(5) 
HRA and encourages Strasbourg to reconsider the decision."'^ ^ 
Especially given my arguments in this chapter, the obvious and compelling 
answer to this conundrum is domestically to regard the railway provider - and 
indeed any other bodies previously labelled 'governmental organisations' by 
Strasbourg - as core public authorities. It is important to remember that cases 
other than RENFE have taken the view that governmental organisations can 
Quane (fii341) 117. 
My views on the 'necessary' narrowness of the core public authority category were given in 
Chapter 4. 
Quane (fh 341) 117. 
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never invoke their own ECHR rights. Far from suggesting the reconsideration 
of dicta in a single decision therefore, Quane would appear to be urging 
Strasbourg to rethink its interpretational attitudes to Art 34 on a more general 
level. Strasbourg jurisprudence should not be shoehomed into s 6(3)(b) HRA in 
this way. 
Summary: Chasing the Strasbourg Rainbow 
I have attempted to show in the foregoing analysis that Aslon Cantlow has been 
misapplied by the Court of Appeal in R (West) v Lloyd's of London and by the 
House of Lords in YL v Birmingham City Council in order to be regarded as 
authority for the proposition that Strasbourg jurisprudence on active liability and 
'governmental organisations' under Art 34 is relevant to determining the 
meaning of 'functions of a public nature' under s 6(3)(b) HRA.^^^ Quane's views 
that Strasbourg jurisprudence should apply to s 6(3)(b) are tainted by a similar 
misunderstanding of Aston Cantlow and an overly ambitious perception of the 
ability of Strasbourg jurisprudence to articulate a doctrine whereby private 
persons exercising public or governmental functions are considered 'the state'. 
This is not to say that such a doctrine will not develop over time. However, as it 
currently stands, Strasbourg jurisprudence is unsuitable for use as an 
interpretative aid to 'fianctions of a public nature.' Its only proper relevance, it is 
contended, is to the identification of core public authorities under s 6(1) HRA. 
See e.g. Ayuntamiento de Mula v Spain (App no 55346/00) (unreported); Danderyds Kommim 
V Sweden (App no 52559/99) (unreported). 
Weaver (fh 329) would appear to continue the 'Strasbourg' trend: see [32] (Richards LJ). 
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D. CONCLUSIONS 
In substance i f not in form, the law after the House of Lords' ruling in YL 
perpetuates the institutional approach to 'functions of a public nature' under s 
6(3)(b) HRA. Although YL represents a pleasing departure from the early law by 
demonstrating an increasing judicial tendency to untangle 'functions' under s 
6(3)(b) from 'acts' under s 6(5), judges still seem unwilling to attempt to 
demarcate private and public acts in a principled manner. 
YVs principal error is to rely on Strasbourg jurisprudence as an interpretative aid 
to 'functions of a public nature' under s 6(3)(b). A detailed examination of the 
Strasbourg cases commonly said to be relevant to s 6(3)(b) reveals extreme 
difficulty - i f not impossibility - in classifying the relevant bodies as 
institutionally private persons to whom s 6(3)(b) would apply domestically. 
Hence the term 'chasing the Strasbourg rainbow', a phrase seemingly apt to 
describe the efforts of those who believe in Strasbourg's recognition of an 
intermediate 'hybrid' public authority doctrine similar to that found in s 6(3)(b) 
HRA. 
A better view, I have sought to argue, is domestically to classify bodies regarded 
by Strasbourg as 'state' bodies as core rather than hybrid public authorities.^^" 
Understanding the proper relevance of Strasbourg jurisprudence to the 'public 
authority' provisions under s 6 is crucial to attributing a wider reading to 
'functions of a public nature'. YL's essential equation of core 'state' bodies under 
This would in turn vindicate the instinctive concerns of certain commentators that Strasbourg 
jurisprudence sits uncomfortably with the hybrid public authority concept in domestic law; see 
Cane (fh 311) 46 and, mutatis mutandis, Palmer (fh 3 11) 562. 
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Strasbourg jurisprudence with 'hybrid' public authorities under s 6(3)(b) will 
continue i f applied by domestic courts to result in a necessarily restrictive 
reading of that subsection by excluding from the domestic reach of the 
Convention institutionally private persons whose primary motives are to 
themselves. 
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6. 
Hybrid Public Authorities: 
The 'Two-Strand' Approach 
With the observations from the previous chapters in mind, it is now possible to 
attempt to formulate a more appropriate 'two-strand' approach to s 6(3)(b) HRA. 
For ease of understanding and since the two-strand approach is referred to at 
various points throughout the chapter, a brief outline is helpfial: 'functions of a 
public nature' under s 6(3)(b) are comprised of two distinct 'strands' of function. 
The first strand comprises those functions which, when performed, must be 
performed primarily in the interests of a person other than the performer. The 
second strand comprises functions which are performed by a private person on 
behalf of a core public authority and which would be of a public nature when 
performed by that core public authority. 
This chapter consists of five parts. In the first, I make the basic case for 
extending the meaning of 'functions of a public nature' to include private persons 
who perform public functions on behalf of core public authorities. In the second 
part, I explain more comprehensively the two-strand approach to 'functions of a 
public nature'. The third part briefly compares and contrasts the existing 
proposed solutions to lending a wider reading to s 6(3)(b). I examine the limits to 
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the two-strand approach in the fourth part. The fifth part then applies the two-
strand approach to the relevant bodies in the decided cases, as well as to other 
significant bodies such as the BBC. 
A. T H E C A S E FOR A WIDER READING OF 'FUNCTIONS OF A 
PUBLIC NATURE' 
Although s 145 of the Health and Social Care Act 2008 has sought to remedy the 
immediate problem in relation to care homes, YL v Birmingham City CounciP^^ 
renders it highly doubtfial that private persons performing functions on behalf of 
core public authorities will be adjudged to perform 'functions of a public nature' 
under s 6(3)(b) i f acting for commercial gain.^ ^^ This observation is especially 
pertinent following the first instance ruling in R (Weaver) v London & Quadrant 
Housing Trust, where Richards LJ (with whom Swift J agreed) drew attention to 
the registered social landlord's status as a 'non-profit-making charity' to support 
his conclusion that it was exercising a public function when providing 
accommodation.^^'' The effect of ruling out bodies acting for commercial gain is 
to exclude virtually all contracted out services from the scope of s 6(3)(b). I 
argue in this part of the chapter that compelling reasons exist for holding that 
private persons who perform a public function on behalf of a core public 
authority exercise a 'function of a public nature' under s 6(3)(b). 
A preliminary point must be made. As Freedland notes, on the general question 
in English public law of how properly to demarcate 'public' from 'private', 'Few 
YL V Birmingham City Council [2007] U K H L 27, [2008] 1 A C 95. 
Ibid.,[\]6] (Lord Mance). 
393 [2008] E W H C 1377 (Admin) [54]. 
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i f any distincfions... are more charged with i d e o l o g y T h e public/private 
divide is a 'manifestation... of whatever is the prevailing political philosophy 
concerning the proper role of government.'^ ^^ I do not attempt, given this thesis' 
doctrinal focus, to examine the meaning of the hybrid public authority concept 
on an ideological plane.^ ^* An ideological analysis would be of little or no 
practical use unless Parliament, when enacting the HRA, could be shown to have 
had a particular ideology in mind. This may never be known. This part of the 
chapter does not attempt, either, slavishly to analyse the well-rehearsed doctrinal 
arguments for and against interpreting s 6(3)(b) so as to include persons 
performing public functions on behalf of core public authorities.''^^ In the 
interests of space and in an attempt to argue its point from an original 
perspective, the chapter instead uses some of these arguments to raise the clear 
possibility that Parliament could have intended such an interpretation. This then 
justifies a more searching exploration, which will be undertaken in Part D, of the 
limits to such an approach and to s 6(3)(b) generally. The results of this exercise, 
I argue, wil l help to counter the oft-held judicial views that subjecting contracted 
out bodies to the HRA would represent an unworkable interpretation of s 6(3)(b). 
M. Freedland, 'The Evolving Approach to the Public/Private Distinction in English Law' in 
M. Freedland and J. Auby (eds), The Public Law/Private Law Divide (Studies of the Oxford 
Institute of European and Comparative Law, Hart Publishing, Oxford 2006) 93, 94. 
M. Elliott, '"Public" and "private": defining the scope of the Human Rights Act' [2007] C L J 
485,487. 
For an interesting normative argument as to why and how English public law in general 
should respond to the increasing governmental trend towards contracting out, see M. Hunt, 
'Constitutionalism and the Contractualisation of Government' in M. Taggart (ed), The Province 
of Administrative Law (Hart Publishing, Oxford 1997) 21. 
For an overview, see P. Craig, 'Contracting out, the Human Rights Act and the scope of 
judicial review' (2002) 118 L Q R 551 (favouring such an interpretation) and D. Oliver, 'Functions 
of a public nature under the Human Rights Act' [2004] PL 329 (against it). 
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Arguments Favouring Expansion 
At the outset it is worth discounting one argument in favour of interpreting s 
6(3)(b) so as to include contracted out bodies. The Joint Committee on Human 
Rights (JC) believes the courts' current restrictive approach to s 6(3)(b) to hinder 
the UK's ability to 'bring rights home' by providing domestic remedies for 
Convention breaches actionable in Strasbourg.As seen in Chapters 4 and 5, s 
6(3)(b) is designed to expand on the range of bodies regarded by Strasbourg as 
'state' bodies and, consequently, would not seem to be concerned with 'bringing 
rights home' at all. Nevertheless, two remaining key arguments in favour of 
interpreting s 6(3)(b) so as to include persons performing public functions on 
behalf of core public authorities exist. 
Method of Service Delivery 
Core public authorities such as local authorities are bound by the HRA to respect 
the Convention in respect of all their acts, public or private. A service user whose 
rights are interfered with by a local authority service provider can therefore 
enforce those rights directly against the local authority. As Craig explains, an 
approach to s 6(3)(b) largely excluding private contractors from the scope of the 
HRA arbitrarily renders a victim's ability to enforce their rights directly against 
the body interfering with them wholly dependent upon the method by which the 
local authority chooses for the services to be delivered.^^^ Oliver disagrees with 
Craig's argument that such a result is incompatible with constitutional principle, 
on the ground that constitutional principle axiomatically requires higher 
The Joint Committee on Human Rights' Seventh Report of Session 2003-04, 'The Meaning of 
Public Authority under the Human Rights Act' H L (2003-04) 39, HC (2003-04) 382 [41]. 
P. Craig, 'Contracting out, the Human Rights Act and the scope of judicial review' (2002) 118 
L Q R 551, 554. 
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Standards of 'consideration for others, selflessness and public service' of core 
public authorities than of private persons.'""' For Oliver, ' i t is no part of 
constitutional principle that private bodies... subordinate their own interests to 
those of others.''*"' Two points can be made in response. First, whether or not 
constitutional principle demands the 'subordination' of private persons' interests 
to those of others is irrelevant given that Parliament and the common law, at 
times, do. As will be seen in greater detail in Part B of this chapter, the duty to 
perform a function in the interests of another over one's own can be found, for 
instance, in the exercise of coercive powers, and represents the first of the two 
'strands' of 'functions of a public nature' under s 6(3)(b). Oliver's attempt to 
rebut Craig's point thus loses its force by collapsing into a mere formalistic 
attack on his use of the term 'constitutional principle'. Second, Oliver's remark 
in any event seems somehow to presuppose a duty to subordinate one's own 
interests to those of another as a prerequisite to the performance of a public 
function under s 6(3)(b). As will be seen, whilst this is true of the first strand 
(performance of 'public interest' functions) to the two-strand approach, it is not 
true of the second (performance of a public function on a core public authority's 
behalf). The two strands need not share a common conceptual basis. Oliver's 
apparent assertion that 'functions of a public nature' must all be referable to the 
single concept of altruism is not obviously correct, especially given the 
observations above that the public/private divide is a particularly ideological, 
political and philosophical issue. Unless Parliament has attempted to spell out an 
ideology,'"'^ any presumption that a coherent ideology must underlie the meaning 
D. Oliver, 'Functions of a public nature under the Human Rights Act' [2004] P L 329, 340. 
Ibid, (emphasis original). 
Hansard, at least, reveals nothing to indicate that any members of Parliament had a clear 
ideology in mind. 
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of 'functions of a public nature' is necessarily questionable. For these reasons, 
even though a unified conceptual basis between the first and second strands may 
be intellectually preferable, its absence is not, I suggest, fatal to the credibility of 
the two-strand approach. 
Residual Remedies Inadequate 
The second argument in favour of interpreting s 6(3)(b) so as to include 
contracted out public functions is that the residual remedies otherwise open to 
service providers, particularly in the much-litigated care home context, are 
insufficient to protect that service user's rights to the same level as a direct action 
through s 6(3 )(b). 
The possibility of a service user invoking the horizontal effect of the Convention 
has already been discounted in Chapter 3. Lord Woolf CJ suggested in Leonard 
Cheshire that a resident could 'require' the local authority to contract with the 
provider so as to protect the provider's Convention rights.'"'^ However, the 
source of an obligation to compel the service provider to respect rights is 
conceptually unclear given Leonard Cheshire's thrust that, at times, there will be 
no Convention obligation upon the provider.''"'* This approach also contains 
practical flaws, such as potential inconsistency between levels of rights 
protection depending on when or in which area the contracts are concluded.'"'^ 
R (Heather) v Leonard Cheshire Foundation [2002] E W C A Civ 366, [2002] H R L R 30 [33]. 
Craig (fn 399) 560. See also the JC's Seventh Report (fti 398) [118]. 
'"^ The JC's Seventh Report {ibid.) [115]-[122]; M. Elliott, Beatson, Matthews and Elliott's 
Administrative Law Text and Materials (3 edn OUP, Oxford 2005) 151. See, more generally, C . 
Donnelly, 'Leonard Cheshire again and beyond: private contractors, contract and s.6(3)(b) of the 
Human Rights Act' [2005] PL 785, 791-799, 
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Residents may have their own contracts with providers which stipulate for the 
protection of their Convention rights."*^^  However, this may not always be the 
case, for instance i f the resident makes no 'top-up' payments of their own to the 
provider. Additionally, even those with contracts may be disadvantaged at the 
remedial stage of proceedings by contract law's particular preference for 
damages remedies to more specific remedies such as injunctions.'"'' What the 
service users in Leonard Cheshire and YL essentially sought was the right to 
remain in their respective homes. 
As their Lordships explained in YL, contracting out does not divest core public 
authorities of their own Convention obligations.'"'^ This raises the possibility of 
an action by a service user against the local authority in the event of a 
Convention breach by the provider, but this is not an obviously useful remedy 
given that the local authority would not in many cases be able to provide 
effective redress by, for instance, keeping a care home open.'"'^  
Arguments Against Expansion 
Having briefly outlined the arguments in favour of interpreting s 6(3)(b) HRA so 
as to include private persons performing public functions on behalf of core public 
authorities, it is necessary to address those arguments deployed against adopting 
such an interpretation. The key arguments are twofold. They relate, first, to the 
textual inapplicability of certain Convention rights to private persons and, 
secondly, to the disparity in rights protection which would result between private 
'"'^  Such was the case, as Lord Scott observed, in YL: (fh 391) [32]. 
'"^ Donnelly (fh 405) 799. 
408 
409 
YL (fn 391) [118] (Lord Mance) and [149] (Lord Neuberger). 
The JC's Seventh Report (fh 398) [84]; S. Palmer, 'Public, private and the Human Rights Act 
1998: an ideological divide' [2007] C L J 559, 569. 
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and local authority funded residents in the same care homes. Two further 
arguments, relating to the denial of Convention protection to hybrid public 
authorities and to the difficulty of ascertaining the outer boundaries to an 
interpretation which caught contracted out services, more appropriately concern 
the limits to the two-strand approach and will therefore be addressed in Part D. 
Textual Inapplicability of Qualified Rights 
At first instance in Leonard Cheshire, Stanley Bumton J believed that s 6(3)(b) 
could not have intended to subject private persons such as the service provider in 
that case to the Convention because 'the justifications referred to in Article 8.2 
[of the Convention""°] are all matters relevant to government, and not of any non-
public body.'"*" Even i f his Lordship accurately stated Parliament's intention in 
respect of the qualified rights, this reasoning would fail to explain why a private 
person should not be regarded as exercising 'functions of a public nature' under s 
6(3)(b) in respect of an unqualified right such as Art 3 ECHR.'"" 
However, his Lordship, I would argue, did not in any event accurately state 
Parliament's intenfion regarding the qualified rights. Were s 6(3)(b) to have 
applied to the private service provider in Leonard Cheshire, it would have 
provided a cause of action directly against that private person to allow the victim 
of the rights infringement to bring their dispute to court. However, once in court, 
Art 8(2): 'There shall be no interference by a public authority... except such as... is 
necessary... in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the 
country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the 
protection of the rights and freedoms of others.' 
R (Heather) v Leonard Cheshire Foundation [2001] E W H C 429 (Admin) [71]. See also 
Oliver (fn 400) 343-344. 
Art 3: 'No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment.' 
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that dispute would still involve - at least in Strasbourg's eyes, due to its failure to 
recognise a doctrine akin to hybridity under s 6(3)(b) - a domestic court 
adjudicating a dispute between two institutionally private individuals. The 
court's relationship vis-a-vis each of these private individuals would remain 
exactly the same as in a common law horizontal effect dispute such as Douglas v 
Hello!, where private individuals can avail themselves indirectly of the 
qualifications to the Convention rights due to the duty upon the court under ss 
6(1) and 6(3)(a) as a public authority to act compatibly with the Convenfion.'"^ 
Therefore, for example, although the service provider may not - as Stanley 
Bumton J contends - be able directly to claim that it was acting in the 'economic 
well-being of the country' when evicting a resident, it might be able to persuade 
a judge that the court would be so acting when giving judgment in the service 
provider's favour.'*'" Nothing in s 6(3)(b) appears to relieve the court of its duties 
towards individuals during a private dispute simply because Parliament has 
furnished the victim with a cause of action by designating another private 
individual as a 'public authority' in a particular situation. 
Disparity 
A second argument deployed against interpreting s 6(3)(b) so as to include 
private providers of public functions on behalf of core public authorities is that, 
where a private provider accommodates both privately and local authority funded 
residents, privately funded residents whose services are not provided on the local 
'"^ For an explanation of the mechanics of 'indirect horizontal effect', see Douglas v Hello! Ltd 
[2001] QB 967, [2001] 2 W L R 992 ( C A ) 1005 (Sedley L J ) and 984 (Brooke LJ) . 
It is unclear, largely due to Lord Woolf CJ's omission clearly to identify the particular head of 
Art 8(2) which justified Poplar Housing's actions when evicting the tenant, whether the Court of 
Appeal believed Art 8(2) to apply directly to the public authority in Donoghue, or indirectly 
through the court: Poplar Housing and Regeneration Community Association Ltd v Donoghue 
[2001] E W C A Civ 595, [2002] QB 48, 70-71. 
134 
authority's behalf would lack a direct action under s 6(3)(b). 'To distinguish 
between different residents in the same care home... appears undesirable.''"^ 
Whether or not such contracted out services are caught by s 6(3)(b) however, 
some disparity will result."'^ As seen above, an alternative disparity exists in 
rights protection, i f s 6(3)(b) is not interpreted as applying to the contractor's 
activities, between those receiving services from local authorities on the one 
hand and from private providers pursuant to contracting out on the other. Against 
the opponents' disparity argument and from a common sense perspective, it is 
difficult to see when faced with two alternative forms of disparity why judges 
should prefer the approach like that in YL which denies rather than protects 
rights. Reluctance to expand on the level of protection offered in Strasbourg 
jurisprudence was one explanation proffered,"'^ but as seen from Chapters 4 and 
5, s 6(3)(b)'s purpose would seem to be to expand on those bodies regarded by 
Strasbourg as 'state' bodies. 
In YL, Lord Mance believed there to be nothing inherently public in the provision 
of care and accommodation.'"^ From my analysis of the nature of core public 
authorities in Chapter 4,1 would respectfully disagree that the function is private. 
It is performed by the local authority in the interests of the elderly and vulnerable 
rather than its own, and as a result is factually public in nature. Lord Mance 
disliked the disparity in rights protection which would result from labelling 
Southern Cross a hybrid public authority when the same services, his Lordship 
"'^ Ibid., [117] (Lord Mance). See also [29] (Lord Scott) and [151] (Lord Neuberger). 
"'^  P. Craig, Administrative Law (6"" edn Thomson Sweet & Maxwell, London 2008) 578. 
YL (fh 391) [161] (Lord Neuberger). 
"'^ Ibid., [118]. 
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observed, are provided to both privately and local authority fianded residents.'"^ 
However, this presumes an exact and highly questionable synonymy between 
'services' and 'functions' under s 6(3)(b). Stanley Bumton J stated at first 
instance in Leonard Cheshire that 'the public authority criterion [under s 6(3)(b)] 
cannot be purely functional.'''^" This, I respectfully suggest, is an astute and 
significant remark. In isolation from its context, 'there is nothing in the nature of 
any... [activity] that renders it clearly [public or private].'''^' More background 
information is therefore needed, despite the fact that the services in each case are 
the same, in order to assess the nature of the function under s 6(3)(b). This would 
seem to justify the reference in the second strand of the two-strand approach to 
the arrangements between the private provider and the core public authority and 
to the examination of whether the private provider performs the relevant function 
on the core public authority's behalf."^^ Hence, the disparity which is said to 
exist between privately and local authority funded residents would represent, 
crucially, an inevitable and permissible side-effect of the two-strand approach. 
The arguments in this part of the chapter have focussed on the care home 
context, which has generated much litigation and which s 145 of the Health and 
Social Care Act 2008 has aimed to rectify by designating the provision of care 
and accommodation pursuant to arrangements made under s 21 NAA a function 
of a public nature under s 6(3)(b) HRA. Nevertheless, the arguments favouring 
the expansion of s 6(3)(b) and my responses to the arguments against expansion 
lbid.,{\\9]. 
Leonard Cheshire (fh 411) [68] (emphasis added). This is an analysis which Lord Mance 
himself, ironically, appeared to support in YL {ibid.) [102]. 
Donnelly (fti 405) 804 (emphasis added). 
It is crucial, however, to re-emphasise the arguments from Chapter 5 that a lack of institutional 
proximity between core public authority and service provider should not militate conclusively 
against the relevant function being classified as public. 
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apply to contracting out in general, which the HSCA did not seek to address. In 
sum, I reiterate, I do not claim to have demonstrated in the foregoing analysis 
that Parliament conclusively intended that s 6(3)(b) should apply to persons 
performing public functions on behalf of core public authorities. Instead, I have 
sought to show that this would be a plausible reading of Parliament's intention, 
so as to justify a closer examination of the effects of such an approach. This 
examinafion occurs in Part D, and is used to bolster the credibility of the two-
strand approach as a whole. First however, the approach requires greater 
explanation. 
B. T H E TWO-STRAND APPROACH EXPLAINED 
This chapter argues that two strands of public function exist under s 6(3)(b). The 
first strand involves functions which the performer is obliged to perform in the 
interests of another over himself The second strand involves functions which are 
performed by a private person on behalf of a core public authority and which 
would represent factually public funcfions when performed by that core public 
authority."^^^ As seen in Part A of this chapter, the lack of a common conceptual 
basis to these two strands need not strip the two-strand approach of credibility 
given the ideological and philosophical nature of the debate on the public/private 
"•^ ^ It is recalled from Chapter 4 that all functions and acts of a core public authority are legally 
public. Lord Neuberger stated in YL (fn 391) that '[the concept of 'function of a public nature'] 
has relevance only to hybrid public authorities': [ M l ] . Even though core public authorities are 
defined institutionally by who they are rather than the nature of the functions they perform (see 
Chapter 4), it is unclear why - and his Lordship omitted to argue the point - the H R A prevents 
the nature of a core public authority's functions from 'being used as an interpretative aid to 
s.6(3)(b)': A. Williams, 'YL v Birmingham Cit)' Council: Contracting out and "functions of a 
public nature'" [2008] E H R L R 524, 529. 
divide and the apparent lack on Parliament's part to resolve the issue on that 
level. This part of the chapter explains each strand in greater detail. 
First Strand: 'Public Interest' Functions 
As seen in Chapter 4, a proper appreciation of the nature and functions of core 
public authorities represents a significant indicator of public as opposed to 
private activity which may aid in the interpretation of 'functions of a public 
nature' under s 6(3)(b). 
Chapter 4 concluded that core public authorities, when properly understood, are 
bodies with the primary purpose of serving the public interest over their own. 
Circumstances exist in which those bodies can further their own interests. But in 
the event of a clash between their interests and those of the public (i.e. the 
persons for whom the core public authority is responsible when performing a 
given function), the core public authority must prefer the interests of the public 
when performing its functions. Not to do so may render ultra vires any activity 
undertaken by that core public authority. Therefore, the duty to perform a 
function in the interests of another over one's own is the hallmark of 
'publicness'. Applying this finding to s 6(3)(b) produces the conclusion that a 
function is of a public nature i f the private person is required to perform it, over 
his own interests, in the interests of a person or persons for whom the performer 
is responsible when performing that function. This is the first 'strand' of 
'functions of a public nature' under s 6(3)(b), which functions wil l be referred to 
as 'public interest' functions. 
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Two clarifying points must be made. First, the 'duty' in question - to perform the 
function in the furtherance of the interests of another - is not a duty to perform 
the function but a duty of selflessness during its performance. Core public 
authorities wil l be subject to varied and extensive statutory duties to perform 
certain funcfions, such as making arrangements to provide care and 
accommodation for the elderly and infirm. This might be thought to raise the 
possibility that a typically public function is one which, in the public interest, the 
person is obliged to perform. But private persons may still be subject to duties to 
undertake activities which may well be in the public interest, for instance to pay 
income tax or ensure that their children attend school. The 'duty' in the first 
strand cannot attach to the duty to undertake an activity which is in the public 
interest, since taxpayers and parents sending their children to school would then 
perform public functions under s 6(3)(b) when fulfilling those statutory duties. 
This cannot be right. The 'duty' which characterises a function as public is, in the 
alternative, the duty to perform a function selflessly (rather than self-interestedly) 
by preferring the interests of another person over one's own. Second, and as a 
result, a disfinction must be drawn between a duty to perform a function in the 
interests of another over one's own, and a restriction on the extent to which a 
person can behave self-interestedly. The latter occurs in spheres involving 
typically private activity, such as competition'* '^* or employment.'*"^ As Sir 
Michael Turner remarked in Cameron v Network Rail Infrastructure Ltd in 
relation to Network Rail's funcfions under s 6(3)(b), ' I t was said that the 
""^  The purpose of competition law can be summarised (crudely) as the restriction of 
monopolistic, self-interested behaviour (for instance to maximise profits) in order to further the 
policy goal of delivering better economic outcomes and benefits for consumers: see R. Whish, 
Competition Law [5'^ edn LexisNexis Butterworths, London 2003) 2-17. 
Section 2(1) of the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974, for example, places upon every 
employer the duty 'to ensure, so far as is reasonably practicable, the health, safety and welfare at 
work of all his employees.' 
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defendant has a central role in regard to safety, but so, too, does every other 
employer owe duties [under statute].'''^^ Borderline situations may exist where 
the extent to which a person can act self-interestedly when performing a function 
is so heavily restricted that it amounts, in substance, to a duty to perform that 
function in the interests of another rather than one's own. That must depend on 
the specific provision at hand. But only those functions implying duties to serve 
another's interests over one's own should properly be regarded as public 
functions under the first strand to s 6(3)(b). 
Doctrinal Evidence 
Perhaps due to the judicial omission as yet to address in any detail the nature of 
core public authorities,''^^ the 'public interest' functions doctrine has not so far 
received explicit judicial or academic attention. Nevertheless, implicit doctrinal 
evidence exists to suggest that public interest functions constitute 'functions of a 
public nature' under s 6(3)(b). 
A significant case is R (A) v Partnerships in Care Ltd,^~^ where the claimant, a 
mental inpatient detained in a private hospital pursuant to s 3(1) of the Mental 
Health Act 1983 (MHA), sought judicial review of the hospital's decision to alter 
the focus of treatment on her ward. The patient claimed, inter alia, that to do so 
would deny her appropriate care and infringe Arts 3 and 8 ECHR. Keith J held 
that the compulsory care and treatment of the claimant by the hospital amounted 
'^ ^ [2006] E W H C 1133 (QB), [2007] 1 W L R 163 [35]. 
Even during YL (fh 391) and beyond, divided assertions on how to identify core public 
authorities seemed to reign. Contrast, for instance, the 'institutional' assertion of Lord Neuberger, 
at [141], with the 'functional' assertion of J. Landau, 'Functional public authorities after YL" 
[2007] P L 630,630-631. 
[2002] E W H C 529 (Admin), [2002] 1 W L R 2610. 
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to the performance of a public function under s 6(3)(b) HRA.'*'^ ^ The 'critical' 
factor, according to his Lordship, was that 'those of the hospital's patients who 
are admitted... [under s 3(1) MHA] are admitted by compulsion and not by 
choice'.''^^ Partnerships in Care therefore demonstrates that the exercise of 
coercive powers amounts to the exercise of a public function under s 6(3)(b).''^' 
Oliver, who regards the exercise of physically and legally coercive powers as 
'the only workable test' for public functions under s 6(3)(b), supports this 
conclusion.''"'^ Oliver's confinement of s 6(3)(b) to coercive powers is open to 
objection following Part A of this chapter due to her exclusion of contracted out 
public functions, but her equation of coercive powers with public functions, I 
suggest, is accurate. Donnelly fails to see why the exercise of coercive powers 
amounts to the performance of a public function,"" but I would argue that the 
answer lies in the existence of the duty when performing these functions to do so 
in the furtherance of the interests of another rather than the performer.'*'''' As a 
matter of principle alone, it would be highly surprising i f not deeply chilling for 
Parliament or the common law to provide a private person with the power to 
coerce another either physically (by detention) or legally (by, for instance, 
disciplining them) for the performer's ends. Indeed, the MHA seemingly reflects 
Despite the confusion between 'functions' and 'acts' {ibid.) [24], this appears to have been his 
Lordship's decision: [25]. 
Ibid., [25]. 
Further tacit support can be found in Aston Canllow and Wilmcote with Billesley Parochial 
Church Council v Wallbank [2003] U K H L 37, [2004] 1 A C 546 [90] (Lord Hobhouse) and 
Cameron (fh 426) [35] (Sir Michael Turner). 
Oliver (fn 400) 337. 
Donnelly (fn 405) 804. 
Oliver appears implicitly to recognise this when stating: 'One would expect those exercising 
public functions to be under general duties of altruism': D. Oliver, 'The frontiers of the State: 
public authorities and public functions under the Human Rights Act' [2000] PL 476, 489. In 
Aston Cantlow (fn 431) [64], Lord Hope believed that the performance of a public function under 
s 6(3)(b) could involve a responsibility towards others, which would also lend implicit support to 
the idea that 'public interest' functions constitute public functions under s 6(3)(b). 
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this proposition by authorising applications for the admission of patients for 
compulsory treatment only i f 'necessary for the health and safety of the patient or 
for the protection of other persons'."^^ It is clear that a private hospital may well 
be motivated by profit when compulsorily detaining and treating patients whom 
it is necessary on these grounds to detain and treat. But i f it were not necessary, 
i.e. i f a conflict existed between the profit-making interests of the hospital on the 
one hand, and of the patient or public on the other, the hospital would be unable 
to further its own interests by detaining and treating the patient regardless. The 
MHA does not, therefore, appear to permit the use of its coercive powers other 
than in the interests of the patient or the public: the private hospital must use its 
coercive powers in the interests of others or not at all. 
This raises the related question of whether the exercise of coercion other than 
through the exercise of statutory or common law powers, such as the coercion 
exercised by the Jockey Club as the de facto regulator of the horseracing 
industry, should be treated as the performance of a public function under s 
6(3)(b). There would be a strong normative argument for doing so, namely that it 
makes no difference to the coerced whether the coercion has a specific legal 
basis or whether it results, for instance, from sheer market dominance. However, 
it has been seen that the focus of the first strand is the duty to perform a function 
in the overriding interests of another rather than one's own. Without a legal basis 
for the function, it is difficult to see how a performer could be under such a duty 
when performing it: i f the ability to coerce has been acquired by the lawful 
exercise of individual liberty, one would expect i f anything that it is being used 
MHA 1983, s 3(2)(c). See further, to that effect, ss 2(2)(b), 4(2) and 5(4)(a). 
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for the prime benefit of the performer over anyone else. Self-pursuit and 
individual liberty, Fewings makes clear, go hand in hand.''^ ^ As seen in Chapter 4 
however, Fewings does identify the link between the principles of judicial review 
and the duty to perform a function in the interests of another over one's own. 
Although a greater analysis of the ambit and rationale of the principles of judicial 
review would exceed the scope of this thesis,"" it is tentatively contended that a 
function may be a 'public interest' function under strand one i f the performer is 
amenable to judicial review in respect of it. To this end, the two-strand approach 
would aid in finding a suitable home within the hybrid public authority concept 
for the law on amenability to review. 
The need for a duty to perform a function in the interests of others also prevents 
the functions of voluntarily 'public interest' bodies such as charities from falling 
automatically into the first strand to s 6(3)(b). As seen in Chapter 4, a 
fundamental conceptual difference exists between bona fide public activity on 
the one hand, and merely imitated public activity on the other. 
Briefly to summarise, the first strand of 'functions of a public nature' under s 
6(3)(b) comprises fiincfions which, when performed, the performer is required to 
perform in the interests of another over his own. 
"^^ R V Somerset County Council, exp Fewings [1995] 1 All E R 5 13 (QB) 524 (Laws J). 
The landscape of administrative law, Craig cautions, is profoundly affected by political 
philosophy: (fn 416) 4. For a thorough analysis of the constitutional basis for judicial review, see 
M. Elliott, The Constitutional Foundations of Judicial Review (Hart Publishing, Oxford 2001). 
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Second Strand: 'Inherited' Public Functions 
The above analysis has sought to demonstrate that public interest functions 
constitute the first strand to 'functions of a public nature' under s 6(3)(b). The 
second strand comprises those functions which are performed by a private person 
on behalf of a core public authority and which would be of a factually public 
nature when performed by that core public authority. These functions will be 
referred to as 'inherited' functions. Inherited functions will usually be found in 
the context of contracting out, where private persons perform public funcfions on 
behalf of core public authorities for financial reward.'*^* Part A has already 
attempted to make the basic case for including inherited fiinctions within s 
6(3)(b), and Part D will assess the limits to an approach which does so. 
Function 'inheritance' may at first sight be thought to include functions 
performed in privafised industries by private persons in whom Parliament vests 
an enterprise after removing from the relevant core public authority the power to 
perform those fiincfions.'*^^ Although the government intended privatised 
providers at times to be caught by s 6(3)(b),'''*'' it would not seem sensible to 
regard s 6(3)(b) as applying during the delivery of privafised services per e^.'*'*' 
First, it is artificial to try to evaluate, for instance, the nature of the funcfion of 
providing railway services when performed by the state-owned British Railways 
The arguments in Part A in favour of interpreting s 6(3)(b) so as to cover inherited functions 
would, however, apply equally to cases where private persons such as charities perform these 
services voluntarily on a core public authority's behalf 
'Privatisation' is used in the narrow sense to denote the vesting of an enterprise in a private 
company (see V. Ramanadham, 'The Concept and Rationale of Privatisation' in V. Ramanadham 
(ed). Privatisation in the UK (Routledge, London 1988) 3, 4-6), rather than in the wider sense 
which includes contracting out (see K. Hartley and M. Huby, 'Contracting-Out Policy: Theory 
and Evidence' in J . Kay, C . Mayer and D. Thompson (eds). Privatisation and Regulation: The 
UK Experience (OUP, Oxford 1986) 284, 284). 
Home Office, 'Rights Brought Home: The Human Rights Bil l ' (Cm 3782, 1997) [2.2]. 
For the same conclusion, see James v London Electricity Pic [2004] E W H C 3226 (QB). 
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Board i f as a result of privatisation that core public authority can no longer 
perform the funcfion at all. Second, the 'most obvious' form of privatisation 
involves the 'denationalisation of a public enterprise'.'*'*^ In these cases, where an 
entire enterprise is performed by private persons in a competitive market, there 
would be no arbitrariness in the level of rights protection resulting from the 
method of service delivery as there would for example in the care home context 
discussed above. Third, including the delivery of privatised services in the 
category of 'inherited public functions' would appear to render those functions 
enduringly public under s 6(3)(b). Absent Parliamentary intervention to designate 
the function as private, it is difficult to see how the provision of railway services, 
i f classified as a public function when performed by Railtrack (now Network 
Rail Infrastructure Ltd) as a privatised operator, could be classed as anything 
other than public for as long as the company continued to provide them. At least 
in the contracting out context, a private service provider seeking to limit its 
human rights liability would have the freedom to negotiate the length of its 
contract and hence the length of time during which it performed public functions 
under the HRA or, alternatively, cease to deal with the relevant core public 
authority and thereby cease to perform public functions on its behalf Not so for a 
privatised operator like Railtrack, who would be regarded from its inception as 
performing a public function when providing railway services and whose only 
apparent option to avoid such a consequence would be to cease trading as a 
railways operator altogether. 
Ramanadham (fh 439) 6. 
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This is not to say that the exclusion of the dehvery o f privatised services f rom the 
second strand o f 'functions o f a public nature' means that privatised operators' 
activities w i l l never fa l l within s 6(3)(b). As Cameron demonstrates, companies 
in whom privatised enterprises are vested w i l l usually be given temporary 
regulatory control over their industry in the form of statutory coercive powers.'"''' 
The exercise o f these powers, as seen above, would constitute the performance o f 
public functions under the first strand to s 6(3)(b). 
Again by way o f brief summary, the second strand to 'functions o f a public 
nature' under s 6(3)(b) comprises 'inherited' functions, i.e. functions performed 
on behalf o f a core public authority and which would be o f a public nature when 
performed by that core public authority. This does not, it is contended, include 
the performance o f privatised services per se. 
C. SECTION 6(3)(b): EXISTING POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS 
A number o f potential solutions have been proffered for interpreting s 6(3)(b) 
more widely in an effort to include contracted out service providers. Landau 
advocates what in shorthand may be named the 'abstract function' approach. 
This exploits the wording 'certain of whose functions are... public''*'*'' in s 
6(3)(b) in order to expand the scope of rights protection such that s 6(3)(b) is met 
in a given situation i f any o f a body's functions - not simply the one(s) 
performed in relation to the victim in the case - are public in nature.''"^ Landau 
argues that s 6(3)(b) would therefore be met in all cases i f a care home providing 
Cameron (fh 426) [35]. 
Emphasis added. 
Landau (fn 427) 632. 
146 
care and accommodation also possessed coercive powers o f restraint.'*''^ In 
response, it would be arbitrary i f the provider's s 6 status changed in YL simply 
by virtue o f its possession of coercive powers which it might never have 
contemplated using against Mrs Y L . Additionally, Lord Neuberger's comment 
that hybrid public authorities are only liable for public acts undertaken 'pursuant 
to or in connection wi th ' a public function implicitly rejects the abstract function 
approach (since the approach would only be o f use when public acts were 
performed pursuant to private functions),'*''^ as does Lord Nicholls' remark in 
Aston Cantlow that ' i t is not necessary to analyse each o f the functions... and see 
i f any o f them is a public function.''*''^ 
In the Court o f Appeal in YL, Buxton LJ proffered his own interpretation o f s 
6(3 )(b). For his Lordship, 'publicness' under s 6(3 )(b) depends upon the degree 
of integration between the private body and relevant core public authority,'*'*^ and 
the extent to which the body stands in the local authority's shoes when providing 
a service."^'* However, because of the alleged textual inapplicability to private 
persons o f the qualifications contained in the qualified rights and those persons' 
consequent inability directly to avail themselves o f those qualifications,''^' the 
ultimate question is whether it is 'necessary and just if ied ' to treat the body in 
question as a public authority.''^^ The House o f Lords was right not to endorse 
(indeed, their Lordships did not even discuss) these obiter remarks. The overall 
criterion o f 'necessity and justification' is hopelessly vague. I have sought to 
Ibid. 
rL(fn391)[131] . 
Aston Cantlow (fii 43 1) [16]. 
YL V Birmingham City Council [2007] E W C A Civ 26, [2008] Q B 1 [71]. 
450 Ibid., [Ill 
Ibid., [73]-[74]. 
Ibid., [76]. 
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address the 'textual inapplicability' argument in Part A. Although Buxton LJ's 
second criterion ('standing in the shoes') appears to support the view that 
irvherited public functions should be caught by s 6(3)(b), his first criterion 
('integration') - unless it merely emphasises the need for a person to perform a 
public function on behalf o/ the core public authority - would risk imbuing s 
6(3)(b) with an institutional focus. 
'Assumption of Responsibility' 
Some interpretations proffered rely upon 'assumption of responsibility'. For the 
JC, s 6(3)(b) extends beyond the exercise o f coercive powers by private 
persons'*" to cover those functions performed by private persons ' for which the 
government has taken responsibility in the public interest'.''^'' An example would 
include caring for the sick or disabled, but only when 'assisting in performing 
what the State itself has identified as... [its] responsibilities' by 'doing work as 
part o f a government programme' in discharging the duties necessary for the 
provision o f it.''^^ Although the JC's focus on 'public interest' includes coercive 
powers as well as inherited public functions and therefore indicates the JC's 
recognition o f the two distinct 'strands' o f public function under s 6(3)(b), the 
focus on state 'duties' and 'responsibilities' tends to imply that private persons' 
functions which would have been performed by core public authorities pursuant 
to powers are not public under s 6(3)(b). It is diff icul t to see why not, when the 
arguments in Part A relating in particular to the method of service delivery apply 
no less in the context o f a power than a duty.''^^ The JC's interpretation also 
The JC's Seventh Report (fri 398) [144]. 
''Ubid., [140]. 
Ibid. 
Craig shares this view: (fh 416) 577. 
148 
allows for the argument employed by their Lordships in YL, namely that a private 
provider in the care home context is not discharging a local authority's duty at 
all, since the only duty upon the local authority under s 21 o f the National 
Assistance Act 1948 ( N A A ) is to arrange for rather than provide 
accommodation.' ' '" 
In YL, Baroness Hale (dissenting) proffered a similar interpretation to that o f the 
JC.''^^ Although her Ladyship's interpretation sought expressly to unify all public 
functions under s 6(3)(b) by reference to the 'assumption o f responsibility' by the 
state for the function'*^^ and in that sense represents an intellectually attractive 
interpretation o f s 6(3)(b), the general focus on the state's 'responsibilities' and 
'duties' in the first place, as I have argued, is inappropriate. 
Markus' variant on the 'assumption o f responsibility' theme proposes that a 
public function is indicated under s 6(3)(b) (first) by 'whether the state 
discharges its responsibilities or... recognises [the function] as being in the 
public interest,'''^^ and (second) whether the body 'is in a position to evaluate the 
fair balance that must be struck by the state when interfering with Convention 
rights.'"*^' Although the first criterion would seem sensibly to obviate the need to 
demonstrate a duty on the state's part to perform the function in question, it is 
VL (fh 391) [112] (Lord Mance) and [147] (Lord Neuberger). Their Lordships' argument is 
open to objection however, since it places the focus of the statutory purpose on arrangement of 
provision, rather than on Parliament's real purpose 'which, surely, is to ensure that vulnerable 
members of society are cared for': Williams (fn 423) 529. See further Craig {ibid.) 578; YL (fn 
391) [16] (Lord Bingham) and [66] (Baroness Hale). 
YL {ibid.) [65]. See also [8]-[9] (Lord Bingham). 
Ibid., [69]. 
" ^ " K . Markus, 'Leonard Cheshire Foundation: what is a public function?' [2003] E H R L R 92, 99 
(emphasis added). 
Ibid 
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diff icul t to see the relevance o f the second. Any private company, properly 
legally advised, would surely be ' i n a position to evaluate' the balance to strike. 
Bills Before Parliament 
Following a reassessment o f the meaning o f 'public authority' under s 6 HRA, 
the JC's Ninth Report o f Session 2006-07 called for a 'separate, supplementary 
and interpretative statute' to s 6(3)(b). ' '" The Human Rights Act 1998 (Meaning 
of Public Authority) B i l l was introduced into the Commons by Andrew Dismore 
MP (the JC's Chairman) in January 2007, prior to YL reaching the House of 
Lords.^" This has now been superseded by the Human Rights Act (Meaning of 
Public Function) B i l l , which would classify as public a function 'which is 
required or enabled to be performed wholly or partially at public expense.'''^'' 
Whilst Mr Dismore envisages that the latter would extend the HRA to contracted 
out care for the elderly,"*^' the B i l l in its current form fails to mention s 6(5) and 
address Lord Scott's argument in YL'*^^ that the provider's purported reliance 
upon its contractual rights when seeking to evict Mrs Y L was a private act.''^ ^ 
Also, the extensive list o f factors in cl 1 to which the court must have regard 
when determining the nature o f a function, such as 'public interest' and 'extent to 
which the state makes payment', reveals no coherent approach to s 6(3)(b) and 
indicates no relative weight for the court to attach to each factor. Furthermore, 
'wholly or partially at public expense' would seem capable, absent a de minimis 
The Joint Committee on Human Rights' Ninth Report of Session 2006-07, 'The Meaning of 
Public Authority under the Human Rights Act' H L (2006-07) 77, H C (2006-07) 410 [150]. 
Human Rights Act 1998 (Meaning of Public Authority) H C Bill (2006-2007) [43], cl 1. For 
brief commentary, see Williams (fh 423) 529. 
Human Rights Act 1998 (Meaning of Public Function) H C Bill (2007-2008) [45], cl 2. This 
Bill is due at the time of writing for Second Reading in the Commons on 17 October 2008. 
Hansard H C vol 469 col 739 (18 December 2007). 
"'^  h'yL(fn391)[34]. 
Williams (fh 423) 530. This is also an unfortunate omission in s 145 of the Health and Social 
Care Act 2008. 
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principle, o f expanding on the two-strand approach by including the activity o f 
charities for which they had received government support, regardless o f whether 
that activity was performed on a core public authority's behalf as such. If, for 
instance, the Secretary o f State provides development assistance to a U K charity 
with a view to furthering sustainable development abroad,"^^ arguably all of the 
charity's functions (other than those perhaps with no connection to sustainable 
development), including the employment o f staff, are undertaken partially at 
public expense and are caught by s 6(3)(b). It is doubtful that the HRA was 
intended by M r Dismore to extend this far.''^^ 
In sum, none o f the above approaches to s 6(3)(b) are as appropriate, I would 
suggest, as the two-strand approach. I therefore examine the limits to and 
safeguards against the use o f this approach. 
D. LIMITS TO T H E TWO-STRAND APPROACH 
There are three main points o f limitation to the two-strand approach. First, as 
specifically concerns the second strand (inherited functions), only inherited 
factually public functions are caught by s 6(3)(b). Second and more generally, a 
proper understanding o f the difference between 'funcfions' under s 6(3)(b) and 
'acts' under s 6(5) aids in the reduction of s 6(3)(b)'s scope in appropriate 
circumstances. Third, on a proper understanding o f the HRA's provisions, hybrid 
public authorities should be regarded as capable o f relying on their own 
Convention rights at all times as any other private persons could. 
International Development Act 2002, ss 1(1) and 1(2). 
"^ ^ See Hansard H C vol 472 col 59 (18 February 2008) (Mr Ben Bradshaw MP) for similar 
concerns regarding an identically worded Dismore amendment to the H S C A . 
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Only Contracted out Public Functions Satisfy Strand Two 
In response to the argument that contracted out services should be caught by s 
6(3)(b) in YL, Lord Scott rhetorically asked where it would end i f 'every 
contracting out by a local authority o f a function.. . [turned] the contractor into a 
hybrid public authority'.'*^*' Against this, it is not the contention o f Professor 
Craig, whose work was cited to their Lordships in YL, that every contracted out 
function should be public under s 6(3)(b).''^' Nor is it mine. As seen in Chapter 4, 
only functions performed by a core public authority primarily for the benefit o f 
someone other than the core public authority are factually 'public' functions to 
which s 6(3)(b) would apply upon inheritance; indeed, it is diff icul t to see how a 
factually private function could ever become public in nature upon contracting 
out. Section 6(3)(b) would therefore include, for example, the provision of care 
and accommodation under s 21 N A A as in Leonard Cheshire and YL, but not the 
cleaning o f local authority offices. Section 6(3)(b) would therefore include 
certain functions regarded as instinctively private by judges and commentators 
such as road building and repairs,'*^^ providing cleaning or cooking services for a 
local authority owned care home,''^^ cleaning council tenants' windows''^'' and 
gardening in public parks.'*^^ However, even i f these functions should properly be 
•'™ YL (fn 391) [30] (emphasis added). 
Although Craig (fh 399) did not explicitly make the point, it is clear that he had only inherited 
public functions in mind by his assessment of the nature of the local authority's function of 
providing care and accommodation in Leonard Cheshire as 'public in the classic, social welfare 
sense': 557. Oliver overlooked this (fti 400) when stating: 'Craig considers that if a private body 
does the self-same thing as a public body... it would be performing a "public function"... This 
does not seem to me to be the case... Not everything that [core] public authorities do is a 
function of a public nature': 340 (emphasis added). Lord Mance, having cited Oliver's work with 
seeming approval, made the same mistake in YL {ibid.) [110]. 
Leonard Cheshire (fti 411) [49] (Stanley Bumton J). 
YL (fn 391) [27] (Lord Scott). 
Ibid., [82] (Lord Mance). 
Oliver (fti 400) 338. 
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regarded as falling outwith s 6(3)(b), this chapter demonstrates that there are 
other limitations upon the 'damage' caused by including them. 
Lord Scott also asked in YL whether, i f the provider were a hybrid public 
authority, the same would be true o f each manager and nurse employed there.''^^ 
In response, it is unrealistic to regard the manager of a care home as 'providing 
care and accommodation' on the local authority's behalf when his 
responsibilities are better described as ensuring the performance o f the function 
by the staff. Nurses may be said to 'provide' care and accommodation, but would 
represent a poor choice o f defendant due to their inability to prevent a care 
home's closure or (through their relative impecuniosity) to pay damages for the 
breach o f a resident's Convention rights. 
'Functions' and 'Acts' 
Due no doubt in large part to the confusion between 'functions' under s 6(3)(b) 
and 'acts' under s 6(5) in the earlier case law,''^^ the distinction has not yet been 
subjected to thorough exegesis. Some commentators, however, have made a 
number o f brief observations. Lord Neuberger explained in YL that the term 
'function' has 'a more conceptual, and perhaps less specific, meaning' than 'act' 
under s 6(5), and that ' A number o f different acts can be involved in the 
performance o f a single function.'"*^^ Functions 'can be performed as part o f a 
duty or under a power'.''^^ 
XL (fh 391) [30]. 
''^ See Chapter 5. 
XL (fn 391) [130]. 
Oliver (fh 400) 335. 
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General 
From the above, a pyramid appears to emerge. At the apex are duties or powers, 
i.e. requirements or abilities to undertake a given activity (X) in order to achieve 
an outcome (Y) . Section 21 N A A , for example, confers a duty upon a local 
authority to make arrangements (X) and a power to provide care and 
accommodation (X) in order to aid the elderly and vulnerable (Y) . At a lower 
level are functions, which are undertaken with a view to achieving Y. At the foot 
o f the pyramid are 'acts', i.e. those activities undertaken pursuant to functions. 
Since s 6(1) focuses on the lawfulness o f the 'act', the 'act' is the element of 
conduct capable o f triggering the victim's cause o f action. An act, it seems, w i l l 
be transient and o f short duradon compared to a ' function' such as 'providing 
care and accommodation'. The latter is an ongoing activity which does not of 
itself trigger the cause o f action, but instead generates and explains the relational 
proximity between vict im and performer. 
'Public' and 'Private ' Acts 
The first strand to the two-strand approach measures the 'publicness' of a 
function under s 6(3)(b) by reference to whether or not the performer is under a 
duty to perform that function in the interests of another over himself However, it 
would seem, such a duty cannot represent the touchstone for the 'publicness' of 
an act under s 6(5). It puts the cart before the horse to ask whether there exists a 
duty to perform an act in the interests o f another over one's own, since this must 
logically presuppose the actor's ability lawfully to underteike that act in the first 
place. Indeed, it is diff icul t to see why the law would ever impose a duty to 
perform an act in the interests of another when the actor had no legal right to 
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perform the act at all. The actor's ability lawfully to undertake the act is the very 
issue in question here. Section 6(1), it is recalled, provides that ' I t is unlawful for 
a public authority to act in a way which is incompatible with a Convention 
right.'^«« 
A more appropriate approach when defining a private act under s 6(5), I suggest, 
is to ask whether the victim, in Phillipson's words, has 'freely accepted' the 
behaviour complained of.'*^' Although his thesis concerns the different context of 
common law horizontal effect, the key rationale for employing 'autonomy' as a 
l imiting factor to the applicability of rights in the private sphere - that 'citizens 
ought to be free to have their rights restricted'''*" - applies equally to s 6(5). 
Three instances must be distinguished:"*'' first, the victim who has genuinely 
agreed to the behaviour complained of; second, the vict im who has merely 
formally agreed (i.e. the victim has agreed ' in the face of a monopoly or other 
kind o f power which precludes a genuine choice''**'') and, third, the victim who 
has not agreed. The first should be regarded as involving a 'private' act under s 
6(5), and the third a 'public act'. The second situation, Phillipson's views 
suggest, should also be regarded as involving a public act. First, it is arbitrary to 
deny a direct rights action by labelling the act as 'private' i f the behaviour is only 
formally agreed to. Second, an approach which concerned itself with only formal 
agreement would risk collapsing the public/private divide within s 6 HRA into a 
Emphasis added. 
G. Phillipson, 'The Human Rights Act, "Horizontal Effect" and the Common Law: a Bang or 
a Whimper?' (1999) 62 M L R 824, 846. 
Ibid. Indeed, as Hunt explains, for advocates of more 'vertical' approaches to the protection of 
fundamental rights, 'Maximisation of the private space in which individuals are firee to pursue 
their own conceptions of the good is seen as the ultimate goal of a society's legal and political 
arrangements': M. Hunt, 'The "horizontal effect" of the Human Rights Act' [1998] P L 423. 
Phillipson {ibid.) 846. 
Ibid 
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test which rendered determinative the existence o f a contract between 'public' 
body and complainant. The presence of a contract may at times evidence 
behaviour freely agreed to, since no private person can legally compel another to 
conclude a contract.''*^ But an approach which focussed on the presence of 
merely formal consensual instruments such as contract would starkly resemble 
the courts' approach to the law on amenability of bodies to judicial review''^^ 
which, it has been seen in Chapter 5, is not coterminous with the 'public 
authority' test under s 6(3)(b). 
Rights-Stripping? 
Oliver cautions against a wider reading o f s 6(3)(b) than that which includes only 
the exercise o f coercive powers because hybrid public authorities would be 
incapable o f enforcing their Convenfion rights against core public authorities 
and, consequently, this would ' rol l forward the frontiers o f the state' by 
legitimating state interference with those persons' rights.''^' The issue o f whether 
hybrid public authorities can rely on their own Convenfion rights has never been 
comprehensively judicially or academically addressed. A closer examinafion 
of the issue, I argue, reveals that hybrid public authorities should be permitted at 
all times to rely on their own Convention rights as any private persons could. 
Due to the 'v ic t im ' test under Art 34 ECHR'*^^ which Davis believes to posit a 
"^^ Felthouse v Bindley ( m i ) 11 C B N S 869. 
See R V Panel on Take-overs and Mergers, ex p Data/in Pic [1987] Q B 815, [1987] 2 W L R 
699 (CA) 847 (Lloyd LJ) . 
Oliver (fTi434)492. 
Despite Lord Nicholls's remark in Aston Cantlow (fh 431) [11] that hybrid public authorities 
could rely on their own rights 'when necessary', Baroness Hale expressly left the question 
whether Southern Cross Healthcare could have relied on Art 1 of the First Protocol when evicting 
Mrs Y L 'for another day': YL (fti 391) [74]. 
Art 34: 'The Court may receive applications from any person, non-governmental organisation 
or group of individuals claiming to be the victim of a violation...' This test is replicated by s 7(7) 
HRA. 
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binary relationship between 'state' and 'citizen', he infers that hybrid public 
authorities remain 'victims' capable in Strasbourg's eyes of asserting their own 
rights against the state.''^" From my analysis in Chapter 5 o f the Strasbourg 
jurisprudence and my response to Quane's thesis,'*^' I would agree. 
Domestically, hybrid public authorities might seek to rely on their own 
Convention rights in proceedings against core public authorities or, alternatively, 
in private proceedings to try to justify the prima facie breach of a qualified right 
under the 'rights o f others' head. Buxton LJ believed instinctively in YL that 
'when discharging its public functions... [a hybrid public authority] has no such 
rights'.""^^ But nothing in s 6(3)(b) compels that conclusion such as to displace 
the express provision through ss 7(1) and 7(7) HRA when read together that an 
institutionally private person meeting the 'v ic t im ' test under Art 34 can bring 
proceedings against a public authority or rely on their Convention right(s) in any 
legal proceedings. Even i f s 6(3)(b) did intend to qualify the victim test and 
prevent these bodies f rom relying on their own rights in legal proceedings, the 
possibility would arise o f s 6(3)(b)'s prima facie incompatibility with Art 14 
ECHR. This is because the ability o f private persons to vindicate their 
Convention rights in domestic law would depend - and somewhat arbitrarily 
since hybrid public authorities would not necessarily win against the other party 
by deploying Convention claims''^^ - upon whether or not they were classified as 
hybrid public authorities. Section 6(3)(b) would then be open to interpretation 
H. Davis, 'Public Authorities as "Victims" under the Human Rights Act' [2005] C L J 315, 
321. 
H. Quane, 'The Strasbourg jurisprudence and the meaning of a "public authority" under the 
Human Rights Act' [2006] P L 106. 
'''-Ibid. 
Douglas V Hello! (fti 413) is a perfect example of how one private party's rights can be upheld 
despite reliance by another on theirs. 
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under s 3(1) as far as possible to the Convention-friendly interpretation that it 
does not preclude hybrid public authorities relying on their own rights."^'' 
E . T H E TWO-STRAND APPROACH APPLIED 
The application o f the two-strand approach in this analysis divides into three 
parts: registered social landlords, care homes and other bodies. 
Registered Social Landlords 
Applying the two-strand approach to Donoghue,^^^ Poplar Housing would be a 
hybrid public authority. Although created by the local authority, having local 
authority members on its board and dealing exclusively wi th Tower Hamlets 
LBC's ex-public housing stock,''^^ it would not be a core public authority despite 
appearing institutionally to have as its primary purpose the service o f the public 
interest: it appears to lack specific legal authority for its day-to-day activities 
and, as such, would otherwise be subject to paralysis by Fewings.^^^ The function 
of providing accommodation was originally performed for the benefit o f 
residents by Tower Hamlets LBC and would therefore have been factually public 
in nature. Poplar Housing, performing this function on the local authority's 
behalf, therefore performs a public function under the second strand to s 6(3)(b) 
HRA. The act o f serving notice to terminate was an act which the tenant had not 
As to the scope of the 'rights of others', Strasbourg has previously held that the Convention 
qualifications are to be narrowly construed and admit of no implied qualifications: Klass v 
Germany (App no 5029/71) (1979-80) 2 E H R R 214 [42]; Colder v United Kingdom (App no 
4451/70) (1979-80) 1 E H R R 524 [44]. C f YL (fti 391) [116] (Lord Mance); Jacubowski v 
Germany {A'p'p no 15088/89) (1995) 19 E H R R 64 [25]. 
"'^ Poplar Housing and Regeneration Community Association Ltd v Donoghue [2001] E W C A 
Civ 595, [2002] Q B 48. 
Poplar Housing, 'About Us' <http://www.poplarharca.co.uk/Aboutus> accessed 6 August 
2008. 
•"^ Fewings (fn 436). See Chapter 4 on the 'paralysis' point. 
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freely accepted. Periodic tenancies of the kind in Donoghue'^^^ are 'founded on 
the continuing w i l l of both landlord and tenant that the tenancy shall persist'.''^^ 
One-sided termination therefore indicates service o f notice against the w i l l of the 
other party, rendering Poplar Housing's service a public act under s 6(5). 
The London & Quadrant Housing Trust in Weaver,^^'^ similarly, would not be a 
core public authority for the additional reason that it lacks the institutional links 
possessed by Poplar. Unlike Poplar Housing, only a fraction o f its housing stock 
is ex-public,^°' none o f its board members are local authority representatives^"^ 
and private as opposed to local authority finance is the dominant component o f 
its capital funding.^"^ The provision o f accommodation on behalf o f a local 
authority would, however, amount to a public function under strand two of s 
6(3)(b). The nature o f the act o f seeking a possessory order for rent arrears would 
depend upon whether the tenant had genuinely or meidy formally agreed to pay 
the level o f rent in question; this would in turn depend upon the presence or 
absence o f a monopoly or other power which, in Phillipson's words, 'precludes a 
genuine choice'.^°' ' Relevant factors might therefore include the extent to which 
the tenant was free to negotiate the level o f rent for the property, or the extent to 
which the tenant's circumstances left them free to target properties with that 
particular level o f rent. 
Donoghue (fh 495) 56 (Lord Woolf CJ) . 
K. Gray and S. Gray, Land Law (5* edn OUP, Oxford 2007) 177-178, citing Hammersmith 
and Fulham LBC v Monk [1992] 1 A C 478, [1990] 3 W L R 1144 ( H L ) 492 (Lord Browne-
Wilkinson). 
R (Weaver) v London & Quadrant Housing Trust [2008] E W H C 1377 (Admin). 
'"'Ibid., [21] (Richards LJ) . 
Ibid.,{n] (Richards L J ) . 
Ibid., [20] (Richards LJ) . 
Phillipson (fti481) 846. 
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Care Homes 
In Leonard Cheshire,^^^ the charity service provider was a voluntary 'public 
interest' body and not, therefore, a core public authority. Southern Cross 
Healthcare in YL,^^^ as a profit-earning company, had as its primary purpose the 
service o f its own interests and would therefore be an institutionally private 
person. Neither care home in YL and Leonard Cheshire possessed coercive 
powers, and care home providers acting in the same statutory context have 
previously been found not to be amenable to review in respect o f the provision o f 
care and accommodation.'"^ Consequently, these providers were not performing 
a public function under the first strand to s 6(3)(b). Both providers, however, 
performed the public function of providing care and accommodation on behalf o f 
the local authorities and, consequently, would perform public functions under 
strand two. As previously observed, this result is now brought about in s 145 
of the Health and Social Care Act 2008. In Leonard Cheshire, the act complained 
of was the decision to close the claimants' home ( 'Le Court') and relocate them 
into various smaller h o m e s . T h e decision was taken against earlier promises 
that the claimants could remain in Le Court for as long as they wished'"* and, 
consequently, was a public act to which the claimants had not freely agreed 
under s 6(5). In YL however, the act complained o f was the service o f notice to 
evict after alleged disruptive behaviour from the resident's family during visits. 
Leonard Cheshire (fn 403). 
rz.(fn391). 
R V Servite Houses, exp Goldsmith (2001) 33 H L R 35, (2000) 2 L G L R 997 (QB). 
It could be said against this that the providers did not perform any function on behalf of the 
local authorities at all, since the local authorities were merely discharging their statutory duties 
under s 21 N A A of arranging accommodation with those providers: YL (fn 391) [112] (Lord 
Mance) and [147] (Lord Neuberger). However, as previously mentioned (see fh 457), diverting 
the focus of the local authorities' activities onto arranging accommodation would overlook the 
NAA's real purpose and represent an artificial interpretation of what the N A A actually required. 
Leonard Cheshire (fh 403) [5]. 
J . , [6] and [23]. 
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Southern Cross was seeking to rely on its contractual right to terminate the 
agreement ' for a good reason', a clause to which Y L (acting through her 
daughter), on the face o f the judgment, appeared to have freely agreed. 
Consequently, I would argue, Lord Scott was correct to regard the 'act' in YL as 
private in nature.^" His Lordship's use o f the term 'purported reliance' by 
Southern Cross upon the contractual term,^'" it is contended, is important to keep 
in mind with s 6(5). The question o f whether consent to the act existed should not 
be equated directly with the question of whether, in contract law, the defendant 
was correctly relying on the contractual term in question. The latter would 
involve a more searching analysis o f the terms of the contract which, arguably, is 
unsuitable at the more preliminary 'public authority' stage o f inquiry. Along the 
lines o f Lord Scott's dictum, I suggest, the court should regard the act as private 
i f the defendant is seeking with a reasonable chance o f success to rely on the 
exercise o f a contractual power to which the victim has freely agreed. Whilst in 
some cases this could make it tempting for defendants to try to evade the HRA 
by loosely just ifying their acts with reference to pre-existing contractual terms, 
the reasonableness requirement would prevent this where the acts were only 
tenuously linked to the relevant contractual power. Additionally, a judicial 
finding that the act is reasonably connected to a contractual power to which the 
claimant has freely agreed - and therefore private under s 6(5) - does not 
necessarily meein that the victim lacks a remedy altogether; it merely means that 
the victim must pursue their contenfion that the defendant is acting unlawfully 
through existing private law means. It wi l l still be open for the vicdm to argue. 
511 
Ibid. 
See K £ ( f n 3 9 1 ) [ 3 4 ] . 
on a closer inspection of the contract, that the defendant lacked the contractual 
capacity to commit the act complained of 
Other Bodies 
The bodies in the decided cases, and further bodies such as the BBC are 
considered in turn. 
Decided Cases 
The private hospital in Partnerships in Care,^''' as seen above, performed a 
public function under the first strand to s 6(3)(b) when it compulsorily detained 
and treated patients.^'^ The 'act' in question (the decision to alter the focus of the 
treatment on the ward) was not one to which the patient had freely agreed and, 
consequently, was public under s 6(5). The hospital, I suggest, was rightly 
regarded by Keith J as a hybrid public authority. 
In Beer,^^^ a local authority established and ran a series of farmer's markets 
pursuant to its powers under s 33 of the Local Government and Housing Act 
1989 to take appropriate steps for promoting local economic development. The 
council then helped the stallholders to establish HFML Ltd, a private company, 
to manage the markets. HFML rejected the claimant's application to participate 
in the markets and the claimant sought judicial review, alleging inter alia a 
'^^  Part A demonstrates that contractual remedies cannot be regarded as obvious substitutes for 
human rights remedies. It is important to stress that the above point does not intend to renounce 
Part A's findings. I do not advocate replacing human rights remedies with contractual remedies; 
merely, in relatively rare borderline cases where the defendant (despite having convinced the 
court at the 'public authority' stage that it is seeking with a reasonable chance of success to rely 
on a contractual power) does upon closer inspection lack the contractual capacity to act as it has 
done, the claimant is resigned in the interests of case management to a contractual remedy. 
Partnerships in Care (fri 428). 
The hospital would also be amenable to judicial review: ibid., [26] (Keith J). 
^"^ R (Beer) v Hampshire Farmer's Markets Ltd [2003] E W C A Civ 1056, [2004] 1 W L R 233. 
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breach of Art I of the First Protocol and Art 6 ECHR.^'^ The Court of Appeal 
affirmed the decision of Field J '^^  by ruling that HFML was a hybrid public 
authority, essentially because it would be amenable to judicial review^and had 
stepped into the shoes of its local authority c r e a t o r . T h e court's apparent 
equation of the law on amenability to review with the meaning of 'functions of a 
public nature' under s 6(3)(b) was criticised in Chapter 5. Nevertheless, as seen 
in Part B, HFML's potential amenability to review could indicate its performance 
of a strand one 'public interest' function. Alternatively, the function of running 
the markets was undertaken by the council to promote local economic 
development^^' and was therefore performed by the council in the public interest 
rather than its own. Consequently, it was factually public in nature. HFML Ltd, 
performing that function on the council's behalf,^ ^^ was thus performing a public 
function under strand two of s 6(3)(b). The 'act' in question (the decision to 
reject the claimant's application) was not an act to which the claimant had freely 
agreed and, consequently, was public under s 6(5). Therefore, HFML would be a 
hybrid public authority under the two-strand approach. The Court of Appeal was 
right, I suggest, so to regard HFML. 
The Parochial Church Council (PCC) in Aston Cantlow,^^^ as seen in Chapter 4, 
was not a core public authority. Nor did it exercise coercive powers'^'' or, it 
^" The particular Convention breaches alleged are only evident from the face of the first instance 
ruling, however: [2002] E W H C 2559 (Admin). 
Ibid. 
Beer (fh 516) [31] (Dyson L J , with whom Longmore LJ and Sir Martin Nourse agreed). 
Ibid., [37]-[40] (Dyson LJ) . 
Ibid., [2] (Dyson LJ) . 
The institutional links between council and H F M L emphasise that H F M L performed the 
function on the council's behalf: H F M L ' s registered offices were at the council's offices and 
H F M L ' s company secretary was a council employee and director of H F M L : ibid., [5] (Dyson 
LJ) . 
Aston Cantlow ( f n 431). 
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seems, any functions on behalf of a core public au thor i ty .Even i f it did 
exercise any public functions under s 6(3)(b), the act of enforcing chancel repair 
liability would be private under s 6(5) as an act to which the landowners had 
freely agreed by acquiring their property subject to the obligation to undertake 
chancel repair. The PCC, therefore, would not be a hybrid public authority. Lord 
Scott, differing from the rest of the House on the hybrid public authority point, 
believed the enforcement of chancel repair liability to be public in nature, 
essentially due to the general public interest in the PCC's activities."^ Two 
points can be made in response. First, his Lordship presumptively took the 
enforcement of repair liability as the function in question when, alternatively,"' 
it would seem more appropriate to describe it as the act giving rise to the dispute. 
Second, general public interest is not the touchstone under either strand to s 
6(3)(b) under the two-strand approach. Consequently, I suggest, the majority of 
the House of Lords were correct not to regard the PCC as a hybrid public 
authority. 
Lloyd's of London, run as a commercial business, is a private person rather than 
a core public authority. The presence of the Financial Services Authority as 
Chapter 4. Sir Andrew Morritt V - C tentatively suggested in the Court of Appeal that the PCC 
might be amenable to review (presumably, at least, in respect of the protection of its property): 
[2001] E W C A Civ 713, [2002] Ch 51 [34], a conclusion with which Lord Scott (fn 431), 
dissenting on the hybrid public authority point, seemed without analysis to agree: [130]. It is not 
clear that this would be the case, since the function and context of protecting property, for the 
purposes of judicial review at least, could be regarded like employment as a typically 'private' 
matter: see e.g. R v BBC, exp Laveile [m3] 1 W L R 2 3 , [ 1 9 8 3 ] I C R 99 (QB). 
The Church of England, as their Lordships observed, was a religious rather than governmental 
organisation: Aslon Canllow (fri 431) [13] (Lord Nicholls) and [156] (Lord Rodger). 
Aston Cantlow (ibid.) [130]. 
'''/bid. 
R (West) V Lloyd's of London [2004] E W C A Civ 506, [2004] H R L R 27 [5] (Brooke LJ); 
Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines v Turkey (App no 40998/98) (2008) 47 E H R R 24 [81]. 
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the 'regulatory authority... in the area of Lloyd's business'^ "^ indicates, I 
suggest, that the state has made no attempt to adopt Lloyd's as one of the family. 
Lloyd's did not appear to perform any functions on behalf of a core public 
authority. Additionally, any coercion which it may have exercised against the 
claimant originated not from statute or common law but from contract."*^ Lloyd's 
did not therefore perform 'public interest' functions under s 6(3)(b) and would 
not be a hybrid public authority under the two-strand approach. I would therefore 
agree with the Court of Appeal's conclusion in West that Lloyd's did not fall 
within s 6(3)(b). 
The Jockey Club voluntarily assumed its public interest motives and is therefore 
a private person rather than a core public authority.^^' It is not thought that the 
Club has been adopted by the state: as mentioned in Chapter 4, the grant of a 
Royal Charter two hundred years after the Club's inception was merely a 'mark 
of royal favour to r a c i n g ' . T h e Club did not appear to perform any functions 
on behalf of a core public authority and its coercive ability, like that of Lloyd's 
of London, originated from contract rather than statute or common law."^ The 
Jockey Club is not amenable to judicial review in respect of its regulatory 
functions.^"''* Stanley Bumton J, I suggest, was right in Mullins not to regard the 
Club as a hybrid public authority under s 6(3)(b). 
West {ibid) [26] (Brooke LJ) . 
Ibid., [8]. Relevant to strand one under s 6(3)(b), Lloyd's was also held not to be amenable to 
judicial review: [40] (Brooke LJ) . 
See Chapter 4. 
R V Disciplinary Committee of the Jockey Club, ex p Aga Khan [1993] 1 W L R 909 (CA) 932 
(Hoffmann L J ) . 
Mullins V The Appeal Board of The Jockey Club [2005] E W H C 2917 (Admin) [28]. 
Aga Khan (fii 532), applied by Stanley Bumton J in Mullins {ibid.) [45]-[46]. 
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Network Rail Infrastructure Ltd is not a core public authority.Additionally, as 
demonstrated by Cameron, it had been stripped of its regulatory coercive powers 
by the time of the act complained of."^ As seen in Part B of this chapter, the 
performance of privatised services per se should not be regarded as amounting to 
the exercise of a public function under the 'inherited function' strand to s 6(3)(b). 
Consequently, I suggest, Sir Michael Turner was correct not to regard Network 
Rail as a hybrid public authority. 
Further Bodies 
The National Greyhound Racing Club, for the same reasons as the Jockey Club, 
would not be a hybrid public authority under the two-strand approach to s 
6(3)(b).=^^ The Panel of Take -overs and Mergers (PTM), I argued in Chapter 4, 
could be regarded as a core public authority due to its possible consensual 
adoption by the state. Were it not to have been adopted, it would be a hybrid 
public authority when performing the legally coercive function of regulation"^ to 
the extent that it performs public acts such as making directions of restraint"^ or 
See the discussion in Chapter 4. 
Cameron (fh 426) [35]. Lacking a regulatory role, Network Rail could hardly be regarded as 
amenable to judicial review along Datafm lines as a de facto public body. 
The N G R C ' s core public authority status, it is recalled, was discussed and discounted in 
Chapter 4. Additionally, as relevant to strand one of s 6(3)(b), the Court of Appeal has previously 
held that the Club is not amenable to judicial review when regulating greyhound racing: Law v 
National Greyhound Racing Club [1983] 1 W L R 1302 (CA) . 
Section 943(2) of the Companies Act 2006 allows the P T M to make rules '(a) for or in 
connection with the regulation of- (i) takeover bids, (ii) merger transactions, and (iii) 
transactions... that have or may have... an effect on the ownership or control of companies'. 
Hence, the function of regulation is coercive - like compulsory psychiatric treatment in 
Partnerships in Care - in the sense that it occurs under Parliamentary warrant and not necessarily 
with the consent of the subject. The conclusion that the function of regulation was public under s 
6(3)(b) could also follow, as seen in Part B, from the PTM's amenability to review in respect of 
that function: see Datafm (fh 486). 
™ Ibid., s 946: 'Rules [made by the Panel: s 943(2)] may contain provisions conferring power on 
the Panel to give any direction that appears to the Pane! to be necessary in order... (a) to restrain 
a person from acting... in breach of the rules.' 
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orders of disclosure,^'"' imposing sanctions^'" or ordering the payment of 
compensation for a breach of its rules.^ "^ ^ 
The HRA status of the BBC, whilst never having fallen for judicial 
consideration, is an 'interesting question'.'''^ Fenwick and Phillipson discount the 
possibility of the BBC's status as a core public authority since core public 
authorities lack the ability to enforce their own Convention rights and ' i t would 
seem absurd to disallow it from claiming that its freedom of expression had been 
interfered with.'^'*'' The authors then deduce from ProLife,^^^ which concerned an 
application for judicial review of the BBC's decision to refuse to screen an 
election broadcast showing aborted foetuses, that the BBC 'is acting as a public 
authority when it acts, effectively, as a regulator.'^''^ Since a decision to 
broadcast precedes any broadcast, they then reason that the BBC could be seen as 
performing a public function under s 6(3)(b) when broadcasting generally,^''^ but 
observe in particular against this that the BBC could not assert its rights against 
the government when performing this public function.'''^ The authors thus 
conclude that 'no satisfactory answer [exists] to this conundrum'. 549 
Ibid., s 947(1): 'The Panel may by notice in writing require a person... (a) to produce any 
documents...' 
Ibid., s 952(1): 'Rules [made by the Panel: s 943(2)] may contain provision conferring power 
on the Panel to impose sanctions on a person who has... (a) acted in breach of the rules...' 
''l Ibid., s 954. 
H. Fenwick and G. Philiipson, Media Freedom under the Human Rights Act (OUP, Oxford 
2006) 114. As the authors note (115), the Commission has previously left open the Art 34 status 
of the B B C when filing claims in Strasbourg: BBC Scotland, McDonald, Rodgers and Donald v 
United Kingdom (App no 34324/96) (1998) 25 E H R R C D 179; BBC v United Kingdom (App no 
25798/94) (1996) 21 E H R R C D 9 3 . 
Ibid.,\]5. 
R (ProLife Alliance) v BBC [2004] 1 A C 185, [2003] 2 W L R 1403 (HL) . 
Fenwick and Phillipson (fii 543) 120 (emphasis original). 
Ibid., 121. 
Ibid., 122. 
Ibid, (emphasis original). 
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Applying the preceding chapters' analysis, the BBC (and possibly Charmel 4 
given its institutional 'public interest' characteristics),"^ I would argue, is a core 
public authority. The public policy exception in Radio France,seen in Chapter 
4, would allow the BBC to rely on its right to free expression by classification as 
a 'non-governmental' organisation in Strasbourg anyway, thus alleviating the 
authors' key concern of the effect on the BBC's media freedom. Despite coming 
into being as a company named the British Broadcasting Company in 1922, the 
BBC was incorporated by Royal Charter shortly thereafter (in 1927)."^ The grant 
of this Charter - which seeks extensively to prescribe the BBC's rights and 
obligations - is more, to quote Hoffmann LJ in Aga Khan, than a 'mark of royal 
favour' to the BBC's activities.^" The Charter, which is renewed every ten years 
and by its own admission provides the 'suitable legal framework' for the BBC's 
operations,"" furnishes the BBC with the 'capacity of a natural person'^" and 
imbues it with the specific legal power (relevant to the Fewings 'paralysis' point 
above) to undertake general functions 'which directly or indirectly promote the 
Public Purposes'."^ Although historical evidence exists to suggest that the 
executive of 1926 had previously sought to promote the public interest and 
"° The Channel Four Corporation was created by the Broadcasting Act 1990, s 23. It consists of 
members the majority of whom are chosen with the Secretary of State's approval by the 
communications regulator, O F C O M : ss 23(3)-(4). O F C O M also determines their remuneration: 
Sch 3, para 4(1). The Corporation is imbued with the specific legal authority to undertake its day-
to-day activities (Sch 3, para 1(3)). Moreover, Channel 4 (unlike Channels 3 and 5) is subject to 
particular public interest obligations regarding its broadcasting, such as ensuring a 'significant 
contribution' to 'programmes of educative value': Communications Act 2003, s 265(3). 
Radio France v France (App no 53984/00) (2005) 40 E H R J l 29. The relevant decision is the 
admissibility decision of 23 September 2003. 
The B B C , 'A Brief History Of The B B C <http://www.bbc.co.uk/dna/h2g2/A30044459> 
accessed 7 August 2008. 
Aga Khan (fii 546) 932. 
This is stated in the current Charter's preamble: HM Privy Council, 'Charter of Incorporation 
of the British Broadcasting Corporation 2006'. The Charter is available online at 
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/bbctrust/assets/files/pdf/regulatorv_framework/charter agreement/rovalc 
hartersealed sept06.pdfi> accessed 7 August 2008. 
Art 47(3). 
Ibid., Art 5(2). The 'public purposes' include 'sustaining citizenship and civil society' and 
'promoting education and learning': Art 4. 
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preserve the BBC's independence by declining Winston Churchill's suggestion 
of expropriating the BBC so as to control its output,'" there is still scope, 1 
would suggest, to argue that the BBC had been adopted by the state. A body's 
independence, it is recalled, does not necessarily preclude that body's status as a 
ceo 
core state body. The executive, it would seem, had regarded the BBC as 'one 
of the family' from its inception, when it was bom out of a radio broadcasting 
pilot by the Post Office 'at the Government's behest'.''^ As for assent to the 
executive's view, the BBC responded flirtatiously to the grant of the Charter by 
changing its name to the British Broadcasting Corporation'^" and willingly 
subjecting itself to the extensive and onerous public interest obligations 
contained therein.'^' 
For the sake of completeness, the BBC is undoubtedly a body whose primary 
purpose is to serve the public interest rather than its own. Aside from receiving 
funding from licence money,'^^ 'The BBC exists to serve the public interest'.'^^ 
The BBC is driven by the 'sovereign' BBC Trust,'^" which sets 'the overall 
strategic direction of the BBC and 'wil l perform these roles in the public 
interest'.'^' The Secretary of State determines the level of remuneration which 
The B B C ( f t i 552). 
" 'See Chapter 4. 
The B B C (fti 552). 
Ibid. 
These include acting in the public interest 'in all its functions': Royal Charter (fh 554) Art 23. 
^" Department for Culture, Media and Sport, 'An Agreement Between Her Majesty's Secretary 
of State for Culture, Media and Sport and the British Broadcasting Corporation' (Cm 6872, 2006) 
Part 75(1). 
Royal Charter (fn 554) Art 3(1) (emphasis added). 
Ibid., Art 9(2). 
'"•^ Ibid., Art 7(1). 
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the BBC is to grant the Trust,'^^ and can even influence how the BBC is wound 
up and its assets dissolved.'^' 
Should the above analysis be incorrect and the BBC better regarded as an 
institutionally private person, its amenability to judicial review under ProLife, as 
seen from Part B, could indicate its performance of a 'public interest' function 
under strand one of s 6(3)(b) 'when it acts, effectively as a regulator.''^^ Part D 
of this chapter has sought to explain why classifying the BBC as a hybrid public 
authority would not prevent it from relying on its own right to freedom of 
expression against other core public authorities as any other private person could, 
thus alleviating Fenwick and Phillipson's concerns. 
F. CONCLUSIONS 
There are two distinct strands of public function under s 6(3)(b): 'public interest' 
functions which connote a duty to perform a function in the interests of another 
over one's own, and 'inherited' factually public functions performed on behalf of 
core public authorities. The lack of a unified conceptual basis to these strands is 
not fatal to the credibility of the approach. Additionally, the two-strand approach 
supports Craig's recent observation that the public function issue arises in two 
different contexts: 
'[I]t is important at the outset to remember that s.6(3)(b) may be applicable either in 
cases where there is no contracting out... or in cases where this does feature on the facts 
Ibid., An 17. 
Ibid., Art 53. 
Fenwick and Phillipson (fn 543) 120. 
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of the case, such as YL. This has implications for the test to determine "'public function" 
[sic] for the purposes of s.6(3)(b).'''' 
Strand two has been consistently denied by the courts. Weighty evidence exists, 
however, to imply at the very least that Parliament could have intended to 
include the second strand. This observation is bolstered by the weaknesses which 
I have sought to expose in the 'rights stripping' and 'endlessness' arguments 
deployed against extending the current judicial interpretation of s 6(3)(b) so as to 
include strand two. Moreover, the potential for s 6(5) to reduce the scope of s 
6(3)(b) where necessary - in relation to a particular act to which the victim has 
freely agreed - represents a more nuanced, context-specific and altogether 
sophisticated outer boundary to the hybrid public authority concept than the 
outright denial of the existence of a second strand to 'functions of a public 
nature'. 
' Craig (fri 416) 577. See ftirther YL (fii 449) [40] (Buxton LJ) . 
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7. 
The Meaning of 'Public Authority'; 
Conclusions 
The meaning of 'public authority' can now be concluded by reference to the 
three species contained within s 6. 1 shall offer a summary of the previous 
chapters' findings before assessing their implications. 
As seen from Chapter 4, a core public authority is a body whose primary purpose 
is to serve the public interest over its own. In the event of conflict between its 
interests and those of the public, i.e. the person or persons for whom the 
authority is responsible, the public interest must prevail. A core public authority, 
to borrow the language of Laws J, has 'no axe to grind beyond its public 
responsibility'."" Core public authorities contrast institutionally with private 
persons, whose primary purposes will usually be to further their own interests. 
Private persons or bodies such as charities may voluntarily further the public 
interest, but will not become core public authorities when doing so unless 
consensually adopted by the state as 'one of the family'. Whilst consensual 
adoption may take many forms, it is difficult to see how a private person could 
properly be regarded as a core public authority unless imbued with specific legal 
R V Somerset County Council, exp Fewings [ 1995] 1 Ail E R 513 (QB) 524. 
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authority for its day-to-day activities. This results from the Fewings principle in 
administrative law that public bodies must demonstrate specific legal authority 
for their actions. Since it is unlikely that a core public authority would be 
regarded as a person not amenable to judicial review, one would expect core 
public authorities to be subject to Fewings in administrative law and, in turn, 
core public authorities without specific legal authority for their day-to-day 
activities would be paralysed by the Fewings principle. 
Private persons or bodies can become hybrid public authorities in a given 
situation by performing a 'ftanction of a public nature' unless performing a 
particular, private, act."' A private act is one to which the victim of the rights 
infringement has freely agreed. 'Agreement' should be regarded as agreement in 
substance, rather than simply in form. 
Under the 'two-strand' approach expoimded in Chapter 6, a private person will 
perform a 'function of a public nature' in two circumstances. First, a function 
will be public i f common law or statute requires its performance in the interests 
of a person other than the performer, although the performer need not be under a 
duty to perform the function at all. This is the 'public interest functions' strand. 
Second, a function will be public i f performed on behalf of a core public 
authority and i f that function would be of a factually public nature when 
performed by that core public authority. In the care home context, consonantly 
with s 145 of the Health and Social Care Act 2008 (HSCA), this would include 
the provision of care and accommodation pursuant to arrangements made 
HRA, ss 6(3)(b) and 6(5). 
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between a private provider and local authority under ss 21 and 26 of the National 
Assistance Act 1948. This second strand is the 'inherited functions' strand. Since 
both strands look to the nature and fiinctions of core public authorities as 
indicators of true public activity, a proper appreciation of the core public 
authority concept is crucial to a proper understanding of s 6(3)(b) HRA. The two-
strand approach, by designating functions as strand one 'public interest' 
functions i f the performer is amenable to review in respect of them, may go some 
way to identifying the correct relationship between s 6(3 )(b) HRA and the law on 
amenability to judicial review. 
A potentially controversial aspect of the two-strand approach is that strand one 
appears to include the functions of fiduciaries such as trustees, solicitors and 
agents. 'Put crudely, the central idea [of fiduciary duties] is service of another's 
interests.'"^ The fiduciary 'wi l l not be allowed to say that he has preferred his 
own interest to that of his principal.'"'' Two points can be made. First, it is 
unclear to what extent it is unacceptable for fiduciary functions to fall within s 
6(3)(b) HRA."' ' The ambit and rationale of the fiduciary principle remain 
uncertain,"^ with one commentator stating that it 'is informed in some measure 
by considerations of public policy aimed at preserving the integrity and utility of 
P. Finn, 'Fiduciary Law and the Modem Commercial World', in E . McK.endrick (ed). 
Commercial Aspects of Trusts and Fiduciary Obligations (OUP, Oxford 1992) 7, 9. 
P. Millett, 'Bribes and Secret Commissions' [1993] R L R 7, 20, cited with approval in 
Attorney-General for Hong Kong v Reid [1994] 1 A C 324, [1993] 3 W L R 1143 (PC) 337 (Lord 
Templeman). 
This is especially pertinent following Conaglen's recent analysis of the similarities between 
fiduciary duties and the public law principle of bias: M. Conaglen, 'Public-private intersection: 
comparing fiduciary conflict doctrine and bias' [2008] PL 58. As seen in Chapter 6, Fewings 
links public law principles with a duty to act in the public interest and therefore to strand one. For 
a more general exposition of the similarities between public and private law, see D. Oliver, 
Common Values and the Public-Private Divide (Butterworths, London 1999). 
E . Bum and G . Virgo, Maudsley & Burn's Trusts & Trustees Cases & Materials (7"" edn 
OUP, Oxford 2008) 781-785. 
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these relationships... given the purposes they serve in society'."^ Hence, it is not 
self-evidently improper to impose upon fiduciaries an additional obligation to act 
compatibly with the Convention. Second, i f it is, whilst strand one appears to 
include fiduciaries' functions, the logic of strand two specifically excludes them. 
When a fiduciary such as an express trustee manages property, he does so to 
promote the objectives (i.e. on behalf) of a private person (the settlor)."' The 
same function of managing property, when performed by the setflor, would be 
private in nature. In this sense, the fiduciary has inherited only a private 
function from the settlor. As seen in Chapter 5, there is logical force in the 
argument that inherited functions should remain the same in nature regardless of 
who performs them. Whilst this logic has hitherto been deployed to advocate 
expanding s 6(3)(b) so as to include contracted out service providers performing 
public functions on behalf of core public authorities, it would seem equally 
capable of explaining why fiduciaries' functions might be better regarded as 
private in nature. 
Section 6(3)(b) aside, domestic redress may also be had against private rights 
violators through the 'horizontal effect' of the Convention. This may take place 
through the courts' duties under ss 6(1) and 6(3)(a) as public authorities to act 
compatibly with the Convention when developing the common law, or through 
the interpretative obligation under s 3(1) HRA, which requires statutes to be read 
Convention-compatibly regardless of whether the dispute involves only private 
" ' F i n n (fii 572) 10. 
In an agency context, for example, the person on whose behalf the fiduciary acts would also 
be the principal to whom the fiduciary obligations are owed. 
This does not apply to trusts imposed by law, which lack a settlor. However, 'there is a great 
deal of uncertainty whether resulting and constructive trustees' are fiduciaries anyway, because 
the trustee 'has not knowingly subjected him or herself to fiduciary obligations': Bum and Virgo 
(fit 575) 779. 
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individuals. The true extent of common law horizontal effect, as Chapter 3 
argued, requires courts not to apply Convention rights, but to develop the 
common law consonantly with the values underlying them. This 'weak' form of 
indirect horizontal effect generates a balancing exercise between Convention 
values and non-Convention factors and allows the courts to decline to engage in 
judicial 'legislation' by effecting comprehensive reform of the common law, 
even i f the consequence is a failure by the state to fulf i l its positive obligations 
towards the victim. Weak indirect horizontal effect therefore seeks to preserve 
the boundaries between judicial and Parliamentary legislation, as well as 
avoiding the somewhat drastic potential consequence - of applying a Convention 
right to the extent contended for by a claimant in all novel factual disputes -
which could follow under stronger approaches from the uncertainty surrounding 
the Strasbourg jurisprudence on positive obligations. 
Returning to the issue of hybrid public authorities. Chapter 5 sought to show that 
Strasbourg evinces no doctrine of hybridity in its jurisprudence on which bodies 
constitute core state bodies under the active liability principle, or on which 
bodies constitute 'governmental' organisations incapable of vindicating their 
own rights under Art 34 ECHR. Contrary to previous academic and judicial 
commentary, in no decided cases has Strasbourg made it clear that an 
institutionally private person will become a 'state' body or governmental 
organisation when it performs 'state' functions. Hence, two concepts do not 
directly affect the width of s 6(3)(b). The first, given the irrelevancy of 
Strasbourg jurisprudence to the hybrid public authority concept, is the apparent 
lack of a general warrant under s 2 HRA to expand on the level of rights 
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protection which Strasbourg would provide. Strasbourg jurisprudence is, 
however, relevant to the core public authority concept due to the common basic 
'public interest' theme to the core of the state in domestic law and under the 
Convention. The courts' current approach to s 2 - by which they follow 
Strasbourg jurisprudence save for good reason - will , however, influence to 
some extent their interpretation of the core public authority category. 
The second concept which does not directly affect the width of s 6(3)(b) is the 
interpretative obligation under s 3, which instructs courts to interpret prima facie 
Convention-incompatible legislation in a Convention-friendly fashion. The 
purpose of ss 6(3)(b) and 6(5), by subjecting institutionally private persons to the 
Convention when performing public acts pursuant to public functions, would 
seem to be to expand on rights protection by widening that category of bodies 
regarded as capable themselves of infringing a victim's rights. However, as 
Chapter 6 observed, s 3 could apply to s 6(3)(b) so as to meet contentions that the 
hybrid public authority provisions strip hybrid public authorities - institutionally 
private 'victims' in Strasbourg's eyes - of the ability to assert their Convention 
rights either directly against public authorities or against private persons via the 
court. In this sense, s 3 would lend indirect support to the widening of 'functions 
of a public nature' by weakening the arguments in favour of interpreting the term 
narrowly. 
So, what is the significance of these findings? When viewed against the backdrop 
of Strasbourg jurisprudence, hybrid public authorities remain institutionally 
private victims who are equally as capable as any other private persons in 
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Strasbourg's eyes of asserting their own Convention rights. Nothing in the text of 
the hybrid pubhc authority provisions seems to compel the alternative 
conclusion, countenancing what Morgan would regard as the 'deliciously ironical 
prospect' of Convention-incompatibility within the HRA itself,^^^ that hybrid 
public authorities are somehow stripped of the Convention rights which as 
private persons they would otherwise enjoy. 
Thus, when taken with Strasbourg's binary perception of the division between 
'citizen' and 'state', all ss 6(3)(b) and (5) appear to do is to confer upon a 
claimant a statutory cause of action allowing him to initiate a complaint against a 
private defendant who exercises 'functions of a public nature' and performs a 
particular public act. When in court however, the claim no longer involves a 
direct allegation by the claimant that the defendant has interfered with his rights. 
Instead, the claimant and defendant, as private persons, make any rights claims 
against each other indirectly via the court as a public authority. This switch is 
necessary in order to preserve the hybrid public authority's ability, as an 
institutionally private person satisfying the 'victim' test,^^° indirectly to avail 
itself against the court both of the qualifications contained in the qualified rights, 
and of its own Convention rights. An apt name for this would be 'chameleonic' 
horizontal effect, due to the changing nature of the allegation made by the 
claimant: he alleges directly through s 6(3)(b) that a defendant hybrid public 
authority has interfered with his rights in order to bring that defendant to court, 
but indirectly when in court that the court would fail in its duty as a public 
' J. Morgan, 'Questioning the "true effect" of tiie Human Rights Act' (2002) 22 L S 259, 273. 
See Art 34 E C H R and s 7 HRA. 
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authority to protect the claimant's rights by giving judgment in the defendant's 
favour. 
For two reasons, the chameleonic model would differ from the 'weak' indirect 
horizontal effect model which Chapter 3 argued befits the common law. First, 
since passive liability (i.e. the law on positive obligations) does not apply to the 
hybrid public authority concept, the claimant would not be required to show 
when mounting a s 6(3)(b) action - unlike in a case of common law horizontal 
effect - that a positive obligation existed upon the state to regulate the private 
581 
activity complained of. The second difference is that whilst under the weak 
indirect approach the court would only be required to weigh the values 
underlying the Convention rights against non-Convention factors, s 6(3)(b) 
would require the application of the rights themselves, because a court allowing 
any non-Convention factors to trump the right would have allowed the hybrid 
public authority, against the text of s 6(3)(b), to act incompatibly with the 
Convention. 
The hybrid public authority concept, upon closer inspection, is somewhat of a 
sheep in wol fs clothing. Against the backdrop of the Strasbourg scheme, it must 
continue to treat hybrid public authorities as the institutionally private 'victims' 
which Strasbourg and s 7 HRA would regard them as. It cannot, without 
generating the UK's liability under the ECHR, deny those hybrid public 
As Chapter 3 sought to argue however, such a task would not be difficult in most areas of 
passive liability due to the uncertainty surrounding the Strasbourg jurisprudence and the 
concomitant need in domestic disputes with novel facts for domestic courts to presume the state 
to be internationally responsible. 
See G. Phillipson, 'Clarity postponed: horizontal effect after Campbell' in H. Fenwick, G . 
Phillipson and R. Masterman (eds), Judicial Reasoning under the UK Human Rights Act (CUP, 
Cambridge 2007) 143, 153. 
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authorities the rights protection which Strasbourg would afford them. With this 
in mind, it is practically impossible to see why the judiciary should be so 
unwilling to embrace the hybrid public authority concept more fully in future. 
Especially given the recent enactment of s 145 of the Health and Social Care Act 
2008, it is crucial to understand in-depth the true effect of the concept. The 
public authority status of private care home providers will no doubt arise again 
for judicial consideration shortly after s 145 does enter into force. It would be 
disappointing - despite Parliament's best and obvious efforts to extend the rights 
protection of the elderly and vulnerable - i f judges afraid of the wolf and 
oblivious to the sheep were to seize on the HSCA's omission to mention s 6(5) 
HRA in order to continue their seemingly determined trend of excluding private 
providers from the Convention's domestic reach. 
This thesis' findings on the limits to the public authority provisions do expose 
the clumsiness of Strasbourg jurisprudence and its inability to respond flexibly to 
the modem political climate, which surrounded the HRA's enactment, of 'a 
shrinking public sector and an increase in the role of the private, voluntary and 
charitable sectors in the provision of public services.' Whilst the designation 
of private persons as public authorities required to act compatibly with the 
Convention may generate the instinctive impression that such public authorities 
are subject to the same conditions of rights-restriction as core public authorities, 
Strasbourg's crude institutional distinction between 'state' and 'citizen' hinders 
the domestic implementation of such a principle in the absence of clear 
Parliamentary language seeking to prescribe it. 
S. Palmer, 'Public, private and the Human Rights Act 1998: an ideological divide' [2007] C L J 
559, 561. 
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Strasbourg should recognise a doctrine of hybridity. Strasbourg's recognition of 
such a principle could prove a useful interpretative guide to s 6(3)(b). Since both 
strands to the term 'functions of a public nature' are informed by a proper 
appreciation of the nature and functions of core public authorities, whose 
characteristics closely resemble those of core state bodies and governmental 
organisations in Strasbourg, there seems little reason why Strasbourg could not 
also reason from the inside out to develop a similar doctrine. After all, 
Strasbourg has previously declared that the 'Convention must be interpreted in 
the light of present-day conditions'^^'' and, as Chapter 5 observed, Sychev v 
Ukraine'^' may represent an early indication that Strasbourg will be prepared to 
take the bait. In Sychev, the European Court of Human Rights distinguished 
between 'state authority' under Art 34 and bodies exercising 'certain state 
powers' when ruling that a judgment-executing Liquidation Commission could 
engage the state's responsibility under the active liability principle.However, 
as Chapter 5 argued, Sychev does not on its own clearly reveal a doctrine of 
hybridity due to the court's questionable reliance upon earlier authority as 
purported evidence of the existence of that doctrine, and to the difficulty of 
inferring from the facts of the judgment whether or not the Liquidation 
Commission was a self-serving institutionally private person at all. 
Should Strasbourg attempt to develop a hybridity doctrine in future however, it 
will encounter the obvious obstacle of the difficulty of identifying a theoretical 
foundation for the applicability of rights in the private sphere. This, as Chapter 6 
Tyrer v United Kingdom (App no 5856/72) (1978) 2 E H R R 1 [31], cited with approval in 
Marckx v Belgium (App no 6873/74) (1979-80) 2 E H R R 330 [41]. 
(App no 4773/02) (unreported). 
Ibid., [54]. 
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observed, is an inherently political and philosophical issue. Given Strasbourg's 
express refusal to develop a general theory of the applicability of rights to private 
activity in the field of positive obligations and passive liability, there seems 
little reason at present to presume that Strasbourg would be any more willing to 
do so for hybridity. 
Therefore, should Parliament have intended the hybrid public authority concept 
to eschew Strasbourg's binary distinction between 'state' and 'citizen' and strip 
hybrid public authorities of their Convention rights, it would seem more sensible 
for Parliament to make this clear by expressly providing for 'rights-stripping' in 
an amending statute rather than waiting for Strasbourg to develop a doctrine of 
hybridity which did so itself Given the failure of the current Human Rights Act 
1998 (Meaning of Public Function) BilP^* even to reveal a coherent theme to the 
term 'ftinctions of a public nature' however, this development would seem 
unlikely to occur for some time. Even i f Parliament did wish to take this step, it 
could involve the startling prospect of the UK attracting international liability for 
removing the rights of hybrid public authorities in an effort to adopt a more 
contemporary view of the state than Strasbourg. Whilst the meaning of 'public 
authority' as currently enacted may be capable of reasonably precise definition 
therefore, the background presence of a relatively rudimentary Strasbourg 
scheme could prove prohibitively problematic for successor Parliaments 
attempting to devise a more sophisticated formulation in future. 
VgT Verein gegen Tierfabriken v Switzerland (App no 24699/94) (2002) 34 E H R R 4 [46]. See 
also Chapter 3. 
Human Rights Act 1998 (Meaning of Public Function) H C Bill (2007-2008) [45]. 
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